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THE GREEK DILEMMA

THE GREEK
DILEMMA

. — .

War and
Aftermath

William Hardy McNeill



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FIRST EDITION

To my wife, Elizabeth

Preface

THE history of Greece during the past six years reveals a bitter struggle for power between a Left, dominated and led by the Communist Party, and a Right, which has rallied around the figure of King George II. The struggle between these two extremes has been powerfully and decisively influenced by foreign intervention. The Russians have supported the Left morally; the British have supported the Right by arms, and, in conjunction with the United States, economically as well.

The story, I believe, is interesting in itself. It takes a larger interest from the light which events in Greece can throw on the pattern of world politics which seems so rapidly to be dividing all the nations of the world into two great rival camps. Greece has become a bone of contention between Russia and Great Britain. The struggle between Left and Right which is now going on within the country reflects, and adds its part to, the forces which divide Russia from the West. Consequently, the fate of Greece is inextricably tangled with world politics. It is even possible that the fate of the world may take a decisive turn from future events in Greece, for the conflict is more naked and direct there than in almost any other country.

This book arises from twenty months' residence in Greece, between November 1944 and June 1946. During that time I was able to travel through all parts of the country, and was witness to many of the scenes here described. The project of writing this book formed itself in my mind while I was still in

Greece, and I was able to interview most of the men who have played a leading part in the recent shaping of the country's history.

All opinions and judgments expressed in the book are, of course, my own.

W. H. M.

15 October 1946

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THE GREEK DILEMMA

Glossary

EAM	<i>Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon</i> —National Liberation Front. Leftist political resistance organization.
EDES	<i>Ellinikos Dimikratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos</i> —Greek Democratic National League. Conservative guerilla army in western Greece.
Athens EDES	Conservative political resistance organization in Athens; started EDES guerillas, but later broke with them.
EKKA	<i>Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis</i> —National and Social Liberation. Socialist resistance group to which a small guerilla band attached itself.
ELAS	<i>Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos</i> .—National People's Liberation Army. By far the largest guerilla force in Greece, organized by EAM.
<i>Ipefthinos</i>	The Responsible. Chief EAM local official.
<i>Kapetanios</i>	Political commissar with ELAS.
KKE	<i>Kommunistikon Komma Ellados</i> —Communist Party of Greece. The most influential component of EAM.
Liberal Party	<i>Phileleftheron Komma</i> . The party of Venizelos. Conservative republican.
PAO	<i>Panellinios Apeleftherotiki Organosis</i> —Panhellenic Liberating Organization. Conservative guerilla organization in Salonika area.
PEEA	<i>Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis</i> —Political Committee of National Liberation. The Provisional Government of the Mountains set up by EAM in 1944.
Popular Party	<i>Laikon Komma</i> . Principal royalist party.
RAN	Rumeli-Avalona-Nisi, that is, a province of southern Bulgaria, Valona and Nish. A conservative irridentist organization.
X	<i>Chi</i> , a letter of the Greek alphabet. Anti-Communist secret society; with an affiliated political party of the same name.

I

Greek Society and Politics

GREECE is today a small country, an unwilling pawn of Great Power politics, distressed by poverty and distracted by internal strife that verges on chronic civil war. As all Greeks are vividly aware, their nation occupied no such subordinate position in times past. The ancient Greeks put a stamp on Western civilization that has never been erased, and for centuries after the fall of Rome, the Greek Empire of Byzantium was perhaps the most powerful, and certainly the most civilized, state of Europe. The fact that their place in the contemporary world cannot compare with past greatness weighs constantly upon the national pride of the Greeks. They like to dream of rising again to a leading place in the world, and for long hoped to rebuild the vanished Empire of Byzantium and make the Imperial City of Constantinople once more the capital of the Greek state.

Ever since Greece became independent of the Turks (1830), this hope has run through Greek political life like a will-o'-the-wisp. But the little kingdom of Greece was weak by itself, and speedily fell into bitter quarrels with neighboring Christian peoples of the Balkans, so that the coveted capital and the hope of territorial expansion at the expense of the Turks both remained unattainable. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, events of the Balkan Wars and of World War I, coupled with the appearance of a catalytic new political personality—Eleftherios Venizelos—

breathed new life into the old ambition and brought about an entirely new political balance inside Greece itself.

Venizelos first distinguished himself in 1908 as a leader of a revolt against the Turkish rulers of his native island, Crete. His fiery eloquence, ardent nationalism, and extraordinary personal magnetism won him many followers and admirers, so that when a military league staged a successful coup d'état against the Government in Athens, the officers who had led the conspiracy fixed upon the young Venizelos as an appropriate leader for their cause. Accordingly, although legally a Turkish subject, Venizelos was asked to come to Athens in 1910, and within a few months he became Prime Minister of Greece.

The new Prime Minister was above all else a Greek nationalist. He took the dream of a Greater Greece with deadly seriousness, and was able to win the support of most Greeks for his plans. In 1911 Turkey became embroiled in a war with Italy over the province of Tunisia. The time to strike against the hereditary enemy seemed ripe. Venizelos hastened to join in a league with Bulgaria and Serbia for the purpose of attacking the Turks and partitioning the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. No definite agreement was made as to where the new Greek boundaries should run; and in fact there were basic conflicts between the territorial ambitions of the three Christian nations.

Without settling these conflicts by any definite advance agreement, the governments of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia agreed to coöperate in a war against the Turks. Accordingly, in the fall of 1912, the three armies were mobilized, attacked the Turks simultaneously, and won immediate success on all fronts. The Bulgars defeated a Turkish army in Thrace and drove forward toward Constantinople. The Serbs met another Turkish army in Macedonia and utterly defeated it, capturing all the northern part of that province. The Greeks pushed northward toward Salonika and captured it in

October. A second Greek force traversed the wilds of Epirus, where it besieged and eventually captured the capital, Jannina.

The great successes of the three allies were soon dimmed by quarrels over the division of the spoils. Austria and Italy were alarmed by Serbia's unexpected victory. They hastened to blunt its effect in the Adriatic by diplomatic intervention, and succeeded in setting up Albania as an independent state. By this means Serbia was shut off from the sea, and the Straits of Otranto were secured against any possible penetration by Serbia's friends, the Triple Entente. Serbia thereupon demanded compensation for her losses in the West; but the Bulgars (and the Greeks) were unwilling to concede any of their newly won territory. At the same time, the Bulgars demanded Salonika, claiming that their greater effort in the war entitled them to the lion's share of the spoils. Prolonged and acrimonious negotiations ensued which were only broken off when the Bulgars made an unannounced attack on the Greek and Serbian armies.

The Bulgar attack on their former allies did not prosper. The Turks promptly renewed hostilities in Thrace; and the Rumanians too joined in the fray against Bulgaria. Such an encirclement was too much for Bulgar armies. They suffered a number of defeats, and in July 1913 the Bulgarian Government was compelled to make peace. In the settlement which followed, Greece annexed Crete, the principal Aegean islands, Southern Epirus and the southern half of Macedonia. Serbia acquired the northern part of Macedonia and the Sanjak which had previously separated her from the sister state of Montenegro. Bulgaria, although she had borne the main brunt of the fighting against the Turks, was forced to content herself with the provinces of Western Thrace and Pirim. The Bulgars were bitterly disappointed and cherished a burning animosity against both Serbia and Greece for wresting from them so much of the fruit of victory.

The next three years were a tangled and disastrous time for Greece. Crown Prince Constantine had personally led the Greek Army which captured Salonika, and had been able to take command of the troops besieging Jannina in time for the final assault. King George I was assassinated during the war, and Constantine became King while serving in the field. He reaped a great popularity from his military successes, and formed around himself a group of ardent admirers. Venizelos, the other great Greek protagonist of the Balkan Wars, rivaled the King's popularity. The two men did not like one another personally. Each felt the other claimed more than his share of credit for the Greek victories. Furthermore, there were differences in the social background of the men who supported the two rivals, and this lent edge to their personal dislike.

But what brought all these points of friction into full play was a question of high policy raised by the outbreak of World War I. King Constantine wanted Greece to cling to neutrality and husband her strength against unforeseen contingencies. Venizelos, on the contrary, advocated joining the Allied side of the conflict. King Constantine had family connections with the German Kaiser, and he had a soldier's respect for the might of German arms. Venizelos was influenced above all by one consideration: Turkey was belligerent against the Allies, and if Greece should join the Allied side she could hope to gain Constantinople and make the Aegean a Greek lake, in the event of an Allied victory. It was a gamble, of course; the Allies might be defeated. But Venizelos was a born political gambler and gladly risked what he had already won, in hope of winning more.

A moral issue was also involved, for Greece had been in alliance with Serbia, and, depending on how one construed the words of the treaty, she was or was not obliged to come to Serbia's assistance when the Serbs were attacked by Austria. Diplomatic intrigue flourished in Athens as French, Russians,

British, Germans, and Austrians did all in their power to advance the fortunes of the party favorable to their respective interests. It was a situation in which honest and patriotic Greeks could feel sincere doubt, but the uncertainties of both arguments seemed merely to make the two sides more fanatic. All Greece came to be torn between the contending factions.

Bulgarian entry into the war (1916) on the German side strengthened the Venizelist party, for victory over Bulgaria and Turkey could now open the road to Constantinople, which had previously been blocked by a neutral Bulgaria. An election in 1916 gave the Venizelists a small majority, but Constantine refused to re-appoint Venizelos as Prime Minister. The fiery Cretan thereupon decided on insurrection. He withdrew from Athens and established a Government in Salonika in open defiance of the King. A French and British expeditionary force landed in Macedonia in support of the Venizelist Government where it opened the Salonika front against the Bulgars. This could plausibly be construed as treason; but the King countered in kind, for he sent secret instructions to the Greek garrison of Eastern Macedonia to allow the Bulgars to pass without opposition, thinking that Venizelos would be taken unexpectedly on the flank and overthrown by the Bulgar armies. This stratagem failed, and Allied diplomacy backed up by Allied guns (warships bombarded the Royal Palace briefly) compelled the Government in Athens to come to terms with Venizelos early in 1917. It was a victory for the revolutionaries, for Venizelos became Prime Minister again, and Constantine was forced to relinquish his throne to his second son, Alexander. Alexander was a less stubborn man than his father or his elder brother, George, so that the intensity of the struggle between royalists and Venizelists died down for a few years.

The Venizelist Government in Salonika had begun to build a volunteer army. After the reconciliation, the regular Greek Army was sent to the Salonika front where it combined

with the Venizelist troops and fought creditably under Allied command for the next year. After the Bulgarian surrender and the Turkish collapse (early fall, 1918), Greek troops in conjunction with French and British occupied Thrace and bivouacked within sight of the long-dreamed-of capital, Constantinople. It was a time of high elation for the Greeks. Venizelos hastened away to the Peace Conference at Paris where he became one of the dominant figures of that international gathering. He won great concessions for Greece in Asia Minor, but failed to gain the keystone city of Constantinople.

Greek disappointment over this failure was severe. Simultaneously, the untimely death of King Alexander reopened the scarce-healed controversy of the early war years, and a corrupt Government at home sullied Venizelos' popularity. In 1920 new elections were held and Venizelos was defeated. King Constantine returned in triumph, and a group of the King's personal friends and supporters took over the Government.

The royalists faced a difficult problem in Asia Minor. Greek troops had taken up garrison duties in the area assigned to Greece by the peace treaty, but the Turkish insurrectionary Government headed by Mustapha Kemal had refused to accept any partition of Asia Minor and defied the Greek claims to part of the peninsula. Faced with Turkish intransigence, King Constantine and his followers decided to overbid Venizelos' patriotic appeal which had won him such great political successes in the past. Accordingly, they undertook an offensive against the Turks, fondly hoping to annex most or all of Asia Minor. Unfortunately for their ambitions, imperial interests in Syria persuaded the French to lend support to Mustapha Kemal, and Great Britain was unwilling to back the Greeks to the bitter end. Using French surplus war stocks, the Turks built up an army whose strength became superior to that of the Greek forces, and in the spring of 1922

the Turks were able to inflict a serious defeat on the Greeks. Retreat soon turned into a desperate rout. The Greeks were unable to hold the Turks anywhere on the mainland, and what remained of the beaten Army made its way to safety in the islands off the coast or took ship directly to Athens. As the Turks advanced they systematically uprooted all the Greeks and other Christians who were native to Asia Minor. Many thousands were killed, especially at Smyrna when a great massacre of the large Greek community signalized the final victory of the Turks. Despite the thousands who were slaughtered, over a million Greeks and Armenians succeeded in escaping by sea to Greece.

After this disaster the Greeks had no choice but to negotiate a peace with Turkey whereby they gave up all their claims in Asia Minor. A systematic exchange of populations between the two countries was agreed upon. The treaty with Bulgaria, concluded some years before, had also provided for a population exchange. Consequently, during the following three years, all persons who opted for Turkish or Bulgarian citizenship were expelled from Greek territory; and about half a million more Greeks came to swell the total of refugees who had come from Asia Minor in 1922. (One exception was made: it was agreed that the Greek population of Constantinople should not be displaced; and in return the Turkish population of Western Thrace was allowed to remain undisturbed.)

During the following years the Greeks' dream of a reconstituted Byzantine Empire faded. Nearly all the Greek population which had formerly been scattered over the Balkans and Asia Minor, had either been absorbed into the rising nationalities or forcibly transferred within the new boundaries of Greece. Turkey had emerged from the war as a compact national state, able and willing to protect Constantinople against attack. It followed, after the bitterness of war and defeat, that Greek relations with Turkey grew

steadily more friendly until in 1931 a treaty of amity was concluded between the two ancient enemies.

Part of the reason for this rapprochement was the fact that Greece found herself faced with the implacable enmity of Bulgaria. The Bulgars never gave up hope of recovering the provinces of Thrace and Macedonia. The Greeks, for their part, nourished a deep grievance against the Bulgars who had twice fought against them, and who so openly coveted the new provinces which Greece had won.

The negotiation of peace with Turkey did not bring internal pacification to Greece. The quarrel between King Constantine and Eleftherios Venizelos arose, in part, as we have seen, from personal incompatibility between the two men. It quickly took on a wider significance, however, when rival and hostile political parties formed around the two leaders. From 1916, when Venizelos embarked upon his Salonika adventure, he became the leader of a sort of disguised revolution. New men, representing a new class, rose to power in his wake and rudely shouldered aside the members of the semi-aristocratic families who had previously exercised a near monopoly of political leadership.

During the nineteenth century the little kingdom of Greece had been organized on almost patriarchal lines. The overwhelming majority of the population was peasant, and took almost no active part in the political rivalries of the capital. In the villages the peasant way of life was well consolidated. The peasants generally owned the land they cultivated, and were able by hard work and frugal living to feed and clothe themselves and their families. Lack of education and lack of any active discontent united to restrain them from any important part in the political quarrels and maneuvers of the Athens Governments.

Many, but not all, villages had traditional associations with a particular aristocratic family. Originally, these great families had been large landowners, or leaders in the Greek

War of Independence, but during the nineteenth century their estates were nearly all broken up by sale to the peasants, and the former landowners moved to Athens, where they dabbled in politics. The peasants were generally willing to vote for their patron at election time; and in return they expected and received his personal intervention on their behalf whenever his help was needed in dealing with the Government.

In the capital, political faction was chronic and sometimes embittered, but it arose solely from personal rivalries and jealousies, exacerbated from time to time by foreign encouragement of one or another party. There were no social differences between the various political groups, and political maneuvers often had the appearance more of a parlor game than of anything more serious. By degrees, the widespread devastation of the War of Independence was repaired; new land was steadily brought under cultivation; and public improvements, such as railroad construction, were carried through with the help of foreign loans.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this form of social organization began to develop new strains. The basic cause was a growing overpopulation. Greek peasant society produced a large surplus of children. Marriages normally were made at an early age, and large families were both expected and desired. In consequence, arable land which had been left waste after the War of Independence was rapidly reseeded, and fifty years later a surplus rural population began to appear. Younger sons could no longer find enough unoccupied land on which to make a living, and were forced to look outside the village community for means of livelihood.

Two solutions were found for this problem. By far the more important was emigration. A swarm of peasant boys began to leave for America (and other parts of the world), there to seek their fortune. Very often the emigrant was

chosen in family conclave as the most likely to succeed in the strange outside world, and his passage was financed by the pooled resources of the whole family or by a relative who had already established himself in America. The Greek peasants when they came to America still maintained strong social roots in their ancestral villages. Their purpose was to make money as quickly as possible in order to send much-needed cash back to relatives in Greece. Consequently, despite their peasant origin, Greek immigrants seldom if ever took up land, but rather sought work in the cities, and faithfully sent surplus earnings home to Greece.

But the journey overseas was long and expensive. Many Greeks were loath to separate themselves so far from their families or were unable to pay the cost of passage. Migration to the towns of Greece itself offered hope of livelihood for such persons; and the easy availability of a cheap, hard-working labor force, recruited from the surplus peasant population of the villages, helped to make possible a notable development of light industry in Greece after 1900. Textile manufacture far outstripped other industries. Factory production remained on a relatively small scale, however; and before World War I proletarian industrial laborers numbered only a few thousand in all of Greece. Other thousands of peasants who could find no land in their villages were able to contrive a living in the towns of Greece by pursuing various service occupations or by becoming artisans and small traders. A few of the more ambitious and intelligent men were able to acquire professional training at the University of Athens but very often discovered that their hard-won education failed to assure them an adequate income due to serious overcrowding of all the professions.

The growth of towns meant the development of a group in the Greek population which fell outside the traditional social organization. To be sure, old attitudes and loyalties persisted strongly among the peasants who came to the towns,

and the townsmen were not numerous enough to challenge, by themselves, the traditional political and social leadership of the great families, even if they had clearly wished to do so. They remained a marginal group. But the social problem of Greece in the early years of this century was more than the restlessness of the growing group of impoverished townspeople, for the great mass of the peasantry was less well content than before due to the ever-increasing land shortage. Village custom failed to adjust population to the land, and the traditional political leaders of Greece proved almost unaware of, and totally unable to cope with, the population problem.

This was roughly the social situation in Greece when the dynamic figure of Eleftherios Venizelos arrived from Crete. He proclaimed a fiery nationalism; and his program of territorial expansion easily appealed to the land hunger of the Greek peasantry. More than this, he channelled the restlessness of the townsmen toward a new political expression. From the beginning, the marginal group in the towns was the most ardent and prominent of Venizelos' supporters. Hundreds of ambitious and impecunious lawyers, many of whom were peasants' sons, flocked to the political party which formed around him. The new party was called *Phileleftheron Komma*, that is, Friends of Liberty Party, or, as the name is usually translated, the Liberal Party.

Very few of the old families cared to associate with the new political group, finding its members as a rule, poor, coarse and uncultured. But Venizelos' great successes in the Balkan Wars, and the palpable force of his personality, quickly made his party a real power in the land. Thus, for the first time since Greece had achieved liberation from the Turks, the political and social leadership of the old families was seriously questioned. They met the challenge by reconciling the petty differences that had previously divided them. By and large, the old families rallied round the King,

forming what came to be known as the *Laikon Komma*, that is, the People's, or Popular, Party. King Constantine became in fact, though not in name, the party leader.

The annexation of Macedonia and Thrace, and the influx of a million and a half refugees after 1922, worked a fundamental change in the balance of forces in Greek politics. The new citizens of the Greek state were generally loyal to Venizelos and opposed to the Popular Party and the King. In the north, where large numbers of refugees had settled on the half-vacant land of Macedonia and Thrace, the population became almost solidly Venizelist; and in the larger towns, where other thousands of the refugees found habitation, Venizelist influence almost eclipsed that of the Popular Party. Only in southern Greece, and especially in the Peloponnese, did the conservatives retain their old-time leadership. In the country as a whole, preponderance passed to the Venizelists.

Thus, during World War I, the struggle between political parties assumed what was for Greece a new character. Instead of mere personal rivalries, the quarrels of the politicians came to reflect social cleavages and the bitterness of political strife increased correspondingly. After 1922 the struggle took on a constitutional form: royalist versus republican. This development of the controversy arose in large part as a result of the personal characters and acts of King Constantine and of his son, King George II. Venizelos began his public career as an advocate of constitutional monarchy, and perhaps never espoused theoretical republicanism with complete enthusiasm. But when King Constantine became the chief of Venizelos' political opponents, he forfeited the neutrality which best becomes a king. It became impossible for the Venizelists to feel any real loyalty to a king whom they knew to be exerting every effort against them. While Alexander was King (1917-20) the Liberals got along well enough under the monarchy; but after Alexander's untimely death and

Constantine's restoration, the Venizelists were driven toward republicanism, willy-nilly.

After the defeat in Asia Minor (1922), King Constantine fled from Greece, and his son, George II, succeeded to the throne. George was entirely unable to stem the popular revulsion which arose against the Government that had led Greece to such a disaster. Reflecting popular feeling, a triumvirate of Venizelist officers proclaimed a revolution against the royal Government. They met with little resistance. The leaders of the revolt, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Plastiras, Lieutenant Colonel Stylianos Gonatas and Admiral Hadji-kyriakos seized control of the Government, and invited King George to leave the country. At the end of 1923, new elections were held. The royalists abstained, so that the new Chamber of Deputies and Cabinet were solidly against King George, and, in the absence of any other candidate for the throne, came to favor the establishment of a republican Government. Accordingly, in March 1924, George was formally dethroned and Greece officially became a republic.

By this act, the Liberals and associated parties became indelibly stamped as republican; while their major rival for political power, the Popular Party, by virtue of its origin and composition, favored monarchy. Thus the constitutional issue was created which has distracted Greek politics ever since.

After 1922 the republicans enjoyed a secure majority. For the five years immediately following the end of hostilities with the Turks (1923-28), Greece was governed by a series of short-lived republican Administrations. A new Constitution was drawn up and adopted after long discussion, but constitutional procedures were by no means always followed. Threats of violence were chronic, and in 1926 General Theodore Pangalos established a dictatorship, which, however, was overthrown a few months later by a palace coup d'état. Gradually the most pressing problems created by the

war faded away, and more stable government was established. In 1928 Venizelos became Prime Minister again, and was able to remain continuously in office until 1933. This unwontedly long Administration was able to accomplish much for Greece, but proved unable to relieve the suffering and discontent brought to Greece by the world depression of the early thirties.

During the postwar period, the principal line of division in Greek politics remained royalist versus republican. The two main groups were in turn extensively subdivided into a large number of small parties. These splinter parties usually formed around the figure of some prominent politician, and in many cases consisted only of a coterie of personal hangers-on. The small parties thrown off by the Liberals were in general rather to the left of the main stem, as for example, the Progressive (*Proodevtikon*) Party led by George Kafandaris or the Democratic Socialist (*Dimokratikon Koinonikon*) Party of George Papandreou. These parties remained small, and in parliamentary maneuvers usually joined forces with the larger Liberal group.

A similar development took place among the conservatives. After 1924 the main stem of the Popular Party officially accepted republicanism, although many of its members never gave up hoping for the return of the good old days, represented for them by the vision of the King once more secure on his throne. Moderate and royalist wings developed within the Popular Party, and an open split between the two seemed sometimes to be imminent. No breach ever took place, however, and public advocacy of the King's return was left to small parties. Of these the only significant one was the party of Free Opinion (*Eleftherofrones*) led by General John Metaxas. Metaxas was a brilliant military organizer and tactician, a personal friend of King Constantine and a bitter enemy of republicans and republicanism. His party, however, was very small.

During these years, Greek political life differed from that of other European countries in two respects. No powerful peasant party arose to dominate the scene as was the case in Bulgaria, Rumania and Croatia. It is difficult to understand why an effective agrarian party did not develop in Greece, since peasants always constituted the majority of the population. Self-styled peasant parties enjoyed a paper existence after 1908, but, perhaps because of the distraction of the constitutional issue, the main mass of the peasantry was never won away from adherence to the Liberal and Popular Parties which remained distinctly bourgeois in leadership and orientation. Socialism, such as was familiar in Central and Western Europe, found equally small success in Greece. A Socialist Party was founded in 1908, but its members were predominantly intellectuals. Their ideas won little support even among the laboring classes of the cities, which, despite their changed circumstances, still generally clung to the attitudes of their peasant ancestors.

During the period of republican predominance (1922-33), the country made considerable economic progress. Factories grew in number and size; roads and other communications were improved, and new areas of land were made fit for cultivation by the execution of large-scale drainage and irrigation projects. As long as world prosperity was general, the Greeks were able to make out satisfactorily enough. After 1924, free immigration to America was stopped. The stream was partially diverted elsewhere, notably to Australia and South Africa, while the rising rate of industrial development in Greece itself helped to absorb what was left over of the surplus rural population.

The Greek economy was, however, exceedingly vulnerable. Even after the annexation of the relatively fertile and extensive fields of Macedonia and Thrace, the country did not raise enough food to feed its population. As much as forty per cent of the wheat consumed by the Greek people had to

be imported from abroad. In addition, essential and expensive manufactured goods could not be produced locally, and had to come from more developed industrial areas.

The imports of Greece were necessities. They were largely paid for by the exports of luxuries: tobacco, olives and olive oil, currants, briar and liquorice roots, etc. As long as trade was relatively free and other countries prosperous, this was an advantage for Greece. Greek tobacco, by far the largest export, commanded a high price on the market, being of a peculiar type and fineness which could not be produced elsewhere in the world. (The so-called Turkish tobacco in our cigarettes is in large part Greek.) Fields devoted to tobacco would pay for five to ten times the amount of wheat that could have been grown on the same land. Greece enjoyed a similar but slighter advantage from raising her other specialized agricultural crops.

But when the depression of the early thirties came to the world, the Greek economy was exposed to serious dislocation. Other countries could afford to do without fine tobacco or olive oil; Greece could not afford to do without bread. Consequently, prices for Greek luxury products fell far more than did the price of bread, and it became more and more difficult for Greece to buy enough wheat to satisfy the needs of her population. Serious hardship resulted, and some land was shifted from the raising of specialized crops back to wheat growing.

On the political scene, the onset of the depression sharpened once more the bitterness of party controversy. The Popular Party grew in strength; and in 1933, when elections were held, the Liberals lost their majority. This outcome was a surprise to the republican political leaders. A small group of Army officers, believing that a Government directed by the Popular Party would surely oust them from their positions, tried to organize a coup d'état. The revolt was led by Nicholas Plastiras (now a general), but it did not

gain the support of the more moderate republican leaders, and was speedily put down. Plastiras fled to France, as did his chief followers. The net effect of the revolt was to discredit the republicans and weaken their influence in the Army.

Sentiment favoring the return of King George undoubtedly increased, but the country was by no means of one mind, and the cautious leader of the Popular Party declined to bring the King back suddenly, or without a plebiscite. Prolonged and futile parliamentary maneuvers resulted. The new Government failed to come to grips with the economic crisis which afflicted the country, and popular sentiment tended to harden toward extremes. On the one hand, a small Communist Party won new support; on the other, a good many Greeks began to think that the return of the King would be a good thing and relieve the prevailing political instability. But it was neither of these groups which precipitated renewed violence. In February 1935 several hundred republican Army officers attempted a coup d'état against the Popular Party Government. This revolt was better organized and on a much larger scale than the revolt of 1933. Venizelos was persuaded to give the movement his reluctant blessing, but he himself took little or no part in it. After a few days of fighting, the revolt was put down in Athens, and an army marched northward to Macedonia where the republicans had gained control. Determined action by the royalist military leaders, and the failure of the coup d'état in the south persuaded the republican generals in the north to give up the game after only a few skirmishes. The leaders of the uprising fled to safety abroad. Venizelos was among the refugees. He died in exile the next year.

The revolt of 1935 provoked a reorganization of the Government. Out-and-out royalists came to power and set about preparing the way for the return of King George II to the Greek throne. General John Metaxas was appointed Minister

of War and purged the Army and police of all republican officers who were suspected of complicity in, or sympathy with, the revolt. When the Army and police had been purged, an election was arranged. The republican parties boycotted the election, and consequently an overwhelmingly royalist Chamber of Deputies was returned. The new Government hastened to organize a plebiscite for the return of King George, and, in November, a ninety-seven per cent vote in favor of his restoration was announced. The plebiscite was extensively falsified and in no sense represented accurately the opinions of the electorate. Nevertheless, King George returned to his throne, arriving in Athens late in November 1935.

The King came back with the hope and intention of ruling as a constitutional monarch, more or less on the British pattern. He declared a general amnesty for all political offenders, and insisted that new and honest elections be held. Accordingly, another election took place in June 1936. All parties participated, and there was no systematic falsification of the result. The Chamber of Deputies which was so chosen, divided almost equally between republican and royalist parties. The largest single party was the Liberal, with 127 seats. With other splinter groups, the total strength of the republican bloc amounted to 142. The Popular Party gained only 69 seats; but other royalist groups swelled the total to 143. Thus the two were almost exactly balanced and neither could command a majority in the Chamber.

Such a deadlock was hardly new in Greek politics. What was new was the fact that fifteen deputies representing the Communist Party of Greece held the balance of power between royalist and republican blocs. This fact seemed to promise great influence for the Communists in any Government based on the Chamber of Deputies. It marks the arrival of a new force on the Greek political scene; a force which has

played a most important part in the subsequent history of the country.

The Communist Party of Greece (*Kommunistikon Komma Ellados*, or as often abbreviated, KKE) was not a new organization in 1936. It had been founded in 1918 by a group of intellectuals and labor leaders. It was first called the Socialist-Labor Party, but changed its name in 1924 when it became formally affiliated with the Third International.

During the years of prosperity the Communists made little headway in Greece. The landowning peasants found nothing to attract them in Marxist doctrine, and the workingmen of the towns were generally too close to their village origins easily to abandon the traditional peasant frame of mind. The party did make a number of converts among students and professional classes. Marxist ideas appealed strongly to the numerous professionally trained men who were unable to earn a satisfactory living, since it explained their personal failure on "scientific" grounds, and proved it to be not their own fault. Another group in the Greek population was likewise touched by Communist propaganda, namely the refugees in the larger towns. Many of these had enjoyed relatively spacious living in Asia Minor, where they had been merchants and artisans. In Greece, few were ever able to rise again to the same standard of living they had known in their old homes; and most of them were reduced to penurious day labor. Among these refugees, especially of the younger generation, the doctrines of the Communist Party met with considerable success. Accordingly, many tobacco workers of Kavalla and other towns of northern Greece, and a substantial number of the refugee laborers in Athens and Pireus became Communists before the war.

The Communist Party differed from other Greek parties in its stronger discipline and centralized control. The party was directed by a Political Bureau, headed by a Secretary

General. He appointed subordinate officials to direct the party's activity in all the towns and districts of Greece. In theory, the Political Bureau represented a Central Committee, elected by the members of the party at periodic congresses; but, in fact, the membership of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau was determined by cabals among the top leaders of the party, and only a single slate of candidates was presented for election at the congresses.

During its early years, the Greek Communist Party was not thoroughly subordinated to the Comintern; but in 1931, when the party split wide open on a relatively minor question of tactics, the Third International intervened, and settled the dispute, bringing the Greek Communists thoroughly into line. An entirely new Political Bureau was sent to Greece from Russia in that year, and all of the former leaders were demoted. Nicholas Zachariades became the head of the Greek Communist Party; and, despite his youth (he was only twenty-nine years of age), he was quickly able to restore discipline among the Greek Communists.

In the next five years KKE won many new adherents. Its propaganda was powerfully aided by the hardships of the depression and the apparent inability of the established political parties to cope with the worsening economic situation. The Communists gained steadily in the elections, but the party remained small, and in 1936 was represented by only fifteen deputies. But, as we have seen, the deadlock between royalists and republicans gave the handful of Communist deputies an importance out of all proportion to their numbers. It seemed that any party Government would be at the mercy of the Communist bloc unless a coalition between the royalist and republican groups could be arranged.

By a remarkable coincidence, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister both died before the Chamber of Deputies convened, and General Metaxas, as the senior Cabinet Minister and leader of the tiny Party of Free Opinion

(seven seats), found himself in control of the Government when the Chamber opened its session in April 1936. By agreement of both republicans and royalists, the Chamber was immediately prorogued for a period of five months, and Metaxas was empowered to govern in the interim. The reason for this extraordinary decision was that neither the republican nor the royalist party wished to see itself at the mercy of the Communist deputies; but neither group could yet bring itself to unite with the other in support of a coalition Government.

While the Chamber was prorogued, negotiations between the various political parties were carried on, and some sort of understanding between the Liberals and Populists was in fact arranged during the course of the summer. But Metaxas had little faith in the words of professional politicians. Moreover, he liked the taste of power which the coincidence of the deaths of his seniors and the paralysis of the Chamber had given him. The Communists, meanwhile, had been active in their turn, attempting to negotiate with the republicans and persuade them to form a Popular Front on the pattern of France. The Communists were rebuffed, however, and rumors that they were about to organize a general strike began to circulate in Athens. On the strength of these rumors Metaxas was able to persuade King George that extraconstitutional steps were necessary. Accordingly, on 4 August, the King signed a decree conferring dictatorial powers on Prime Minister John Metaxas. The Chamber was dissolved *sine die*, and the Constitution suspended. Thus fortified, Metaxas called out the Army and was easily able to quell all opposition.

The dictatorial Government proceeded to try to bring order, discipline and prosperity to the Greek people. It soon proved itself vigorous, and far more effective in carrying out policies than any of its predecessors had been, distracted as they were by parliamentary insecurity and uncertainty. Metaxas modeled his regime more or less consciously on the

pattern of the Fascist and Nazi dictators, introducing a uniformed youth movement, emphasizing things military, and repressing free speech. Politicians of all parties, including the Populists, were silenced; and if individuals showed signs of refusing to accept the new order, they were exiled to one or another of the islands of the Aegean. A far-reaching system of secret police was set up to spy on "subversive" elements in the population, and incautious conversation in public places was likely to land a man in jail or at least bring him up for warning from a local police official.

One of the main aims of Metaxas' rule was to build up the Greek Army. The whole economy was organized to serve this end. Special subsidies and protective tariffs were set up to foster the development of industries which might contribute to the military power of the country. A small but surprisingly efficient munitions industry was built by such methods. Trade was carried on largely through barter agreements with other countries, and Germany took an ever larger proportion of Greek exports, sending in return mostly munitions and machinery of war. Trade unions were "coördinated" and made into administrative branches of the central Government. At the same time, Metaxas put into effect laws protecting the workmen from certain abuses, providing unemployment insurance, etc. The Government collected taxes from the industrialists and other men of means with an efficiency equalled by no previous Greek Government. Using these devices, Metaxas brought about a substantial economic recovery; but it is also true that the diversion of the national wealth to military and other nonproductive expenditures made the cost of living rise steadily. Wages were not adjusted to rising prices, and real wages decreased slightly.

A particular target of the regime was the Communist Party. Most of the Communist leaders were clapped into jail at the very beginning of Metaxas' rule, but KKE was able to preserve at least a skeleton of its organization. The number of

its sympathizers increased during the period of dictatorship even though, for the time, no open propaganda or coördinated action could be undertaken. Other political parties, unable or unwilling to go underground after the example of the Communists, practically disappeared. Of course, the body of former sympathizers remained, and only a few leaders were ever exiled or jailed. But the organization and morale of the traditional parties almost completely disintegrated under governmental repression.

The dictatorship was never popular. In free elections, Metaxas had attracted only a small number of voters, and after his accession to undisputed control of the state machine, his popularity did not increase. He relied upon the Army and the police to maintain himself in power. Both these organizations were expanded and pampered as against other branches of public service. Army officers and the police consequently were generally well content with the Government and accorded it their passive or active support. Among the population at large, dissatisfaction was almost universal, but there was no organization capable of consolidating and leading the general discontent to open expression.

Such a Government, in so small and poor a country, must have seemed easy prey to Benito Mussolini when he cast his eye around for new glories to win and fresh worlds to conquer. Occasion for quarrel was easy to manufacture. Accordingly, in 1940, the Italian Government delivered an ultimatum to Metaxas, and without waiting for his reply, invaded Greece in the early morning hours of 28 October.

II

War and Occupation

RELATIONS between Greece and Italy had never been especially cordial; and from the time of Mussolini's accession to power, Greece figured in the Italian landscape chiefly as a candidate for admission to the Roman Empire about to be reborn. In 1923 relations were severely strained when Mussolini sent warships to bombard the Greek island of Corfu, but the matter was settled peaceably by the League of Nations. Following the collapse of Austria in 1918, Italy had taken over sort of unofficial protectorate of the little backward state of Albania. In 1938 Italian control became official. Soldiers were sent from Italy and met with little or no resistance as they marched inland to "pacify" the wild Albanian mountains. In general the Albanians were well enough content with their new rulers. A normal amount of brigandage and sheepstealing continued within the country and across the borders into Greece and Yugoslavia. Such disorders were age old, and were taken into small account until one day in 1940 an Albanian brigand was killed a few miles inside the Greek border. The Italians chose to make his death an international incident.

The threat which Italian military occupation of Albania offered to Greece was certainly not lost on so shrewd a soldier as General John Metaxas. He bent every effort to strengthen the Greek Army and Navy, and in particular rushed to completion the road that now connects Epirus with Thessaly. In the spring of 1940 the Greeks had an additional warning of

Italian intentions, if one were needed. The light cruiser *Helle*, one of the proudest ships of the Greek Navy, lay at anchor off the island of Tinos where it had been sent to convey a sacred icon to Athens for the Easter celebrations. While anchored there, it was sunk without warning by a torpedo. Pieces of the torpedo were later recovered and proved to be of Italian manufacture. Overt acts were supplemented by a systematic barrage of propaganda against the Greek Government's policy toward the small Albanian minority of Epirus.

Italy's aggression against Greece was connected with events on the larger European scene. When World War II broke out in September 1939, Italy at first remained nonbelligerent. In the spring of 1940, however, just as France was reeling to collapse under the bombs of German Stukas and the grinding tread of German tanks, Mussolini saw fit to enter the fray. In North Africa, small British forces succeeded in containing the more numerous Italian armies of Libya. Under the circumstances, the Italian Government needed a success to parade before the public; furthermore, possession of Greece and Crete would provide an easier and more secure supply line to the Italian armies of the North African desert, and would bring the Fascists one step nearer to the realization of their ambition of rebuilding the ancient Empire of Rome. To gain these ends, Mussolini decided to occupy part or all of Greece.

Accordingly, on the evening of 27 October 1940, the Fascist Government delivered an ultimatum to the Greeks demanding the protective occupation of unspecified zones of Greek territory, monetary compensation for the death of the Albanian brigand and a number of other concessions. The ultimatum had six hours to run. Even before the six hours expired, the first Italian troops marched across the Greek border in Epirus. Metaxas, for his part, after anxious consultations, boldly refused the Italian demands.

It would appear that Italian intelligence reports had grossly

miscalculated both Greek strength and Greek morale. Mussolini expected to meet with little resistance. He planned to be in Salonika within a couple of weeks, and to reach Athens a fortnight later. For the first day or two the Italians advanced without much trouble. Greek border guards fell back before the attackers, but were able to delay the Italian troops by repeated skirmishes. Geography narrowly defined the course of the invading army. One column tried to penetrate southward, toward Jannina; while a second set out eastward for the plateau of Western Macedonia, Kozani and Salonika. The first of these columns succeeded in moving some twenty to thirty miles across the Greek frontier during the first two weeks of the war, but its rate of progress was much slower than expected; and, as the Greeks retreated, their resistance steadily intensified. The other column had to climb a mountain ridge from Koritsa before it could reach the Macedonian plateau. This the invading army never succeeded in doing; the Greeks were able to stop the Italians at the foothills of the mountain only three or four miles inside their border.

The Greek Army had been partially mobilized when the Italian ultimatum came, but it was deployed along the entire northern frontier. Immediately following the outbreak of war, a great wheeling movement was begun. The Bulgarian and Yugoslav frontier was stripped of most of its forces. Reservists streamed to call-up centers in obedience to the proclamations of the Government. In the course of the next seven months a total of twenty-two divisions and over 300,000 men were mobilized. Equipment was poor, for the Greeks had little but infantry weapons with which to oppose Italian tanks and airplanes. Ammunition and food both became seriously short at the front, and for days on end Greek troops lived without warm food or any fire, on snowy mountain slopes in the dead of winter. Only a transcendent morale made such endurance possible.

By mid-November the Italian advance had been stopped. A

few days later the Greek counter-attack began. A whole division succeeded in crossing the Pindus Mountains north of the Metsovon road and was able to fall upon the undefended flank of the Italian column which had pressed southward toward Jannina. The Italians were unprepared for the attack. (The Greeks left transport and supply behind them when they scaled the mountain range, save for what small trickle of food and ammunition mules were able to bring up after them.) To cover themselves, the Italians retreated; but the retreat turned into a rout as the morale of the Fascist soldiers cracked. Precipitous retreat carried them across the border into Albania, and victorious Greek troops, coming north from Jannina, west over the Pindus Mountains, and plunging down from the Florina pass were able to capture Koritsa (November) and Argyrokastron (December).

The Greek advance came to a grinding halt some thirty miles inside the Albanian border. Greek endurance and supply lines were strained to the limit, and while the force of their attack weakened, the Italians steadily picked up reinforcements and fresh supplies as they drew back, until they were at length able to halt the Greeks and recover something of their shaken morale. During the balance of the winter the battlefield shifted very little. Both Italians and Greeks endured great hardships from the severe winter weather. Lack of sufficiently warm clothing caused thousands of Greek soldiers to lose their hands and feet by freezing. To this day, wheel chairs carrying legless men, whose limbs were frozen at the Albanian front and had to be amputated, are a common sight in Athens.

In February the Greeks tried to resume their advance, and they were able to straighten out the battle line in the center by conquering a few square miles. But the attack was costly and failed to break through. In the spring, the Italians in their turn prepared an assault on the Greek lines, attempting to drive southward in the direction of Koritsa. The Greeks

were able to stem the attack, but had to expend almost their last reserves to do so. The Albanian front had seemingly settled down to a stalemate.

The unprovoked Italian aggression created a remarkable and seldom-paralleled surge of self-abnegating patriotism that ran through the whole Greek nation. All the psychological energy of the Greeks, which normally was frittered away in striving against one another, suddenly turned against the invader. The nation united as never before. Fashionable ladies of Athens, who had never worked in their lives, volunteered as nurses, travelled through the remote and barbarous mountains of Epirus and did their best to organize hospitals in the mountains. Men too old to fight served as muleteers, making their way over the precipitous mountain paths. Others helped to bring up supplies over the few roads by car or wagon. Peasants of the near-by villages gave their labor gladly to clear the roads of snow in order that the precious stream of supplies could continue to flow toward the front. The transport system of the Greek Army would have amazed an American soldier. Civilian vehicles of all descriptions battered themselves to pieces on the rough and narrow roads. Wagons and mules carried loads where motor vehicles could not go; and not a few supplies were carried on human backs—often by local peasant women.

In the fervor of the moment, Metaxas found it safe to grant pardon to many political offenders. Not all his prisoners were released; and in particular he kept the main figures of the Communist Party under lock and key. Nevertheless, in the early days of the war, the Communist leader, Nicholas Zachariades, wrote a letter from his prison cell in Corfu, instructing all good Communists to join in the fight against Fascist aggression and loyally to coöperate with the hated Metaxas regime. The general political spirit was well typified by the action of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who shortly before the establishment of dictatorship had organized a party

of National Unity (*Ethnikon Enotikon Komma*) and been exiled from Athens for his pains. Upon release from detention, he volunteered to serve as a private in the Army and went to the front in that humble position.

The enthusiasm of civilians was reflected to the full in the ranks of the Greek Army. The original repulse of the Italian forces had been possible only through an almost reckless daring which risked being cut off from all adequate supplies in order to attack on an exposed flank. When the Italian retreat began, a wave of high confidence ran through the entire Greek Army. Individual soldiers performed almost incredible feats of daring and endurance, marching long miles and attacking with dash and persistence. The story is told how on one occasion a Greek detachment found itself without ammunition in the face of an Italian outpost. Nevertheless, the Greeks attacked the panicky Italian soldiers with only rocks and empty rifles in their hands, drove them from their trenches, and captured enough ammunition to continue their advance. Even if the story be not exactly true, it was widely circulated among the Greek troops and was generally believed, as it is still. The spirit of the troops was such that they might well have been capable of such heroic rashness.

It seems probable that the Greek success was due more to the amazing morale of the Army than to well-prepared plans or skillful generalship. The perennial individualism of the Greek showed itself on more than one occasion by disobedience to orders; and when their officers failed to lead satisfactorily, the troops let their displeasure be known, and in a few instances took matters into their own hands and shot the offending officers. The whole advance must have been chaotic and confused. Small units moved forward until they met opposition, attacked and overcame it if they could; if not, waited until more Greek troops came up and a stronger attack could be launched. Much of the Greek supply came from captured Italian stores. At no time was the supply of am-

munition and food from the rear adequate to sustain a heavy offensive.

The coming of spring did not dampen civilian ardor for the war, but at the front many men must have realized that no repetition of the first days of success was possible. The Greeks had deployed almost their last reserves to stop the Italian offensive of March, and there were no replacements for the men who fell sick or suffered wounds. Food was inadequate, ammunition scarce; and the Italians were superior in numbers, supply and equipment. A small trickle of military supplies from the British and the effective help of a squadron of RAF fighters, could not counterbalance the Italian superiority. Under the circumstances, no great victories could be hoped for by the Greeks; and indeed, had the Germans not intervened, it seems probable that Mussolini's legions would have been able to hold their line and probably even to advance against the Greeks during the summer of 1941.

But it was not destined that the Greek effort should gutter out in slow defeat. The Epic of Albania, as the Greeks habitually now call their war against the Italians, had an epic ending; the ponderous weight of the German Army came to the rescue of Italian arms in April 1941, easily and swiftly crushing the resistance that stood in its way.

During the autumn and winter of the Albanian War, events had moved rapidly on the European scene. In the fall of 1940 Germany toyed with and then abandoned the idea of an invasion of England. In North Africa, British troops were able to drive back the Italians in Libya, sweeping as far westward as Bengasi. To counter this success, the Germans had begun to organize the Afrika Korps which was to reverse the balance and drive the British almost to the gates of Alexandria. But the main attention of the German High Command had shifted from west to east. The German generals were busy, in secret, preparing plans for the invasion of

Russia. To secure the southern flank of the armies in Russia, the Germans found it necessary to bring the entire Balkan Peninsula within their sphere of influence. To win Bulgaria was no problem, for the Bulgars gladly seized what seemed a chance to regain territory lost to Greece and Yugoslavia, and opened their frontiers secretly to German troops. Rumania yielded to *force majeure*, giving up Transylvania to Hungary and admitting the German Army.

But in Greece and Yugoslavia, the Germans had a more difficult problem. Both countries had been traditionally associated with the French and British, and a strong current of antipathy to the Germans and their Nazi Government ran through the people of both nations. Through the winter of 1940 the Greek public was so engrossed in the war with Italy as to spare little attention to the threatening developments to the north. The Greek Government was at least partially informed of German troop movements in Bulgaria, but was unable to spare any large number of soldiers from the Albanian front to safeguard the Bulgarian frontier. Diplomatic maneuver was equally shut to the Greeks. Since they were engaged in a bitter war with Italy, the ally of Germany, the Greeks could scarcely expect to come to satisfactory terms with the German end of the Axis without having to yield to the utterly unacceptable demands of the Italians. Willy-nilly, Metaxas was forced to rely upon the British. He must have realized how weak was the British power in the Eastern Mediterranean, how inadequate to protect Greece against the might of German armies. Nevertheless, Britain was the only ally to whom Greece could turn, as Greece was the only ally which Britain could find on the whole continent of Europe.

A few months before the outbreak of World War II, the British Government had "guaranteed" the territorial integrity of Greece. Accordingly in the first months of 1941, when the threat from the north loomed unmistakably, the Greek Government asked Great Britain to honor this guar-

antee by despatching an expeditionary force to help stave off the German and Bulgarian danger. Churchill, despite disastrous experiences in France and Norway, was still an optimist. He felt the importance of demonstrating before the world that Britain still kept her promises even in time of extreme emergency. Furthermore, he perhaps welcomed a land front in Europe against the Germans, thinking that the rugged mountains of Greece might stop German armor, and later serve as a convenient bridgehead from which a British attack on German-held Europe could be launched. Whatever Churchill's thoughts, he decided to respond to the Greek appeal. The victorious British Army of the Nile was broken up, and a total of about sixty thousand men, including the best of the British North African divisions, were sent into Greece under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

The first British troops arrived in Athens, 4 March 1941 and were received by a wildly enthusiastic populace. They were rumored to be but the advance guard of a mighty host, and extravagant hopes based upon these rumors no doubt helped to bring about the popular revolution that took place in Yugoslavia in April when the Government which had come to terms with Hitler was overthrown, and another, committed to resist the Germans, put in its place.

The Germans were not unprepared for the British landing in Greece. A German army had secretly been concentrated in southwest Bulgaria against just such an emergency, and by the beginning of April it was ready to advance. Accordingly, on 6 April, Germany declared war on both Yugoslavia and Greece.

The lines of the German attack on Greece followed geographically determined routes. Starting from western Bulgaria the main column cut through the southeast corner of Yugoslavia and moved down the rolling plains of the Axios Valley toward Salonika. Within three days of the opening of

hostilities the Germans entered Salonika and cut off the Greek garrison in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. A second and smaller column swung wide through Yugoslav Macedonia, captured Skoplje, and crossed the Greek frontier at the Monastir Gap. Travelling south through open, rolling plateau country, this force was able to penetrate to the Aliakmon River (Kozani) by 14 April. Meanwhile the Greeks had put up a brave but brief battle along the Bulgarian frontier (notably in the Kula Pass), but when cut off from the rest of Greece by the capture of Salonika, the garrison of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace surrendered.

The British had landed their first troops in Greece a scant month before the German attack, and by the beginning of April had not succeeded in bringing more than a small part of their total force into northern Greece. No serious effort was made to hold the Germans north of the Aliakmon River. Small British and Greek detachments beyond this line withdrew as best they could before the advancing German columns. The first battles were fought when the Germans reached the precipitous valley of the Aliakmon, with its sea-buttress, Mt. Olympus. Together these two geographical features formed the so-called Olympus Line. To this day shattered tanks can be seen in the Vale of Tempe and along the Aliakmon gorge where the two armies fought. But German strength in tanks, airplanes and manpower was far superior to that of the defenders, and the Germans were able to break through the British-Greek line after three or four days of hard fighting (17 April).

The disorganized Allied troops fell back on Mount Oeta and the historic pass of Thermopylae, but here too the German superiority quickly told (24 April) and the British decided to evacuate the country. Weary troops embarked from Pireus and Nauplion, leaving all their heavy equipment behind them. German airplanes harried the retreat, and many ships were sunk in the harbors and in the narrow waters off

the Greek coast, yet more than half of the British expeditionary force escaped.

In Albania, meanwhile, the Greek Army had been cut off. A fast-moving German column crossed the mountains from Thessaly and captured Jannina (23 April). The main body of the Greek Army had begun to retreat within a day or two of the German attack, but the men were utterly weary and dispirited, and equipment and supplies were even shorter than usual, so that no effective defense was established in the rear against the advancing Germans. On the same day that the Germans took Jannina, General George Tsolakoglu, commanding the Greek Army of Epirus, surrendered all the forces under his command. With this surrender the main body of the Greek Army acknowledged defeat. Tsolakoglu had no authority from the Greek Government in Athens for his capitulation. He proceeded on his own initiative in the face of a desperate situation.

On 26 April German parachutists landed on the isthmus of Corinth and cut off British stragglers. The next day, advance columns entered Athens from the north, and the Nazi swastika was raised high over the Acropolis.



Less than a month later the indefatigable Germans launched their famous airborne invasion of Crete. The island was ill defended. Some of the disorganized British troops after their evacuation from the mainland had been landed in Crete; and there were a few Greek soldiers on the island also. The German attack came as a surprise, and after severe losses (particularly at sea, where ships of the British Navy braved the dangers of the Luftwaffe to destroy convoys of German troops attempting to cross into Crete) the Germans were able to win control of Malame airdrome near Khandia, land their airborne infantry, and overpower the defenders. The first parachutists landed in Crete, 20 May; by 2 June organized resistance to the invaders had ceased. It was a novel campaign, very costly to the Germans, but assured them of a valuable

air base for raids on shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean, and also gave them a new and shorter route of supply for the Afrika Korps in Libya.


The dictator, Metaxas, died at the end of January 1941, and so did not live to see the conquest of his country. He was succeeded by the King's nominee, Alexander Koryzis, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece. Koryzis headed the Greek Government through the disastrous days of the German attack, but when defeat appeared certain, he committed suicide (19 April). In the emergency, King George himself assumed the prime ministership for a few days. Meanwhile, he cast about for a liberal politician who might prove able to reassure the public and willing to take over. Several leading republican figures refused the post, but Emmanuel Tsouderos, an ex-Venizelist Minister and another former Governor of the Bank of Greece, was prevailed upon to accept the appointment, 22 April 1941.

Tsouderos refused to sanction General Tsolakoglu's surrender, and the new Government decided, without trying to make terms with the German conquerors, to go to Crete, hoping there to set up a free Greece against some future and better day. The King and a handful of Ministers and other high officials were all who fled from Athens. They had no more than established themselves in Crete when the German attack began, and the refugee Government fled a second time, to Cairo.

In Greece itself the conquerors embarked upon a policy of conciliation. Greek soldiers were not held as prisoners of war but were allowed freely to return to their homes, and the entire Greek Army was demobilized. The Germans were anxious to reconcile the Greeks to their place in the New Order of Europe. They had no wish to keep more than a skeleton force of German soldiers in occupation, since all available Germans were needed for the great attack on Russia which was about to begin. The Germans decided that



MAP OF GREECE



it was necessary to keep their troops at a few key strategic points. The rest of the country they handed over to their allies, the Italians and Bulgars. Accordingly, Crete remained in German hands, as did some of the other Aegean Islands. German troops occupied a strip of territory facing on the Turkish border in Thrace, and German garrisons were stationed in Athens and Salonika. The Bulgars were permitted to annex Eastern Macedonia and Thrace; elsewhere the Italians were entrusted with responsibility for controlling the country.

General Tsolakoglu, after surrendering the Army of Epirus, travelled down to Athens, and on 30 April, just a week after his surrender, he was installed by the German commander as Prime Minister of Greece. (The area of East Macedonia and Thrace entrusted to the Bulgars was no longer counted as a part of Greece, and the power of the Greek administration did not extend there.) Tsolakoglu had little difficulty in finding men to obey him. In general the governmental machine which had functioned under Metaxas and Koryzis continued to operate. The gendarmery remained responsible for ordinary day-to-day police work, and few of its members deserted or refused to accept the orders of the new Government. The same was true of other branches of the state service. The one great difference lay in this, that there was no longer any Greek Army. Instead Italian and German troops provided the ultimate support for the regime. But control of the armed force meant practical control of the Government. From the beginning, Tsolakoglu's Administration had no independence, but obeyed the orders of German and Italian military commanders in all things. Nevertheless, for the first months of occupation, in ordinary day-to-day administration, the Greek Government functioned much as it had done under the dictatorship of Metaxas. Axis control was disguised, operating only behind the scenes on the level of high policy.

In spite of these precautions, the quisling Government was never able to win the support of any considerable number of the Greeks. The Greek people hated and feared the Germans and Bulgars; remembering the glories of the Albanian campaign, they despised the Italians who now strutted as conquerors in the streets. Nevertheless, during the first year of occupation the spirit of resistance found little expression in Greece. The people must have been rather stunned by the suddenness of their disaster. From the dizzy excitement inspired by their success against the Italians, they found themselves reduced to what seemed hopeless subjugation. Nearly all Greeks turned despairingly to the immediate task of keeping alive.

During the ensuing months this was no simple task. Famine came to sit at the table. Thousands of Greeks died from lack of food or from disease brought on by undernourishment. Greece had not been able to raise enough food to feed its population before the war, and the Germans were not willing to send any surplus grain from their own storehouses to the relief of the conquered country. The physical ravages of war had not been overly severe in Greece; but some fields had not been planted due to the fact that peasant sons were away in the army fighting against the Italians, and the harvest was mediocre. Serious shortage of transport and steady deterioration of the roads further exacerbated food shortages by making distribution more difficult. It is impossible to estimate with any exactitude how many Greeks died during the winter of 1941-1942 as a result of the famine. The number runs into the thousands, and perhaps into the hundred thousands; but it is easy to exaggerate, since reports came chiefly from the cities, especially from Athens, where the shortage of food was most severe.

Reports of starvation in Greece quickly spread through the world, and a variety of Greek organizations, including the Exile Government, bent every effort to relieve the suffering.

A remarkable agreement was concluded between the principal belligerent and neutral countries of the world to permit famine relief in Greece. Under this agreement an International Red Cross administration was set up in Greece, staffed by Swiss and Swedes, which distributed Canadian and American wheat, shipped into Greece with safe passage guaranteed by all belligerents. Relief brought in by the Red Cross under this agreement helped to end the famine; and after mid-summer 1942, the food supply became, at least comparatively, adequate.

With the new year (1942) there came a partial but none the less real economic recovery. In the confusion of defeat nearly all economic activity had come to a halt, but gradually factories resumed operation, and production increased. The Germans seized relatively little from the industrial plant of Greece, although they did dismantle a part of the munitions factories and ship them away to the north. Other machinery was too antiquated or inefficient to justify the trouble of removing it. Furthermore, the Germans and Italians employed large numbers of Greeks as auxiliaries to their armies. Men were put to work building defenses against Allied landing; others were hired to repair railroads and bridges which had been destroyed in the course of the war. The occupying armies and the Greek Government paid all these workmen by the simple device of printing paper currency. Inflation was the natural and inevitable result; but not until late in 1943 did the depreciation of the currency assume runaway proportions. Before that, times were relatively good for the Greek workmen and businessmen. The shortage of goods which became so pronounced in 1944 had not yet shown itself seriously. Jobs were abundant and profits easy to take. It would be false to suppose that the Greeks were as well off economically in 1942 as they had been before the war; the economic recovery existed only by contrast with what preceded and what followed. The Greeks have always been poor, and real and wide-

spread deprivation undoubtedly continued through the peak of occupation prosperity. The fact remains that for most of the population times were better in 1942 than they had been before or were soon to be again.

Despite the economic recovery, the summer of 1942 saw the beginning of effective resistance to the Axis occupiers in Greece. Small bands appeared in the hills, performed various acts of sabotage, and attacked isolated Italian and German soldiers. As time went on the guerilla forces steadily waxed in power and numbers, and the prestige and authority of the quisling Government waned in proportion. By degrees many of the ordinary state services in the countryside disappeared. Schools went first, for the schoolmasters were as a group generally sympathetic to the resistance bands. Police power weakened more slowly; but by mid-1943 the gendarmery of the Greek Government dared not travel over large areas of the land, and its members remained in relatively large concentrations near the towns and along main roads.

While the provincial administration of the Greek Government thus weakened, an enormous and unhealthy growth took place in the capital. Vast numbers of persons were added to the civil service lists, many of them possessing no qualification except a crying need for some ready cash or a close relative in a position of power. As the strength and prestige of the resistance groups grew in the land, the quisling Government faced a growing moral crisis. Many of its functionaries felt secret sympathy with the guerillas in the hills, and some few of them gave up the security and comfort of town living to join one or another of the bands. As inflation began to show its force, the salaries of civil servants became inadequate to sustain life, so that state officials were driven to all sorts of devices in order to secure the wherewithal to live. Corruption flourished, and whatever efficiency the Greek Government had had under Metaxas gradually withered.

It became increasingly common, as the certainty of German

victory lessened and eventually disappeared, for officials of the Greek Government to come into relation with British or Allied secret services. Many a man liked to have a foot in both camps, so that no matter who might win the war, he would be able to put a bold front forward and claim to have been a loyal supporter of the victor from the beginning. An amazing and incredibly complicated maze of espionage and counterespionage developed from this situation. British "agents" were everywhere; and the same man was often both a British and a German agent, telling each what he thought it well for them to know, and often inventing or embroidering the truth of his reports almost past recognition.

It would slander the Greek nation, however, not to emphasize that the Allies generally got the best of the bargain. Nearly all Greeks sincerely hoped for an Allied victory and were willing to do what they could to bring the victory about. Their reports to the Germans must usually have been systematically falsified; while reports to Allied authorities were for the most part innocently, though effectively, exaggerated. Very few Allied nationals were ever betrayed by Greeks to the German police, even though dozens of Greeks knew the whereabouts of each British or American officer in the country. Many Greeks underwent personal danger to shelter Allied personnel, and hundreds of aviators were able to escape after losing their planes, thanks to the faithful help of Greek peasants. In truth, the company of Greek traitors to the Allied cause was very small. Most of the persons who became collaborators did so reluctantly, driven to it either by cupidity, fear or hatred of the Communists in the resistance movement.

There is no need to follow in detail the vicissitudes of the quisling Government. General Tsolakoglu continued to hold the post of Prime Minister until December 1942 when he was replaced by Konstantine Logothetopoulos, a distinguished doctor and former Rector of the University of Athens. He in

his turn resigned in April 1943 and was succeeded by John Rallis, a professional politician who had held several Cabinet posts as a member of the Popular Party. Rallis remained as Prime Minister until October 1944 when the Germans finally abandoned Athens and their puppet Government dissolved of its own accord.

During the period of occupation, an inoffensive, law-abiding citizen found Greece a hard place in which to live. From 1943 onward there were two separate and contradictory laws in the land; the law of the Government in Athens, and the law upheld by the guerillas of the mountains. The conflict between the two was bitter and irreconcilable. Many helpless villagers found themselves exposed to the retaliation of one or both sides for acts committed under duress. Increasing numbers began to flock into the larger towns where security was greater. An additional attraction in the towns was the easier access to the relief supplies brought in by the Red Cross. Difficulties of transport steadily increased as the years of occupation passed, and the Red Cross became unable to make deliveries of the relief shipments to the remote regions of the country. Peasants whose houses had been burnt or whose animals had been carried off and other property stolen, were all the more ready to come into the towns, knowing that food would be available for them there through the Red Cross. In consequence, few houses, once destroyed, were rebuilt, and the damage to the country was increased by the progressive pauperization of a part of the population.

When guerilla activity began to show itself in Greece during the summer of 1942, the occupying forces at first took little notice. Efforts were made to apprehend the persons who committed acts of sabotage or who dared to kill Axis soldiers. Even in these early days, when no culprits could be found, exemplary punishment was sometimes meted out to a whole village. As the scale of guerilla activity increased, the German and Italian occupiers began to take systematic counteraction.

Their effort to win the loyalty of the Greek people was clearly a failure. The Greeks had repaid the German overtures by supporting the guerillas, passively if not actively. Consequently the Germans decided to control by terror. Wholesale retaliation became a settled policy. In August 1943 the Germans officially announced that for every German soldier killed in Greece no less than fifty Greeks would be executed. The theory behind such a policy was that fear of the consequences would lead peasants and townsmen to refuse coöperation with the guerillas. In fact, the policy operated to ingrain hatred of the Germans into almost every Greek heart. Moderate men found themselves torn between two desperations; they could not easily approve of the guerillas whose action against the Germans resulted in wholesale executions; and they certainly could not bring themselves to sympathize with the Germans who so cruelly were destroying innocent lives. The impossibility of such a choice between hammer and anvil practically destroyed all middle-of-the-road opinion in Greece. Some few extremists chose rather to accept support from the Germans than to allow the Communist-led guerillas to gain undisputed control of the country. But most men who could not bring themselves to join the guerillas in the hills, saw no comfort in coming under the German mantle. They were confused, disorganized and afraid, and grew ever more so until the German withdrawal in 1944.

German methods in making reprisals were ruthless. On more than one occasion in the town of Athens a German patrol was sent out to the scene of the death of a German soldier, and there arrested the first fifty persons who happened to walk down the street, lined them against a wall and shot them out of hand. In the country retaliation was more sweeping still. If the guerillas had ambushed a German patrol, blown a bridge or committed some other act of sabotage, the Germans made it a practice to go to the nearest village and there burn down some or all of the houses. In extreme cases, where

the offense had been more serious, the Germans made systematic attempts to kill all the inhabitants and burn their houses to the ground.

One of the most famous instances of this indiscriminate cruelty is the destruction of Kalavryta, a town of sentimental interest to every Greek, for there began the War of Independence in 1821. In the spring of 1944 a German column was waylaid in a gorge some miles to the north of the town, and a few prisoners were taken. The captives were brought to Kalavryta, kept for a few days and then taken into the hills and executed. When news of these happenings came to the German Command, an entire battalion was despatched to punish the townspeople. When first the German troops arrived in Kalavryta most of the inhabitants had fled; but the Germans remained for several days, professing the intention only of punishing the individuals who had harmed German soldiers. Believing these assurances, most of the villagers filtered back to their homes. Then one morning, the German officer in command ordered all the people of the town to report to the square. When they had all congregated, the men were separated from the rest, marched out into a near-by field and there mowed down by hidden machine guns. The women and children, meanwhile, had been penned into the church, and the building set on fire. The rear door of the church was opened (in disobedience of orders) by one of the German soldiers, and most of the women were able to escape with their children; but of the men, only a few who successfully shammed death in the field ever lived to tell the tale. Before departing from Kalavryta, the Germans scattered a special inflammatory powder through all the peasant homes and set them alight. It was by such massacres that the Germans hoped to keep the Greeks down.

It would be false to say that the systematic retaliation and terror did not have an effect. It did. Many Greeks became almost frantic, seeking a nonexistent peace, hating the Ger-

mans and hoping that the guerillas would cease to provoke them. Others reacted by joining all the more strenuously in the resistance movement, doing what they could to revenge themselves on the Germans, and recking nought of the additional cost their acts might have for fellow Greeks. It is doubtful whether the German policy of deliberate terror and wholesale retaliation reduced the power or scale of the resistance movement; but it is certain that it produced a bitter resentment against the guerillas in the minds of many who suffered unjustly for their acts. Further, the economic cost to Greece was heavy. Almost a fourth of all the buildings in Greece were damaged in some degree; thousands of Greeks were killed; and regular cultivation of considerable areas of land was interrupted.

Most of the systematic destruction was wreaked during the last year and a half of occupation. While the Italians were in control of Greece, terror was largely confined to individual arrest and execution, though cases of mass punishment were not unknown. It was not until after the collapse of the Italian armies in Greece (Sept.-Nov. 1943), when the Germans were compelled to take over responsibility for peace and order in the whole country at a time when they needed troops desperately on the Eastern and Italian fronts, that German wrath against the guerillas and anger at the people who sheltered them reached such a peak that massacres such as I have described were regularly resorted to.

After the Italian collapse, the Germans were seriously pressed for men to hold even the main lines of communication through Greece. Many large but relatively remote districts were never reconquered by the Germans, but remained from 1943 onward under guerilla control. After the fall of 1943 the German shortage of men was so great that they organized Greeks into the so-called Security (or Police) Battalions. These battalions were commanded by regular Greek Army officers, but each unit had attached to it a German

liaison officer who in practice acted as the battalion commander. They were recruited on a semivoluntary basis. Most of the battalions originated as volunteer bands eager to fight against the Communists. After they had been officially recognized and equipped by the Germans, the quisling Government made halfhearted attempts to conscript Greek civilians into the battalions. But it was always easy for a man to hide himself from government officials, if necessary by joining the guerillas in the mountains, so that in practice few if any men joined the battalions save of their own will.

The Security Battalions were not organized over all Greece. They centered chiefly in the southern part of the country, where a predominantly conservative peasantry was easily persuaded that Communist guerillas were worse even than German tools. In Athens and Salonika, battalions were also raised, for in the last year of occupation the guerillas extended the sphere of their operation into the principal cities, where they quickly grew too strong for ordinary police to handle. Elsewhere in Greece it was difficult or impossible to find personnel who were willing to serve under the Germans, and Security Battalions were never successfully brought into operation. The total force was not large, numbering about five thousand men.

The Security Battalions were organized to fight against the guerillas. The combat sometimes took the form of direct engagement between the rival forces, but usually the weaker side was content to retreat without standing pitched battle. Instead, it was the villagers who bore the brunt. Peasants were penalized for assisting the guerillas, and the Security Battalions no less than the Germans themselves were guilty of wholesale acts of retaliation against helpless populations. The guerillas, for their part, undertook to punish anyone who ventured to assist the Security Battalions. It followed that the net effect of the formation of these battalions was to spread still wider the rapine and destruction that had already

blighted Greece, and to intensify the internal discord which had begun to paralyze the whole country and jeopardize its future.

Three and a half years of occupation, then, brought unmitigated disaster to Greece. The quisling Government decayed steadily, losing power and efficiency until it became entirely helpless by 1944. Economically, a sort of false prosperity followed the famine of 1941, but after mid-1943 unchecked inflation began, prices rose astronomically, and in the end the currency became worthless so that economic exchange reverted to a barter basis. Losses from retaliatory destruction were heavy and grew ever more serious. But perhaps the most irreparable damage of all was the hurt done to the Greek spirit. The country became hopelessly divided against itself. In the mountains one community lived and fought under the dominant control of the Communist Party. In the towns and villages, moderate men knew not where to turn, and came to fix their hopes blindly on an Allied liberation which they fondly believed would cure the ills which beset their country. On the extreme Right a small number of persons threw in their lot with the Germans, and lived in fear of violent retaliation from the guerillas after the expected departure of their protectors. It was not an easy thing to be a Greek during the years of occupation, nor could any wise man see clearly what way his duty lay. What alone was clear in the confused situation was that more trouble lay ahead after the so-much-hoped-for liberation.

III

Resistance

AFTER the sudden overthrow of the Greek state and the precipitous evacuation of British troops from Greece, it must have seemed to most Greeks that the Germans had every chance of winning the war. A sort of stunned paralysis descended on the population. There seemed nothing to do to restore the independence of the country or win back the severed provinces of Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. Within a few months of their defeat, the problem of finding enough food distracted attention from all other questions, and men began to dispute mournfully in the cafés as to which had lost the most weight. Under the circumstances there seemed little a man could do save blindly wish, hope and hate.

Despite this initial lethargy Greece was not a country easily cowed by a hated and despised conqueror. An age-old tradition of guerilla action against the Turkish oppressors was ingrained deeply in the sentiments of every Greek. Old ballads, familiar to everyone, told of the deeds of daring performed by robber *klefti* of olden time; and the Greek War of Independence, as all Greeks knew, had been fought out in large part by just such irregular bands. Furthermore, the Greeks had guns. When the Greek Army retreated in defeat before the German invader, many soldiers foresaw the end of organized resistance and started on foot for their homes, carrying their rifles with them. Apart from these weapons, many

Greek peasants treasured antique firearms, taking an almost childlike joy in their possession.

The country, too, is by nature well suited to guerilla action. All of Greece, one may say, is mountainous. Plains are the exception, and are cut off from one another by ranges of almost barren hills. The principal mountain mass of Greece is the Pindus, a broad, broken range, nowhere more than nine thousand feet high, intersected by valleys in which isolated villages cluster. Roads and other means of communication are few and primitive. Great areas of Greece, particularly in the Pindus, can be reached only by foot or on mule back. A large proportion of the villages lies away from any road along which motor vehicles can pass. Such terrain makes it difficult to police the country in times of peace. In a time when the Government was almost universally unpopular, the task became well-nigh impossible.

A further fact which made the development of guerilla bands inevitable was that the Germans saw fit to hand over nearly all of Greece to Italian control. Practically every able-bodied Greek had taken part in the Albanian War and had learned thoroughly to despise the Italian soldiery. Now that the self-same Italians strutted through the streets of the towns and took up posts along the principal roads, lording it over the Greeks as though they had been victors, no Greek could but remember what had happened in Epirus and Albania when they in their handfuls had put hundreds of Italians to flight. It was easy to believe that the same could happen again; that a national army could form in the mountains and bring discomfiture once more to the haughty Italians.

By the summer of 1942 dozens of little bands began to form in the hills. At first there was no common organization. A leader, distinguished for his military experience, courage or daring, could easily recruit a few restless young men from a village, treat them to some patriotic speeches, and take them

out on a few adventures: cutting telephone wire, threatening Greek collaborators, or perhaps assaulting an isolated Italian soldier. Most of these bands were of no permanent importance, and many of them enjoyed only an intermittent existence, their members going out for a few nights of raiding, and returning to peaceful pursuits during the day.

A few more desperate characters found it wise to remain permanently in the hills. These were mostly men who were wanted by the Government for one reason or another, but included from the very beginning a few who had been sent as emissaries of political organizations for the purpose of forming permanent guerilla units. Two such men, Napoleon Zervas and Ares Velouhiotis, succeeded in forming small bands early in the summer of 1942, which were destined to play a large part in the subsequent history of Greece. The two men had much in common. Both were bold, skillful guerilla leaders and cherished vaulting personal ambition. But the differences between them were also great. Ares Velouhiotis was a Communist and a sadist; Zervas, a republican and an adventurer.

The Communist guerilla leader was universally known as Ares, a name borrowed from the classic Greek god of war. Details of his life are uncertain and his real name is disputed. According to the version most current in Greece, his name was Athanasios Klaras, and he was born into a middle class family of Athens. He was well educated, specializing in agricultural studies. As a young man he is supposed to have entered the civil service as an agricultural extension agent. While working for the Government he became attracted by the Communist movement and joined the party. There are reports that he went to Russia for training and that he was in Spain in 1936-1938. In any event, he was jailed by Metaxas on criminal charges and remained imprisoned until 1941, when, in the general confusion of the German invasion, he

escaped. Once free, he fell in with the Communist leaders, and in 1942 was commissioned by them to form a band of guerillas in the central Pindus Mountains.

Ares' character was an extraordinary one. He could exert great charm and suavity when he so wished; at other times he exhibited the most bestial cruelty, and took such apparent delight in torturing and killing his victims as to repel even his own followers. He proved himself a capable guerilla leader, possessing both courage and resource in sudden emergency, and was able to spur his men on by personal example to deeds from which they would otherwise have shrunk. When he first formed his band, Ares was between thirty and thirty-five years of age, of stalwart build with fierce sparkling eyes. As a guerilla, he let his black beard grow long, wore a black uniform and a black lambskin cap adorned with white skull and crossbones. Around himself he collected a special bodyguard of desperadoes who were similarly uniformed. The band gained a reputation for boundless cruelty and daring. It often served as a special execution squad which tortured and killed men condemned by the "People's Courts."

Napoleon Zervas' career is better known. He was born in western Greece near the town of Arta about 1890. He entered the military cadet school in Athens, but dropped out after two years, being too lazy and undisciplined to study. He thereupon joined the Army as a career non-commissioned officer. When Venizelos set up his revolutionary Government in Salonika (1916) Zervas hastened to join the new Army, in which he was speedily commissioned. He won his way close to the center of power in the Venizelist Army, being aide-de-camp to one of the chief republican generals, and by 1920 had risen to the rank of major. In 1922 he joined with Plastiras in his revolt against the royal Government; in 1925 he assisted General Pangalos to seize power, and became joint commander of the dictator's personal bodyguard. The following year he fell in with the plots against the dictator, and

used his position as commander of the bodyguard to oust Pangalos from power.

This act did not win Zervas a very savory reputation. As a consequence he was forced to retire from the Army, and for the next fifteen years lived as a private citizen. During this time he established himself as a sort of gambling king of Athens. He took no part in the Albanian War, but under the occupation he became interested in an association of republican politicians which formed in Athens in the fall of 1941, under the name of the Greek Democratic National League or EDES (*Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*). Zervas had more military experience than most of the members of this association, and he was selected as the man to lead a guerilla band that, it was hoped, would be able to forward the political program of the organization. Accordingly, in June 1942, Zervas left Athens for his native district in western Greece, and there was quickly able to form around himself a small group of EDES guerillas.

Both EDES and the Communist political organization had made contact with British agents in the course of 1941. When British Headquarters in Cairo decided to try to interrupt the German line of supply that ran through Greece to North Africa, it was known to them that the two bands led by Ares and Zervas were in existence. Consequently when British saboteurs were dropped by parachute into Greece in the summer of 1942, they had instructions to come into contact with both bands and try to gain their assistance. The British plan was to blow up the Gorgopotamos Bridge which carried the railroad line, connecting Greece with the rest of Europe, over a deep gorge in the mountains south of Lamia. The operation was timed to coincide with the British offensive at El Alamein. It had a considerable importance, for much if not most of the German supplies for Rommel's army were being delivered through Greece via Crete. If the British could interrupt the railroad for two or three weeks, German sup-

plies could not be delivered, and the hoped-for victory would be made the easier.

The three British officers assigned this hazardous mission were Lieutenant Colonel Tom Barnes, a New Zealander and the man who actually was to place the charges that destroyed the bridge; Lieutenant Colonel Chris Woodhouse, a clever young Englishman with high social connections; and Colonel Edward Myers, a regular officer of the British Army. With them were several sergeants, specially trained in demolition. The little group was successfully dropped in the wilds of the Pindus Mountains with the necessary radio sets, and paraphernalia for blowing up the bridge. During the following weeks they were able to make contact with both Zervas and Ares. The two guerilla leaders agreed to assist in destroying the bridge, and a total force of some hundred men set out cross country in the early fall. The bridge was guarded by Italian soldiers; and the two Greek bands were assigned the task of engaging the guards (one to each end of the bridge) while the British detachment placed the charges and blew it up. All went well for the saboteurs, and on 24 November 1942 the bridge was destroyed. It was not repaired until about three weeks had passed, and during that time the flow of supplies from Europe to the German armies in North Africa was interrupted.

In fact, the saboteurs were late. Three weeks before they blew the Gorgopotamos Bridge, Montgomery had won the battle of El Alamein. Nevertheless, the secret feat of this handful of British soldiers and Greek guerillas was of great value to the Allied cause, for it helped compel the Germans in Africa to draw back westward until they could reach fresh supplies coming through Italy. By the time the bridge had been repaired, Rommel's army had retreated so far into Libya that Greece no longer served the Axis as a useful line of supply. Thereafter the necessity of garrisoning the countr

became nothing but a drain on much-needed manpower, from which the Germans could reap no military return.

As soon as the bridge was destroyed, the Greeks and British fled for the fastnesses of the Pindus. They were harried by pursuing Italian soldiers; and the British officers, at any rate, were pushed to the limit of their endurance to keep ahead of the pursuit. The original intention of British Headquarters in Cairo had been to carry out this one operation and then withdraw the mission. A submarine was supposed to pick up the British soldiers in a remote cove off the west coast of Greece; and on Christmas Day 1942 the weary group arrived at the shore to wait for the submarine. For several days it did not show up; and at length a radio signal from Cairo came telling the Britishers that they had done well, and would remain in Greece to carry out further operations as directed. Their disappointment was severe; but they had no choice in the matter and made the best of it.

When the British Mission first found Zervas in the fall of 1942, he had with him no more than fourteen men; Ares had a few more, about thirty. From these minute beginnings two armies developed during the next year, until by the end of 1943, Ares' organization numbered perhaps twenty thousand men, while Zervas commanded about five thousand. This enormous growth was made possible by the development of the political organizations which supported the guerillas. We must now examine them more closely.

The Greek Communist Party had succeeded in keeping its organization alive throughout the dictatorship of Metaxas. Communists fought bravely in the Albanian War, obedient to the instructions of a letter written by their imprisoned leader, Nicholas Zachariades. In January 1941, however, after the Greek troops had crossed into Albania, Zachariades wrote a second letter denouncing the Greek invasion as a war of Fascist aggression, and ordered his followers to desert and sabotage the war effort as far as lay within their power. This

second letter did not gain the same wide circulation as had the first, and only a handful of "professional" Communists obeyed. Consequently the patriotic reputation of the Communist Party was not seriously damaged, and after the occupation had begun, when Communist leaders began to call for a common front against the invaders, many patriotic and moderate-minded men were inclined to lend a willing ear to their words.

In the general confusion that followed immediately upon the Greek defeat, most of the jails of the country were opened and their inmates allowed to escape. By this means nearly all the Communist leaders regained their freedom and were able to add their efforts to those of the few who had been able to evade imprisonment. Leadership of KKE passed to George Siantos, for the prewar head of the party, Nicholas Zachariades, had not been able to escape from prison. He fell into German hands and was sent to the Dachau concentration camp where he remained throughout the war.

Since both Zachariades and Siantos have played central rôles in the recent history of Greece, it is worth while to look at their personal careers for a moment. Nicholas Zachariades was born in 1902 in Asia Minor. As a child, his family took him to Skoplje (then still part of Turkey), but after the Serbs acquired sovereignty over that town (1912) the family moved again to Adrianople (Turkey), where the young Zachariades attended a Greek school. At the time of the Russian Revolution he was just fifteen years old, and for some years thereafter he worked as a sailor on the Black Sea. He was intellectually gifted, and perhaps resented the hard life of a Greek sailor. In 1921 or 1922 he skipped ship in some Russian port, and succeeded in winning admittance to a school of Marxist studies. He made a brilliant record, and in 1923 was sent by the Comintern to Greece where he quickly took a leading place in the Communist youth movement. By 1926 Zachariades had graduated to the party itself, and spent a short

time in Salonika where he was arrested by the dictatorial Government of General Pangalos. He escaped, went to Athens, and after Pangalos' fall, became a member of the Athens Regional Committee of the Communist Party. In 1929 he was again arrested, this time on the charge that he had killed a political opponent in a knife fight. His enemy was an "Archivo-Marxist," that is, a member of an obscure and miniscule Trotskyite group. With the help of his fellow Communists, Zachariades again succeeded in escaping from jail, and was shipped to Russia a second time for safety and further study. He is believed to have followed a course at the School of Eastern Studies in Moscow, and is reputed to have made the best academic record that had ever been made in that school.

He certainly made a favorable impression on high officials of the Third International, for, as we have seen, when a split developed in the Communist Party in Greece (1931), the young Zachariades was chosen to take over the leadership of the party. He was notably successful in uniting the fractured party and led the Greek Communists to greater influence than they had previously known. During the next few years Zachariades' prestige rose with his party's successes. In 1935 he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and became Secretary of the Balkan Communist Bureau. As such he was head of all the Balkan Communist organizations, directly subordinate to the Comintern chief, George Dimitroff. When Metaxas came to power, Zachariades was jailed, and he remained a prisoner until the invading Germans removed him to Dachau.

If Zachariades represents the professional internationalist revolutionary, George Siantos may be taken as typical of a more distinctly national type of Communist. He is an older man than Zachariades, having been born in 1890. He came of a poor family in Thessaly, and at the age of thirteen began work in a tobacco factory. Siantos was an intelligent youth

of dominating character. He became prominent in the Tobacco Workers' Federation of Greece even before the Balkan Wars. From 1911 to 1920 he served in the Greek Army, rising to the grade of technical sergeant. During this time he is said to have been strongly impressed by the progress of the Russian Revolution. Upon his discharge from military service, he became a member of the newly formed Socialist-Labor Party.

He soon rose to be one of the leading figures of that party. In 1922 he helped to organize certain small agrarian disturbances that took place in Thessaly and led to the breakup of a few large estates which had previously existed there. Siantos advocated and helped to bring about the affiliation of the Socialist-Labor Party with the Third International, and became a charter member of the Political Bureau of the new Greek Communist Party. In 1925 he became Secretary General of the Central Committee, a post which involved practical control of the Greek Communists.

In 1928 he made his first visit to Russia, attending the Sixth Congress of the Comintern as representative of the Greek party. He resumed the post of Secretary General upon his return, and entered official political life as a member of the Chamber of Deputies in 1930. His career met a sudden obstacle in the next year when a discontented faction of the party broke away from his leadership and began to accuse him of deviations from true Marxist-Leninist principles. He was ousted from power and departed for Russia where he remained for two years, studying in the same School of Eastern Studies from which Zachariades had graduated so brilliantly. In 1933 Siantos returned to Greece and took over direction of the Communist organization in Pireus. Within three years he was again a member of the Political Bureau, with an influence in the party second only to that of Zachariades.

In 1937 Metaxas arrested Siantos and interned him on a

desolate little island in the Aegean. He escaped the following year and took over the direction of the Communist Party in the absence of Zachariades who remained securely in prison. He was arrested again in 1939, and fell into Italian custody after the occupation of Greece. He escaped from them in 1941 and once more took over the leadership of KKE. In due course he became the most influential single individual in the Communist-inspired resistance movement.

The contrast in the careers and characters of these two men is interesting and instructive for the light it throws on the management and control of the Greek Communist Party. Siantos was energetic, clever in conference rooms, and shrewd in his estimate of other men. He was not much of a doctrinaire, and cared more for the preservation of the party as an administrative machine and instrument of power than for doctrinal purity or consistency. He was not an effective public speaker and rather shunned the limelight; yet in private conversation he showed himself thoroughly self-assured, sardonically humorous, ironically amused by the permutations of the human puppet show. His life has been wholly Greek, and it is rumored that he has not always accepted the directions of the Comintern with complete enthusiasm.

Zachariades was a totally different sort of character. He was a virtuoso in abstract intellectual discussion, could make an effective public speech, and has written large numbers of articles, two small books (including one on literary criticism) and translated several Marxist classics into Greek. He was highly educated, narrowly doctrinaire, totally humorless and liked to take a prominent place in the public eye. He was Greek by accident of language, having come to the country as a grown man, an emissary of the Communist International. His whole point of view differed from that of Siantos. Siantos exhibited a sort of peasant shrewdness and soil-rootedness; Zachariades was an international urban revolutionary.

In appearance the two were in striking contrast. Sianto:

was short, balding, and stooped. His nose was long, great pouches hung under his eyes, and a moustache straggled across his upper lip. Zachariades was rather handsome, clean-shaven, with stocky but athletic build. In a social gathering he tended to lecture rather than to converse, and there was always some sense of strain, as though he were not thoroughly at his ease, and, anticipating attack, went out to meet it with aggressive and eloquent words.

The organization which Siantos found under his direction when he escaped from jail in the spring of 1941 was relatively small, but boasted a firm discipline and commanded a deep enthusiasm among its members. A core of professional revolutionaries, of whom a small number (perhaps fifty in all) had been specially trained in Russia, headed a mixed following of students, professional men and workers. The greatest weakness of the organization was the lack of any real following among the peasants. Its greatest strength lay in the fact that the Communists were already familiar with repression and persecution, and had learned to be adept in undercover activity during the Metaxas regime. All in all, the Greek Communist Party was in a strategic position. No other Greek political organization was ready on the ground; and among most politicians a spirit of defeatism prevented any serious efforts to revive the party organizations which had been crushed by Metaxas. Yet despite the supine behavior of their old political leaders, nearly the whole Greek people was united in its dislike of the invaders. The Communists were quickly able to capitalize on this fact and win wide support by establishing a new organization, the National Liberation Front, or as it became universally known from its initials, EAM (*Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon*).

EAM was founded 27 September 1941. Its original constituents were the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party of Gavrielides, the United Socialist Party, the Republican Party, the Union of Popular Democracy and the Socialist Party.

Besides these organizations, some of which were of very slender influence, many individuals from the old Liberal Party were attracted into the new organization, and played relatively important rôles in the early days. EAM was directed by a committee, drawing one representative from each of the constituent parties. On the surface, this arrangement would seem to relegate the Communist Party to a minority place in directing the policies of the Front; but in fact it was otherwise. Of the six groups that united to form EAM, four were indistinguishable in all but name from the Communist Party. Only the Union of Popular Democracy headed by the Socialist intellectual, Elias Tsirimokos, and the Socialist Party, which drew its strength from the rather chaotic labor unions of Greece, were truly independent of the Communists. The others were headed by Communists and followed the wishes of the Political Bureau of KKE in all things.

Despite this fact, Communist control of EAM was inconspicuous during its early days. The movement succeeded in attracting great numbers of non-Communists, and generated such enthusiasm among them that for a while it seemed possible that the Communists would be submerged by the greater numbers of the others and lose control of the movement. But, as we shall see, the disciplined energy of the Communists resulted in their coming into ultimate control of the whole EAM organization.

The influence of the Communist Party was deliberately camouflaged at the beginning. KKE members were not allowed to hold the most conspicuous posts. Thus the first Secretary General of the National Liberation Front was an eminently respectable Socialist named George Economou. A similar policy was followed in filling all subordinate positions; wherever possible men of general respect and good repute were installed.

The purposes of EAM as originally announced were such as would appeal to almost every patriotic Greek. The

organization set out to unite all factions against the invader; to resist the efforts of the quisling Government by strikes and by armed force; and to raise and maintain the morale of the people against the day of liberation. Preaching this doctrine, organizers were sent out to the villages of Greece during the fall and winter of 1941-1942. By this means, KKE's great weakness—lack of peasant support—was largely overcome. In nearly every village of Greece an EAM cell came to be established. Propaganda was intense and well organized. Young boys and students did much of the evangelistic work, and not all of them were Communist by any means. Under the circumstances, the movement spread rapidly and took a firm hold on the loyalties of large numbers of the peasants of Greece.

In the towns, EAM's success was equally great. A few months after its foundation nearly all the laboring men had joined the movement, and a number of singularly successful strikes were carried out by EAM during the ensuing three years as warnings and demonstrations against unpopular Government action. It was in part due to the propaganda and demonstrations organized by EAM that Greek laborers were never conscripted by the quisling Government for work in German factories, and that the number of men who volunteered for work in Germany was small.

EAM drew much of its force from the fact that it appealed to the youth and women of Greece. The movement was able to reach the boys and girls of the nation, and inspire them with a vivid sense of their own value and importance. Boys of fourteen were numerous among the guerillas, while veritable children were regularly employed as messengers, being less likely to suspicion and search. Traditionally, in Greek society, the father had unchallenged control over the members of his family, and the place of women was (and is) far lower than in the countries of Western Europe. EAM, however, established special groups for women, and many a Greek housewife found

herself called upon for the first time in her life to act, in obedience to the directions of the organization, independently of her husband's control. Such emancipation attracted many women, and they became among the most fanatic EAM supporters. In general, one may say that the development of EAM broke down the peasant family system of values and discipline which had previously been dominant among the working classes of the towns. In the country nothing of the sort took place: the families continued to exist as before with the father in supreme control, and the EAM movement was largely limited to the menfolk of the villages. For this among other reasons, the power of the movement was far less in the country than in the towns. In a sense this aspect of EAM's activity only continued an emancipation begun under the Metaxas regime, through the agency of youth and women's groups.

By the spring of 1942, EAM had set up local leaders and organizations over the whole of central Greece. Only after this had been achieved was an effort made to form the armed force, the guerilla army which was to resist the occupation troops. On 10 April EAM made proclamation of its plan to form a guerilla army. It was called ELAS, a pun on the Greeks' name for their country, *Ellas*. The letters are the initials of the National People's Liberation Army (*Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*). The new army did not spring suddenly into existence but formed around a few guerilla chieftains, of whom Ares was by far the most famous and important. At first the bands operated independently, and not until the winter of 1942-1943 did any semblance of effective central control begin to bind the separate bands into what could properly be called a guerilla army.

Thousands of eager young men offered themselves as recruits for ELAS. To be accepted, a volunteer had to be recommended by the EAM leader (*Ipefthinos*) of the village or the district of the town in which he lived. With a certificate of

good character from the Ipefthinos, the would-be recruit presented himself to the nearest band, and if weapons were available, he would be duly sworn in as a soldier of the ELAS. Normal military law was enforced. A soldier once enrolled could not depart without formal permission from his commanding officer; and disobedience to orders was punishable by death if circumstances seemed to warrant. Special military courts were established to enforce discipline, and they also extended their jurisdiction to the trial of civilians who were accused of hindering or harming the activities of ELAS.

The army was commanded by a system of triplices. Instead of a single commander, every unit and headquarters was directed by a committee of three. The three were a military commander (usually but not always a former officer or sergeant of the Greek Army); a *Kapetanios*, who was charged with carrying on propaganda and enlightenment in the unit; and a political representative of EAM. The political representative was supposed to direct relations between the unit and the civilian population and organizations, e.g., he would make billeting arrangements or requisition food from a village. Any important decision had to be agreed to by all three men in command. But in general, the military commander turned out to be the least important of the three, being entrusted only with narrowly military decisions such as the disposition of troops for an attack. Other matters, such as deciding who should be attacked and when, were usually attended to by the *Kapetanios* and the political representative together. The system assured civilian control over the army; more than that, it was so manipulated as to assure Communist control, for as time went on, more and more of the political representatives and *Kapetanoi* were chosen from the ranks of the Communist Party.

Such a systematic description as the above oversimplifies and makes too orderly what was actually a gradual and in part an unforeseen development from the original collection of

small isolated bands. Much of the early development of ELAS took place through the incorporation of bands which had formed independently of EAM. Many such bands were willing to join forces with the larger organization peaceably; especially when, as was often the case, their chieftains were promised a larger command within the framework of ELAS. It was by this method that its two most prominent military figures were persuaded to join the National People's Liberation Army.

Colonel Stephen Sarafis was a Regular Army officer who had attached himself closely to the fortunes of the republican faction in the Army. After the 1935 revolution he was dismissed from active service and exiled to the island of Milos. In 1941 he returned to Athens where he spent some months in jail as a prisoner of the Italians, but was released early in 1943. He thereupon went to his native district in Thessaly and was able to organize a small independent band of guerrillas. In May 1943 his band was one day surrounded by ELAS troops, and Sarafis was offered the choice of surrendering to ELAS or suffering their attack. He chose to surrender, and was taken as a prisoner to ELAS General Headquarters where he was first condemned to death, and then, after some days, suddenly emerged as the Commander in Chief of all the ELAS forces.

This surprising denouement can be understood if one bears in mind two things: first, that Sarafis was a high ranking Army officer (full colonel) with considerable prestige among republican officers, and presumed experience and capacity in military tactics; and second, that as Commander in Chief he was checked by a Kapetanios (Ares) and a political representative (George Siantos), so that his opportunity of independent action was nil. From the point of view of the men who held effective power over ELAS, Sarafis could do them no harm; and by giving military advice and serving as a respectable front, he could do the movement useful service.

Colonel Evripidis Bakirdjis was recruited to the ranks of ELAS in almost the same manner. When the war broke out, he was in exile, where he had fled after the failure of the 1935 revolt. In 1942 he presented himself to the Greek Government in Cairo and was appointed to active duty. He quickly became immersed in the intrigues that were then running through the Greek forces in the Middle East. In order to rid themselves of his troublesome presence, the Greeks suggested that Colonel Bakirdjis might be a useful man to head a resistance group in the north of Greece, where an organization known as EKKA, closely under British protection, was trying to start active military operations against the Germans. The British accepted him, and Bakirdjis was transported into Macedonia (spring, 1943), and he was soon able to form a small band of guerillas. But again ELAS insisted on a monopoly of resistance, and brought its forces into a threatening position so that Bakirdjis was persuaded to surrender to them. In due course, he became the top ELAS commander in Macedonia, and was for some months the president of the Provisional Government of the Mountains when it was organized in the spring of 1944.

Commanders such as Sarafis and Bakirdjis were rare in the ranks of ELAS. Regular Army officers were generally an object of suspicion to the leftists, and officers reciprocated the distrust. Most ELAS units were commanded militarily by former sergeants or very junior Reserve officers of the Greek Army. The Kapetanoi and political representatives were recruited from the ranks of the Communist and associated parties. Some of these were capable and educated men—lawyers and university students or the like; but others were simple workmen or peasants whose only formal education was what they had gained from the propaganda lectures of EAM and the Communist Party.

British policy did much to forward the growth of the power of ELAS. When the three original members of the British

Mission received the order to remain in Greece, they dispersed. Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse joined Ares in the mountains of Thessaly; Lieutenant Colonel Barnes stayed with Zervas in western Greece; and Colonel Myers set up an independent headquarters of his own from which he hoped to coördinate the activities of both bands. It was roughly agreed that Zervas would act in the west, leaving the area east of the Pindus Mountains to Ares. This division was originally made simply because Zervas in western Greece was on ground familiar from his childhood; but the facts of geography put him at a grave disadvantage as against Ares and the ELAS bands. The western part of Greece is isolated from the main centers of population and lines of communication by wild and desolate mountains, and an organization centering itself around the town of Arta was inevitably far removed from the fulcrum of power.

Nevertheless, the British and Greeks worked on the basis of such a delimitation of spheres. Ares' band became the core of the National People's Liberation Army, and, as its numbers grew by recruitment and absorption of other bands, subordinate units, grandiloquently named divisions, regiments and battalions were organized. The British sent in some supplies and weapons by air; more important, they sent large sums of gold which were used to buy food and other necessities for the guerilla soldiers. During the first year the British treated ELAS and Zervas equally; although the fact that ELAS quickly outstripped all rivals meant that in practice the British delivered larger quantities of supplies to them.

British policy was aimed to secure the maximum possible military pressure on the Italian and German troops that occupied Greece. As a first step toward this end it seemed necessary to unite all the various guerilla bands into a single force. In central Greece, Ares and his friends became the chosen instrument. They had been first on the ground, and Ares deeply impressed Colonel Woodhouse with his capacities as a guerilla

leader. The sadistic side of Ares' character was probably kept hidden from the Britisher; and in any case, a little Balkan barbarism probably seemed inevitable and even wholesome to the cultivated young Englishman.

Consequently, as ELAS stretched out its power into new areas, its demand for monopoly of armed resistance was in general supported by the British liaison officers who began to come into Greece in ever-increasing numbers. On the BBC, nightly broadcasts urged all guerilla factions in Greece to unite in harmony in order to resist the invaders. In practice over most of Greece this came to mean union with ELAS.

The guerilla troops were chronically short of clothes and ammunition. Nevertheless, life in ELAS was not of itself very onerous, for the guerillas stayed in remote mountain villages most of the time and lived a life of semi-indolence. Occasional periods of sudden and extreme exertion varied the monotony; and every so often came a whiff of danger which confirmed the soldiers in their conviction that they were national heroes. In the winter, life was harder; but the men seldom had to live in the open for more than a few days at a time since it was the universal practice to requisition lodging (and sometimes food as well) from the local peasants. Food often ran short in the early days; but by midsummer 1943 EAM had succeeded in establishing a remarkably efficient system of requisition and purchase, and had been able to accumulate substantial ration stores which were distributed with fair regularity.

In actual fact, a soldier in ELAS lived a good deal better than did the ordinary peasant of Greece, and did not have to work with the same drudging toil. He further had the psychological exhilaration of believing himself a hero and the true descendant of the robber klefti who had fought in the War of Independence and were enshrined in the Greek national tradition. Under the circumstances, many a peasant's son found himself irresistibly attracted to the guerilla life; and an overabundant peasant population made recruitment easy. Fewer

came from the towns; life was relatively comfortable there, and EAM had other work for townsmen, organizing strikes and serving as propagandists among the more illiterate peasants.

From the very beginning the chief factor that limited the numbers of the guerillas was lack of weapons. Their original armament had been in the country at the beginning, coming mostly from the soldiers who had kept their guns after the Albanian War. Additional weapons came by capture from the Italians and Germans; and a small trickle, but important because it was the best source of automatic weapons, came by air from the British in Cairo. Drawing guns from these sources, ELAS was able to build its strength up to about twenty thousand by the end of the summer of 1943.

Although ELAS became by far the most formidable force among the resistance organizations, it was not without rivals. The most important of these was the EDES led by Napoleon Zervas. EDES shared all the early advantages of ELAS save two: it began operations in what was essentially a backwater of the country and could never reach into the main parts of Greece without coming into collision with ELAS which, holding the Pindus Mountains, blocked the way to the main centers of population; and secondly, the political organization that backed the EDES guerilla force was less efficient and less energetic than EAM. It was this second weakness that was decisive. Had Zervas been supported by an organization as vigorous as EAM, he could undoubtedly have overcome the opposition of ELAS and built up his army in other parts of Greece despite the Communists. As it was, many isolated bands, not wishing to join forces with ELAS, tried to associate themselves with Zervas and EDES; but lack of easy communication or effective support from a political machine comparable to EAM made all such attempts failures, and permitted ELAS to pick off the dissident bands one by one, after the fashion of their dealing with Colonels Sarafis and Bakirdjis.

After Greece had been conquered by the Germans, the established leaders of the Liberal and other republican parties declined to take any active interest in organizing resistance. Most of them were old men (the leader of the Liberal Party, Themistocles Sofoulis, was seventy-nine years old) and unaccustomed to the conspiratorial methods that had to be used. Many of the younger and more impatient Liberals consequently joined forces with EAM when it was founded. Others preferred to organize separately. The Greek National Democratic League (Athens EDES) was the result. This new organization fixed upon General Nicholas Plastiras as its nominal head. It will be recalled that Plastiras had been the military leader of the revolution against King Constantine's Government in 1922, and had led a second revolt, but without success, in 1933. Thereafter he lived in exile, but kept up connections in Greece with former confederates. A few of Plastiras' friends were among the original founders of the Democratic League, and through their influence he came to be recognized as the nominal leader of the organization.

EDES, as the organization was always called, differed from EAM in many respects. It never achieved any wide popular base but remained little more than a cabal of ambitious politicians or would-be politicians in Athens. Active leaders were mostly professors and well-to-do businessmen who made little progress toward building up a rank-and-file membership in Athens. Elsewhere in the country no real organization was ever established. The leading figure of EDES in Athens was General Stylianos Gonatas, Plastiras' colleague in the revolution of 1922. As we have seen, Napoleon Zervas became the military leader of the movement; but after leaving for the west (June 1942) he maintained only very tenuous ties with the parent organization in Athens, and owed little to its support. Some few recruits came to Zervas' forces through the Athens organization; otherwise nothing.

In western Greece, Zervas was able to expand his guerilla

force by much the same methods as were used by ELAS in other parts of Greece. A political committee was organized at his headquarters which sent men round the villages to spread Zervas' fame. They urged young men who had rifles to join him, and selected local representatives in each village who became responsible for providing such supplies and quarters as the EDES guerillas required. But the political propaganda of EDES never had the drive and enthusiasm which was so abundantly possessed by EAM; and the political organization of the villages never reached a level comparable to that achieved by the rival group.

Despite these weaknesses, Zervas was able to expand his force rapidly, and in his case too, it was a lack of weapons that held down the number of his guerillas. Approximately five thousand men had come under his command by the summer of 1943. Their organization followed orthodox military lines. Zervas, himself a former army officer, was able to attract into his forces a greater number of professional soldiers than was the case with ELAS. Military commanders were given full control of their units. Zervas was universally accepted as the Commander in Chief; and his relation to subordinates was a personal one. Among the EDES troops he was known as "Papa Zervas," and his squat figure, distinguished by an enormous black beard, was known by sight to nearly all his followers.

In addition to the two principal resistance organizations, there grew up in Greece an enormous and bewildering number of others, mostly known by a set of initials, one much resembling another. Out of this welter only three organizations actually succeeded in creating an armed force, or in rising to any practical importance. These were known as PAO, EKKA, and X.

The Panhellenic Liberating Organization, or PAO (*Panellinos Apeleftherotiki Organosis*) developed its principal power in Salonika. The core of its membership was regular

and reserve army officers, but some civilians also joined in its councils. In December 1942, at a time when ELAS had not yet appeared in Macedonia, the organization succeeded in coming into contact with Greek and British authorities in the Middle East, and received five thousand gold pounds (roughly \$100,000 purchasing power in Greece) on the understanding that PAO would form an armed force which would be obedient to the commands of the British Headquarters in Cairo.

There was, however, a serious misunderstanding between the British and PAO leaders. The British hoped for the speedy formation of guerilla bands; the leaders of PAO intended rather to re-create the Greek Army in secret, planning to form on paper an organization which would rise to make a sudden blow against the occupiers on the day of, or slightly before, an Allied landing in Greece. Working on these lines, the organization had no trouble in finding officers, but there was notable shortage of privates, since more hoped to give orders than to take them. As long as the army remained wholly a scheme on paper, free scope was given for quarrels over precedence. Fruitless bickering was only broken off when British Headquarters made clear that it looked for more concrete results. Consequently PAO guerilla bands were not organized until March 1943; and at the peak of their strength they probably mustered something like one thousand men divided among a dozen bands.

By the time the PAO bands were formed, ELAS already existed in the mountains that border the Salonika plain to the west. Quarrels broke out immediately. ELAS accused its rival of collaboration with the enemy, and called them Fascists; PAO reciprocated, accusing ELAS of a secret league with the Bulgarians, and calling them Communists. Words soon led to action, and small-scale running fights broke out repeatedly. In June, a British officer travelled north from the ELAS General Headquarters, assigned as liaison officer with the ELAS bands of the region. Discovering the bad relations

between ELAS and PAO, he tried to bring about an agreement for coöperation; but the effort failed, since the leaders on the spot said the matter would have to be referred to higher headquarters. In pursuit of such an agreement, the British officer returned to ELAS Headquarters in the Pindus Mountains, and after the lapse of some weeks, summoned representatives of the PAO Central Committee to come and negotiate an agreement between their organization and ELAS. Meanwhile the fighting between the two organizations continued, neither side winning conspicuous success. Even after a draft agreement had been signed between PAO and ELAS in the Pindus Headquarters, further fighting broke out, and mutual recriminations came thick and fast.

The British Mission (headed after midsummer 1943 by Colonel Woodhouse), in pursuit of its general policy of trying to unify all guerilla organizations and bring them under the command of Allied Force Headquarters (Algiers), had spent the summer of 1943 trying to negotiate formal written agreements between the principal guerilla forces which had come into being in the hills of Greece. The PAO-ELAS draft agreement was only one of several similar peacemaking efforts. A formal agreement was finally drawn up in July, comprising terms of coöperation between all the guerilla groups and establishing their military subordination to Allied Force Headquarters. But after all the negotiation, ELAS refused to sign. They justified this refusal by accusing PAO of having violated the draft agreement that had been made some weeks earlier, and asserted roundly that no agreement with such a band of Fascist collaborators could ever be made. ELAS did, at this time, however, formally acknowledge its military subordination to AFHQ.

The effort at peacemaking thus collapsed, and during the next six months ELAS was able to pick off the PAO bands one by one, and take over control of all Central Macedonia and the Chalcidice as well. In December 1943 the last surviv-

ing remnant of PAO guerillas boarded a caique off the shore of the Chalcidice and succeeded in making its way to the Middle East. The organization itself continued to exist as a conspiracy between a few Army officers and others in the city of Salonika, but after the fall of 1943 it had lost all practical importance.

A single anti-Communist band survived ELAS attacks in northern Greece. Some of its members had belonged to PAO, but the band itself had not been a part of that organization. It was led by Anton Filiates, or as he was universally known, by Anton Tsaous, that is, Anton, the Sergeant. (*Tsaous* is a Hellenized rendering of the Turkish word for sergeant.) This band operated in Eastern Macedonia, in Bulgar-held territory. ELAS power failed to penetrate the area until the fall of 1944. Prior to that time, Anton Tsaous moved through the mountains on the border between Bulgaria and Greece, or occasionally crossed into the rugged mountain mass of Pangeion near the coast. At first he played a sort of Robin Hood rôle, protecting the Greeks against the Bulgars; later as the power of ELAS grew and its threat to his band increased, Anton Tsaous and his followers became more anti-Communist than anything else, and devoted most of their energies to preventing political or military penetration of their area by EAM-ELAS. ELAS accused Anton Tsaous of collaboration with the Bulgarian occupiers. Perhaps, during the last months of the occupation, he and his band did enter upon friendly relations with the Bulgars. But the matter is open to doubt. Accusations of collaboration against rivals were the stock in trade of all the Greek resistance organizations, and ELAS too has been darkly and repeatedly accused of collaboration with the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. In this quarrel it seems impossible to assess blame or try to sift the flatly contradictory evidence advanced by the rival sides.

Another resistance organization which achieved a place in the bickerings and civil wars that beset the Greek guerilla

groups was the so-called National and Social Liberation, or EKKA (*Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis*). EKKA came late on the scene, forming at the beginning of 1943 around the lively personality of George Kartalis. He came of a rich and prominent family, and his uncle had achieved some prominence in the Popular Party. A bright young man, George Kartalis before the war had been a confirmed dilettante in politics no less than in art. He became attracted to Socialist ideas, and in a moment of enthusiasm found himself editing a clandestine newspaper in Athens and heading an organization of intellectuals and political dabblers that called itself EKKA. In Athens the activities of this group were largely propagandist, directed principally toward the middle and upper classes. They supplied many spies for the British intelligence network, and in later times the group came to be dubbed the Golden Resistance as a derogatory reminder of the quantities of gold its members had received from Cairo.

EKKA's military organization was never of central importance in the group's activities and came about almost fortuitously. A certain Colonel Dimitrios Psarros had been among the many individuals who formed small independent guerilla bands in the summer of 1942. Colonel Psarros was a man of high character and reputation, an old-line Venizelist but no revolutionary. His personal prestige was sufficient to attract considerable numbers of men to his leadership, and his band grew to be larger than most, with perhaps two to three hundred members. When ELAS expansion began to reach into the villages on the slopes of Mount Parnassos where Colonel Psarros had established himself, he looked around for support, and found it in EKKA. An agreement was made between the guerilla leader and the politicians of EKKA whereby the band became subordinated to the commands of the EKKA Committee. This arrangement secured additional recruits for Colonel Psarros' band from among some of the young men of Athens who found stimulus in the political

ideas of the Kartalis organization: more important, it gave his band political support and associated it closely with the British services that supplied EKKA so liberally with money.

It followed that when ELAS units attempted to force Colonel Psarros to join them, he was able to refer the question to the EKKA committee, and negotiations between ELAS Headquarters and EKKA ensued. In midsummer 1943 an agreement was drawn up providing for the coöperation of the two organizations; and it was incorporated in the general guerilla charter of July. But, as we have seen, difficulties arose over the final ratification of this document. ELAS found PAO unacceptable as an ally, and raised objections to signing an agreement to which it was a party. The ELAS-EKKA agreement was, however, considered binding, by the British at least. Despite the agreement, mutual suspicions made effective coöperation between the ELAS and EKKA impossible. Colonel Psarros was not able to expand his organization over any new area, as he wished to do, since he was hemmed in by hostile EAM organizations in all the surrounding villages, able and anxious to prevent any other organization from taking root—if necessary by betraying the leaders of the rival group to the Italians.

In the fall of 1943 ELAS began a large-scale effort to eradicate the remaining independent guerilla bands. As a part of this effort, Psarros was surrounded and compelled to give up most of his weapons. His band, however, did not totally break up. Most of its members, being deprived of weapons, returned to their homes; but a small number remained on the slopes of Mount Parnassos. In April 1944, ELAS renewed its attacks, and after a series of skirmishes succeeded in breaking up what remained. Colonel Psarros himself was captured and killed, with some twenty of his officers. Most of the rank and file were compelled or persuaded to join ELAS. So ended the military career of EKKA. Its short-lived effort in Macedonia,

under Colonel Bakirdjis, had, as we have seen, come to nothing some months before.

The history of X is quite different. This organization began as an association among the former officers of the II (Athens) Division. Lieutenant Colonel George Grivas had been Chief of Staff of the Division during the Albanian War, and within a few months of the organization's foundation he became its undisputed head. In its early days, X aspired to recreate the II Division underground, and on a given signal call it into active operation against the German and Italian occupation army. Such a rising was imagined as the concomitant of an Allied landing in Greece. But from the beginning, X had a strong conservative political color. Grivas was an ardent royalist, and his organization came to stand for the King. As the shadow of ELAS spread over the land, X came by degrees to fear more the power of the Communists than the oppression of the Germans. In 1943 membership was extended to include former non-commissioned officers of the II Division; and a few months later privates and even men who had never served in the Division were admitted.

X found arms difficult to come by. The British, already bedeviled by rival and quarrelling resistance groups, declined to add X to their payroll or to supply it with weapons. The only other easy supply of arms was from the German and Italian armies. It is not certain that Grivas ever came into direct contact with the occupying authorities; more likely he dealt indirectly through the Greek quisling Government in whose ranks not a few former Army officers and Metaxas officials were to be found who would easily lend a sympathetic ear to a man of Grivas' position and political ideas. In any case, X was able to possess itself of arms from German and Italian sources. With the weapons so secured, gangs of bravos were equipped, who made it their habit to traverse the streets of Athens by night and seek out leading EAM organizers to

shoot or beat up. X never became very large during the occupation, numbering perhaps five to six hundred armed men at its greatest strength. It became the chief target of ELAS in the city of Athens, and running gun fights became almost nightly occurrences between the rival organizations during the first months of 1944.

From this brief survey, it is clear that none of the armed organizations that set themselves up in rivalry to ELAS succeeded in challenging its power in Greece as a whole. The preëminent reason for their failure was lack of a political backing such as EAM was able to provide for ELAS. The energy and enthusiasm mobilized by EAM was tremendous. Most of its members were inspired by honest and lofty motives and most profoundly believed in the righteousness of their cause. Yet despite their good intentions EAM began to undergo a complicated transformation and degeneration in the months after the summer of 1943. Patriotism and self-sacrifice, high enthusiasm and warm social idealism, all came to serve an intolerant, ruthless and power-hungry political machine which, by its excesses, helped to create an irreconcilable opposition to itself and to bring on the miseries of civil war.

IV

The Beginning of Civil War

AS ITS name implies, EAM, the National Liberation Front, claimed to represent the whole Greek nation in its resistance to the occupying armies and quisling Government. When first organized, EAM attracted well-meaning individuals from many walks of life; persons often energetic and idealistic, and of various political affiliations. Yet from the beginning there were many Greeks who did not join EAM. In the early days there was relatively little active hostility to the new movement, and the fact that the more conservatively minded Greeks did not join the Front was as much due to inertia as to any distrust of the movement's leadership.

In most of the Greek villages, during the first years of occupation, there was no other political organization which could compete with EAM for the loyalties of the peasants, and only indifference or personal rivalries among the villagers prevented everyone from joining in the movement. In the towns, the situation was more complicated. EAM found its first foothold chiefly among the workers and intellectual radicals; and other groups in the population, generally speaking, declined to associate themselves with a movement of such social composition. Some individuals no doubt cried "Communist" from the very first; but most of the upper and middle classes, I believe, remained aloof merely because they were unaccustomed to associate with refugees, impecunious law-

yers and hot-headed students such as filled the ranks of the new movement.

Just as the political leaders of the conservative and center parties steered clear of any association with EAM, so the upper and most of the middle class of the towns were content to let others undertake the crusade and risk the dangers of resistance to the unpopular Government and the hated conquerors. EAM thus became a movement of the dispossessed and the underprivileged; and from a nation-wide beginning gradually became a revolutionary class movement. This transformation was undoubtedly helped and deliberately hastened by the propaganda and actions of the Communist Party; but it was made possible by the initial abdication of the old ruling classes from leadership of the resistance; an abdication which was seldom deliberate and more often arose from a supine preference for the safer, easier path.

EAM's early propaganda was designed to attract as many as possible to its banners, and could have alienated only the few out-and-out collaborators. In September 1942 a pamphlet was secretly published, entitled "What Is EAM and What Are Its Aims?" It had a wide circulation, and may be taken as an official statement of the purposes of the organization. The pamphlet listed them as follows:

1. The protection of the people against hunger, illness and want.
2. Passive and active resistance against the occupying forces and those collaborating with them. The raising of the people's morale. Opposition to all forms of collaboration.
3. Daily paralyzing of the occupying forces to ensure that their war aims are not served by Greek labor or Greek materials.
4. Active resistance to force, answering force by force, armed struggle and a final armed rising.
5. When the occupying forces have been expelled:
 - a. The formation of a Government from the leaders of the National Liberation Struggle, from the

- parties and bands which will have guided the struggle during the fight and during the victory.
- b. The immediate reestablishment of all popular liberties, of press, of speech and of assembly. A general amnesty.
 - c. The immediate calling of elections for a National Constituent Assembly, where the form of popular government of the country will be drawn up.

Surely only black reactionaries could object to such a program! So at least it seemed to most members of EAM. They came to feel that whoever did not join the movement was an enemy of the people and should be treated accordingly. This conviction, and unquestioning acceptance of facile accusations of collaboration made against all rivals, permitted ELAS to attack all independent guerilla bands without qualm, whereas most of the other bands were seriously embarrassed by finding themselves in battle with fellow Greeks, and repeatedly fumbled opportunities to gain military advantage by attempting peace negotiations. In the face of the fervor and conviction of most EAM followers, and the hard calculation of their leaders, no real or enduring understanding with any other independent organization was possible. There came to be no middle ground: whoever was not for, was against, and therefore an enemy of the people.

From the neutral, patriotic beginnings of 1941 and 1942, EAM propaganda gradually took on a definite antiroyalist tone. King George II was portrayed as a man who had come to Greece in 1935 unbidden, who had imposed a dictatorship on the people by subterfuge, and who had cowardly fled the country when the real struggle began. The Greek defeat was attributed to the treason of regular officers who were accused of being pro-German and Fascist (as indeed some of them were). The Government-in-Exile fell under deep suspicion. It was descended from the Metaxas dictatorship without any constitutional break, recognized King George as its sovereign, and constituted a potential rival to EAM for postwar control

of Greece. Prior to 1944, however, the Government-in-Exile was not assailed directly but merely by innuendo. Desire to maintain British support may have influenced this caution.

In attacking the King, EAM was in full accord with the dominant sentiment of the Greek people. Dislike of the Metaxas dictatorship and dislike of the King became identified; furthermore, many Greeks felt that their King had deserted them in the hour of need, forfeiting whatever right he had to rule, by his flight. In March 1942 representatives of nearly all the old-time politicians of Athens signed a petition, the so-called Protocol of 31 March, in which it was stated that King George should not return to Greece before a plebiscite had been held to determine whether the people wanted him or not. This resolution was in due course forwarded to Cairo, where it became the subject of much quarrelling and debate.

By the summer of 1943 the formative period of guerilla development was past. At that time ELAS was indisputably the most powerful organization among the Greeks, with perhaps twenty thousand armed men in its ranks. The character of this force varied. Through the peripheral districts of Greece (except Epirus and part of Aetolia-Arkarnania where Zervas held sole sway) scattered ELAS bands roamed the country, living by requisition off the peasants of the more remote villages, engaging in an occasional brush with the Italian troops that guarded the principal lines of communication, and, rather more often, descending upon some hapless Greek who had exposed himself to the charge of collaboration, punishing him with death or confiscation of all his possessions.

The character of these bands varied markedly from region to region, and also with the individual who happened to be in command. In the Peloponnese, where the peasants were traditionally conservative, EAM was never able to gain undisputed hold on the loyalty of the population, and ELAS bands were consequently comparatively insecure. They reacted by exercising a terrorism more severe than in other parts of the

country. By contrast, in most of Macedonia, almost the whole Greek population was won over to EAM, and the guerilla bands had almost the character of a national army. Communists controlled ELAS in the north as surely as they did elsewhere in the country, but their control was not challenged after the breakup of PAO, and the bands found no occasion to resort to acts of violence such as disfigured their record in the south.

In Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, EAM influence remained weak. The Bulgars treated the territory they had been given by the Germans as an integral part of Bulgaria, bringing in thousands of Bulgarian settlers, and driving other thousands of Greeks from the land. This weakened the Greek element. Still more, those Greeks who remained were more fearful of offending the occupation force than was the case in the rest of Greece. Bulgar vengeance was swifter and surer than the Italian, and was animated by the bitterness of a national quarrel. Another reason for EAM's weakness in this region was its remoteness. As we have seen, EAM's power did not come to Central Macedonia until the summer of 1943, and during the following year only feeble tentacles were extended eastward.

Conservative Greeks today explain that EAM did not try to organize in Bulgar-occupied lands because the Greek Communist Party had an agreement with the Bulgarian Communists by which the Greek leftists agreed to limit their activities to the districts west of the Strymon River. It is said that John Ioannides, one of the senior members of the Greek Communist Party and an old internationalist revolutionary, negotiated this agreement in 1941, long before the power of EAM and the Greek Communists extended into any part of Macedonia. Texts purporting to be the terms of the agreement have been published. The accusation, of course, is heatedly denied by EAM and the Communists. It seems impossible to judge the question without free access to the

secret files of the Greek or Bulgarian Communist Parties. All that need be noted here is that, whatever the reason, EAM and ELAS were relatively weak through the parts of Greece occupied by the Bulgars.

Another area in which EAM had made no impression in 1943 was the extreme northwest corner of Western Macedonia. There, lived a small but compact population of Slavic peasants who took no part in Greek political movements, and in fact had generally been won to the support of the Axis by Bulgarian and Italian propaganda.

In the islands, EAM generally had undisputed control and did not find it necessary to form armed bands. Crete was an exception. In that island, ELAS units operated side by side with independent guerilla bands and never absorbed or even attacked them. Relations were reasonably smooth between all the bands, even when the majority of the non-Communist groups formed a loose federation known as the National Organization of Cretan Guerillas or EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kritikon Andarton*). The unwonted harmony in Crete may have been due to the fact that ELAS was in a minority, mustering not more than one third of the total armed guerillas of the island.

The main center of EAM-ELAS power was in the Pindus Mountains west of the plain of Thessaly. By mid-1943 a veritable state had been there set up, guarded by ELAS soldiers, policed by a special corps known as *Politofylaki*, and governed by the EAM Central Committee. The area had fluctuating boundaries. At no time were the guerillas able to prevent a column of Italian or German troops from moving at will over the country; nor did they often attempt to do so. Rather the guerilla forces melted away before the advancing enemy, and villagers in their path were warned to flee before their approach so that the Axis troops would generally find nothing tangible to oppose them. The guerilla power was none the less real. Taxes were collected in kind to support

ELAS; justice was administered by a system of People's Courts; travel was controlled by internal passports; education, of a narrowly propagandist sort, was carried on by itinerant EAM organizers and evangelists.

The principal agent of the EAM Government in each village was an official called the Ipefthinos (literally, the Responsible). He was appointed by the central authority from among the local villagers, and if an incumbent proved unsatisfactory or showed any signs of lagging in enthusiastic enforcement of the demands made on the villagers, he was promptly replaced by a more efficient tool. The Ipefthinos was often assisted by a special representative of the EAM Central Committee. These were usually young men, full of crusading ardor for the cause, and in many villages tended to edge the native-born Ipefthinos from real control. The tax burden on the peasants was heavy, but perhaps not in excess of the exactions formerly made by the Greek Government. If there was active discontent, it was easily repressed; for any man who ventured to speak against EAM marked himself as an enemy of the people and was promptly and ruthlessly dealt with by the People's Courts.

When one considers the difficulties of transport and communication under which the EAM machine operated, the control it came to exercise appears as a truly remarkable achievement. What made it possible was the enormous enthusiasm of the individual agents in the villages: men of energy, who were content to live poorly themselves in the conviction that they were aiding the cause of liberation and freedom. It is not at all clear how many of the subordinate officials of the EAM regime were Communists. Many of them were members of the party, but most of them probably were not, and took the democratic and disinterested slogans of EAM more or less at face value, looking forward to a social and political regeneration of Greece under their own leadership after the war.

But freedom and democracy in their mouths tended to assume what seems to a man brought up in the American tradition, a peculiar meaning. Toleration of persons who disagreed with EAM was never conceived, since they were all lumped together as Fascist reactionaries. Democracy seemed simply to mean the establishment of EAM in political power; but only by a peculiar distortion of the word could the organization of EAM be termed democratic. The Central Committee of EAM represented the constituent political parties; but, as we have seen, four out of six of these parties were Communist organizations. Subordinate officials were appointed by the Central Committee and were subject to dismissal or transfer without notice. Usually in each village or town there was also an elected advisory committee that assisted the Ipefthinos and the political representative in carrying out their duties, and doubtless the committee often exercised effective restraint against the enthusiasm of the village EAM leaders. But the committees had no mandatory power, and on disputed issues a committee was usually divided against itself, and could not act as an effective check on the power of the appointed officials.

The whole system of government was makeshift. It was sustained by a high enthusiasm and never-ceasing propaganda. If one tries to imagine what the evolution of such a system would have been had EAM succeeded in winning control of postwar Greece, one can only think that as enthusiasm faded the autocratic elements in the Government would have come to the fore. There is a fine line between village labor voluntarily contributed to carry supplies over the mountains and forced labor conscripted by fear for the uses of the state. As has subsequently happened in Yugoslavia, I believe that the EAM Government would have evolved rapidly into an undisguised Communist dictatorship had it persisted in Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans. The elements for such an evolution were all present in the regime of the

mountains, including a secret police (designed originally to ferret out and punish collaborators), a spirit of intolerance, and the principle of appointment from above. Undoubtedly other, truly democratic elements were also present in EAM: elected local committees and a preponderant number of persons who had no liking for the devious methods of the Communists. But only blind optimism or an act of faith can convince an observer that these elements would in the long run have predominated over the centralized authoritarianism of the Communist Party.

Within the area controlled by EAM, the Greek quisling Government had little or no power. Gendarmes dared not travel there save in large groups, and were even then liable to sudden attack. Taxes could not be collected; justice and schools disappeared. Of all the public institutions that had existed before the war, only the Church survived. EAM never became anticlerical. In fact, many priests and a few bishops joined the movement. ELAS had chaplains to minister to the soldiers, and most of its peasant members retained their reverence for the Christian religion. The central administration of the Greek Church in Athens likewise distinguished itself during the occupation by a steadfast and successful neutrality as between EAM and its rivals.

The success of the Greek Church in the difficult times of the occupation was partly due to old tradition. In the time of the Turks the Church had been the sole bulwark of Hellenism, and for centuries had survived under, but independent of, the Turkish administration. The quisling Government bore this same relation to the head of the Greek Church, Archbishop Damaskinos, and his subordinate prelates. They were under, but not of, the Government. A second reason for the Church's good standing with the Left was that the Greek Church has no endowment of land or money. In Greece the parish priests are chosen from among the peasants of the village and share the attitudes and ideas

of their parishioners to the full. Most priests own a patch of land in their own right and till it like any other peasant. They are distinguished from their fellows chiefly by a peculiar dress, and by the semimagical power, conferred by the bishop's ordination, to conduct services, baptisms, marriages and funerals. The priests are little educated, and some of them are only partially literate. Under such circumstances there was no rift between clergy and peasants; and the priests divided as did their parishioners, some favoring, some opposing EAM.

In the cities of Greece, EAM had little military power in 1943. In them were concentrated the garrisons of the occupying armies, and there concentrated also those Greeks who for one reason or another found themselves openly opposed to the leftist movement. In Athens, the city police remained in existence until the time of liberation; in the other towns, gendarme detachments were able to keep more or less effective police power. Taxes were collected rather haphazardly from the townspeople, and the Metaxas law courts continued to function.

The situation in western Greece, where Zervas held sway, was less well organized. Openly EAM had no local representatives in Zervas' territory, although, as events later proved, there were secret adherents of EAM planted in a good many of the towns and some of the villages of western Greece. Zervas depended far less on the political coöperation of the villagers. He bought a large proportion of the food he needed to feed his soldiers, although some of it came by requisition. No system of regular assessment and collection of "taxes" was ever put into effect. Compulsory labor for the benefit of the EDES guerillas similarly remained on a haphazard basis, being called for only as the need arose.

The economic foundations of Zervas' army were similar to those of ELAS. Representatives of EDES were appointed in most of the villages, and billeting, forced labor, or contributions in kind were arranged through them when needed. But

the pitch of enthusiasm for EDES among the villagers was far less. They supported and sympathized with the guerillas, and seldom or never betrayed them to the Italians. They must often have wished, however, to be left alone and relieved of the trouble and expense which supporting EDES meant for them. No all-seeing police or high-crusading enthusiasm prevented the expression of such sentiments; in other words, the EDES organization was less efficient, and more tolerant, than was its counterpart in ELAS territory.

During the first six months of 1943 guerilla activity against the occupying armies was minimal. The effort of the British Mission and of the two principal guerilla armies was in the direction of extending and perfecting their organization, rather than day-to-day fighting against the Italians and Germans. About midsummer, however, the British had done what they could to bring all the guerilla bands into harmonious coöperation and considered all was ready for a resumption of operations. At that time the order came from Cairo to open a general attack on the Italians and Germans, and specific plans for particular acts of sabotage were prepared.

The strategy behind this order was as follows: the German Afrika Korps was just on the point of its final defeat in North Africa, and preparations for the invasion of Italy were already under way. It was hoped that a campaign of rumors and an outbreak of sabotage would convince the Germans that the point of Allied landing would be in Greece, and that they would divert reinforcements from Italy to the Balkan Peninsula in such expectation. Accordingly, British and Greek agents spread the rumor that liberation was rapidly approaching, and it gained almost universal credence among the Greek people. The leaders of ELAS believed it too, and hastened their preparations against an early Allied landing.

The political aims of ELAS leaders first became obvious to the British at this juncture. What happened is this: when

the order to embark on a campaign of sabotage came through, the leaders of ELAS found excuse after excuse to postpone action. They withdrew the best-organized units of their army into the high Pindus with the announced purpose of there forming a "regular" national army that would be able to combat the Italians on equal terms. The peripheral ELAS bands were not always so refractory. Under the pressure of British liaison officers, and with equipment supplied specifically for particular operations, they blew up a number of bridges, attacked trains, cut telephone wires and otherwise made life uncomfortable for the Italian and German garrisons. But it was the universal impression of the members of the British Mission that ELAS did not exert its maximum strength. Most of them put this down to cowardice on the part of the Greeks; and indeed many of the complaints that equipment was insufficient or the enemy too strong seemed to smack of fear. But the British discovered an odd fact: many times the subordinate commander and the men in his unit themselves would agree gladly to a proposed act of sabotage and make no complaint of inadequate equipment or enemy strength; and this after the higher headquarters had decided that the proposal was impracticable until more equipment could be sent from Cairo. So common was this phenomenon that British officers adopted the policy of taking up a proposed operation directly with the unit that they thought best able to carry it out, by-passing the ELAS General Headquarters. Using this irregular method, the British and ELAS were able to produce a real wave of sabotage in Greece; and this, coupled with the common talk of an approaching Allied landing in the country persuaded the Germans to send additional divisions to Greece in the fall of 1943. These divisions were thereby lost to the Germans for the Italian campaign; and it may even be thought that the absence of these troops made the difference between the success and failure of the

Allied landings in Italy. Though it cost Greece dear, the British ruse was a success.

The events of the late summer of 1943 naturally estranged the British Mission from ELAS Headquarters. The British had freely flouted the ELAS chain of command; and ELAS General Headquarters had shown what the British came to regard as disobedience to the orders of the Allied High Command. It seemed as though ELAS Headquarters were trying to keep its armed force intact; and the suspicion that it was to be preserved in order to serve as the instrument for establishing a new regime in postwar Greece became deeply seated in the minds of the British Mission. The same conviction spread among most Greeks who had not joined EAM. In view of the subsequent behavior of ELAS, the suspicion seems to have been well founded.

Zervas for his part had fallen in with British wishes and instructions, and had carried out a number of successful attacks, often commanding in person. Nevertheless, Zervas and his army came under a shadow of suspicion about this time. The EDES organization in Athens viewed with alarm the rise of ELAS and EAM throughout Greece, and some of the members of the organization began to advocate combat of the Communists by any means, even going so far as to approve the organization of the Security Battalions by the Germans and quisling Government. In particular, General Gonatas, who had been the most prominent figure in the Athens EDES organization, won the peculiar enmity of EAM by advising young regular officers to obey the summons of the quisling Government and take service with the Security Battalions. Most of the members of EDES in Athens were too wary themselves in person to enter into active collaboration; but they did lend moral support to others who did, and the reputation of the organization suffered accordingly.

This behavior put Zervas in an embarrassing position.

Accusations of collaboration had already been made against him freely by members of EAM, and now they had fresh reason and more plausibility for their reproaches. To escape such accusations, Zervas decided to break relations with his parent organization. He did so publicly in January 1944 and renamed his army National Units of Greek Guerillas, or EOEA (*Ethniki Organosis Ellinikon Andanton*). The change made little practical difference in his position. Recruits no longer came to him through the Athens organization, but that had never been an important element in Zervas' strength. He could easily raise more men than he could equip from the villages of western Greece alone. Nor did the action ward off accusations of collaboration. It did perhaps weaken their force and hurt the ELAS case against him. If so, that was its only effect. In popular speech his forces still were called EDES, and the original name stuck until their final disbandment.

Events in Greece moved rapidly in the fall of 1943. The expected Allied landing failed to materialize, but a greater surprise came when the Italian surrender was announced, 9 September. General confusion prevailed, for most of the country was still garrisoned by Italian units, and their commanders knew not what orders to accept or what line of action to pursue. The British sent agents to the principal Italian headquarters ordering them to come into the mountains and join in the war against the Germans. At the same time, German troops moved rapidly and were able in many instances to persuade the Italian commanders to remain loyal to the Axis. Many smaller Italian units simply disintegrated, their members deserting, selling their weapons (usually to representatives of the guerillas) and taking up a vagabond life. These men were later rounded up for the most part and formed into labor battalions by the Germans. But some of the Italian units followed the orders circulated by

British representatives and moved into the mountains where they expected, or at least hoped, to be received as allies.

The principal unit which followed this course was the division that had garrisoned the plain of Thessaly. In November 1943 the whole division, complete with artillery and transport, took the road westward toward the Pindus Mountains, marching into the central stronghold of ELAS. The plans of the British Mission were not clear. They had no means of feeding so many men, much less of supplying them with all the thousands of items required to keep a force in fighting trim. Plans were under consideration for partially disarming the Italians, dividing their equipment between ELAS and Zervas, and using the Italians as service and labor troops. But the Greeks had other ideas. The Italians were their bitter enemies, over whom they had triumphed in Albania and before whom they had humbled themselves in the streets of Athens. Such persons would never be allies if the Greeks had anything to do with it.

And the Greeks did, for they were in possession of the ground. As the column reached the higher hills, it was stopped by soldiers of ELAS, surrounded, and ordered to lay down all arms. After vain protest, and in a state of general bewilderment, the Italian soldiers did as they were bid. ELAS came into possession of some ten thousand rifles at one step. It also acquired a few pieces of mountain artillery, mortars, machine guns, mules and a number of motor vehicles. By guerilla standards, it was an enormous booty. Supplemented by the smaller hauls from other parts of the country, the Italian collapse approximately doubled the amount of small arms in ELAS possession, and strengthened the guerilla army, too, by the acquisition of light supporting arms such as they had never had before. As for the Italian soldiers, they were made prisoner and dragged out a wretched existence in the barren mountains until the liberation of Greece in 1944 finally freed those who remained alive.

With such a windfall, the strength of ELAS rose enormously. Its leaders had no intention of letting any of their new-found power escape from them; and British remonstrances, urging division of the booty with Zervas, went unheeded. Zervas had gathered a small harvest of arms himself, but he controlled a relatively small part of the country and no large Italian garrisons surrendered to him. It followed that ELAS was greatly strengthened as compared to Zervas, and its leaders proceeded in due time to exploit their new advantage.

After the Italian surrender, the leaders of ELAS believed that they would be able to gain complete and undisputed control of Greece upon German withdrawal. Their relations with the British Mission had become strained during the summer of 1943; now they elected to throw caution to the winds and defy the British from further meddling in Greek affairs. They refused to give up any of the armament they had acquired from the Italians when the British Mission ordered them to do so. From that time the break was open. British liaison officers remained with ELAS units, but they no longer were accorded the freedom of movement or the deference they had previously enjoyed. Indeed some British officers found themselves in a sort of semi-imprisonment. At ELAS General Headquarters, the British Mission had a similar experience. Their words no longer counted for much, and they became reduced to a status of mere intelligence agents.

In the summer of 1943 American officers had come to Greece for the first time. They never played a rôle comparable to that of the British, being far fewer in numbers and having more limited supplies and cash resources at their command. A few American sabotage teams operated in Greece with considerable effect, but most of the American effort was confined to intelligence reporting, in which endeavor they operated successfully and independently.

British reaction to the changed state of affairs in Greece

was prompt. Further supply to ELAS was cut off in the hope that its leaders would change their ways. When this proved unavailing, the British undertook to build up Zervas' strength as a makeweight against ELAS. They sent equipment for fifteen thousand men and provided gold to pay the EDES soldiers regularly. But while Zervas' strength grew, ELAS was able to expand even more rapidly, using the Italian arms to equip new recruits. Consequently, Zervas' strength never approached that of ELAS.

Within a month of the Italian surrender, and before the British had finished building up Zervas' strength, ELAS attempted to eliminate the EDES army completely. The leftists accused Zervas of having violated the guerilla charter which had been signed during the summer and proceeded to attack him. Open civil war resulted.

Strengthened by the captured ammunition and weapons, ELAS was able to drive Zervas back toward the sea; but the fighting was hard, and Zervas showed himself to be a crafty and daring commander. In early January Zervas began to run out of ammunition, and his troops were compelled to withdraw into a small valley some twenty miles from the sea. For two days the whole fate of the EDES guerillas hung in the balance. Ammunition was expected from Cairo, but the weather was bad and long hours of waiting and watching brought no result. Finally, just as the morale of the retreating force was reaching rock bottom, an airplane appeared, flying low under broken clouds. While the guerillas cheered wildly, the plane dropped several hundred thousand rounds of small arms ammunition. With this, Zervas was able to stand off the attacks of ELAS. About a week later ELAS in its turn began to run short of ammunition. Zervas started to advance, and ten days of furious marching followed: ELAS retreating as fast as human legs could go, and Zervas pursuing. The rout crossed over the peaks of the Pindus in the dead of winter—no mean feat of endurance for the often ill-clad and always

ill-fed guerillas—and the victorious forces of Zervas pursued toward the plains of Thessaly. But once over the crest of the mountains, ELAS was within easy reach of ammunition and other stores that had been painstakingly accumulated, so that the tables once more were turned. Zervas and his men had to withdraw, but their retreat was comparatively slow, involving repeated rearguard actions.

By February Zervas was back within the old boundaries of his power. ELAS for its part had expended far more of its precious ammunition and other supplies than had originally been planned, and saw no immediate possibility of finishing off the rival army which could always count on the support of the British. Furthermore, the outbreak of large-scale civil war in Greece had become known round the world, and there was strong pressure from public opinion within and outside of the country against the continuation of such fratricidal strife.

Accordingly, on 12 February 1944, representatives from ELAS Headquarters, from the British and American Missions, and from Zervas, met at the Plaka Bridge over the Arakthos River. An agreement was there drawn up exactly delimiting the zones in which ELAS and Zervas would operate against the Germans. It was solemnly agreed that neither side would infringe upon the other's territory, and that both would turn all their effort against the Germans. The Plaka Bridge Agreement failed to inspire any deep confidence in either side. From that time onward Zervas kept his two best "divisions" on his landward frontier as guard against a second ELAS attack; and ELAS reciprocated, stationing strong detachments in border villages.

The transformation of EAM-ELAS into a ruthless and unscrupulous instrument of power was signalized to all Greeks by the events of this civil war. It was clear to all that ELAS had been the aggressor, and had preferred the arbitrament of force to negotiation as a means of settling the differ-

ences which inevitably arose between independent (and more or less lawless) guerilla forces. The effect of this development upon Greek civilians who stood outside the EAM movement was to create an active dislike and fear of the Left; and many began to revise their attitudes toward the quisling Government, thinking of it as a protection against sudden seizure of power by EAM. Some few Greeks, as we have seen, even embarked upon active collaboration with the Germans, hoping to form military organizations—X and the Security Battalions—that could stand against ELAS in the post-occupation struggle for power. The experience of civil war transformed Zervas' force from radical republican into conservative nationalist, and EDES guerillas even came to wear the King's crown on their caps. The dominating sentiment among them became a hatred of communism, which in practice meant a hatred of ELAS. On the other side, ELAS steadily portrayed Zervas as a Fascist and collaborator who was perfidiously in the pay of both the British and the Germans. The stage clearly was set for future troubles.

For the High Command of ELAS and EAM the civil war with Zervas was only one item in their agenda. As we have seen, the only other important independent guerilla band—that led by Colonel Psarros—was partly disarmed in the fall of 1943 and totally eliminated the following spring. But the major attention of the leaders of ELAS was directed to still other ends.

One of these was the creation of a powerful ELAS Reserve in the towns of Greece. Prior to the fall of 1943, EAM had existed in the towns as an unarmed secret organization. It now began to build up extensive arms depots, and to create a reserve army from among its sympathizers. This Reserve was organized territorially. Each city block had its platoon or company, with designated commanders and an arms depot. In some cases the arms were entrusted to the individual members of the Reserve, but more usually the rifles were dis-

tributed in caches where it was easier to control and safeguard them. Many of the weapons acquired from the Italians were used to equip the Reserve, and some were sent from villages where it was calculated they would not be needed. Units of the Reserve drilled by night. Patrols were frequently sent through the streets after dark, especially in Athens, where gangs of X-ites had begun to threaten the security of prominent EAM citizens.

During the course of 1944 the ELAS Reserve became a large organization, and by the time of liberation it probably outnumbered the regular troops of ELAS. In Athens and Pireus its strength was between ten and fifteen thousand men equipped with rifles, sub-machine guns and pistols. Elsewhere its numbers were smaller, but the total probably ran between thirty and forty thousand for the whole country.

When rumors of the creation of the ELAS Reserve began to circulate, the anti-Communist Greeks jumped to the conclusion that this was the instrument designed to secure the revolution after liberation. Leftists answered that it was designed to bring about the liberation; that on a given day the Reserve would rise against the occupiers and drive them from their strongholds in the cities. Doubtless both motives were operative among the men who planned and carried out the creation of the Reserve, mixed in different proportions according to their personal political ideals. The Reserve was no more purely Communist than was the ELAS in the mountains; but as in its active counterpart, Communists generally held key positions in its organization. As the future was to demonstrate, the Communists were able to bring the Reserve to obey their will. For the immediate time, the new organization assured the extension of ELAS power to those portions of the country into which it had previously been unable to penetrate due to the presence of the Germans. With the firm establishment of the ELAS Reserve in the towns, no corner of the country, save Zervas' small district in the west and

certain vague areas in Bulgarian territory, was not actually or potentially in the hands of ELAS. As soon as the Germans retreated (and by 1944 it was obvious that they soon would have to do so) the country would be theirs.

The second major enterprise undertaken by the leftists after the Italian collapse was the organization of a provisional Government in the mountains. The complexion of the Government-in-Exile was far from satisfactory to EAM. It was solidly conservative, and in the event of its return to Greece it could not be expected to accept with good grace the new order of things which EAM hoped and expected to bring about. In particular, EAM was resolved to prevent the return of King George II to Greece. Accordingly, in March 1944, EAM set up a provisional Government of its own, known as the Political Committee for National Liberation, or PEEA (*Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis*). The first President of the Committee was Colonel Evripidis Bakirdjis, succeeded in April by Professor Alexander Svolos. They were no more than figureheads. Real power was concentrated in the hands of a few Communist leaders, chief among them George Siantos, the Secretary of the Interior in the "Cabinet."

It is worth while to dwell for a minute on the career of Siantos during the years of resistance. As Secretary General of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, Siantos became the most influential single individual in determining the development of EAM and ELAS. Despite his power, he remained effectively in the background, and it was not until after the Germans had left Greece that he emerged as the dominant figure of the leftist resistance movement. He held no post in EAM, but assigned the task of representing the Communist Party on the EAM Central Committee to another man, Demetrios Partsalides. Siantos did, however, occupy an official position in ELAS, acting as political representative in the General Headquarters. Ares, also a member of the Communist Party, played the rôle of Kapetanios in

the Headquarters, and Colonel (now usually called General) Sarafis was the military member of the triumvirate. It is not difficult to imagine what counsels prevailed among these three men. Sarafis, save for narrowly military matters, was a nullity; Ares devoted himself to serving as contact man vis-à-vis the British and American Missions, and also carried out a number of special "sticky" jobs personally, such as the liquidation of Psarros. High policy lay with Siantos, and he was able skillfully to confound the British and build up an instrument of power far more efficient than any other in all Greece, save for the German Army itself.

When Siantos and his councillors decided to establish the Provisional Government they took a step of great significance. By implication the authority of the Government-in-Exile was denied, and British governance of Greek affairs, which had been exercised in the name of the Cairo Government, rejected. No change in the system of internal administration resulted from the establishment of PEEA, but a new symbol was created toward which the loyalties of the members of EAM and ELAS could be directed. The repercussions in Cairo were greater than in Greece itself. There a mutiny in the Greek Army was stirred up by agents of EAM and Prime Minister Tsouderos was overthrown.

By the establishment of this Committee the divergence between the resistance movement and the emigré Government was written clear for all to see, and the problems which German withdrawal would bring as to the postwar government of the country became obvious to everyone in Greece, and to those outside who took an interest in Greek affairs. The obvious step was to try to bring about some sort of reconciliation between the two Governments. Before tracing the efforts that were made in this direction, however, it will be necessary to describe the history of the Greek Government-in-Exile.

V

The Government-in-Exile

THE small group of men that fled with King George from Crete ahead of the advancing German Army could be called a Government only by courtesy coupled with an act of faith. They had no country to govern, and were deeply divided against themselves. The Prime Minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, immediately before assuming office, had been under house arrest, in the keeping of none other than his Minister for Interior, Constantine Maniatakis. As can be easily imagined, there was little love lost between the two men. Standing uneasily over the discordant groups in the Cabinet was the King, a descendant of Danish princes, George Glücksburg by name. Such a refugee Government must have presented a forlorn appearance indeed when its members debarked in Alexandria, Egypt, and proceeded to take up their residence in Cairo.

Cairo itself in the summer of 1941 was full of confusion and alarm. Rommel's armies defeated the British in the Western Desert and drove forward, it seemed irresistibly. Semipanic spread through Cairo and Alexandria. It was decided that the Greek Government should move again beyond the reach of the Germans. Consequently, in July, King George and his Cabinet fled to Capetown, South Africa. After some months in that remote city, the King and a group of high officials, travelled to the United States, and were officially received. The seat of the Greek Government in the meanwhile was removed to London, where it established itself in

September, 1941. In London, the Greek exiles were close to the seat of power but far from their own country and the Greek armed forces which had meanwhile been created in the Middle East. When disorders broke out in the Greek Middle East forces, it seemed wise for the Government to move closer to the scene, and accordingly, in May 1943, the King, Tsouderos, and a small company of officials moved back to Cairo. There the Government remained until the eve of the liberation of Greece.

The wanderings of the Greek Government during its first two years of exile had important consequences. By travelling to far corners of the world, the Government necessarily lost contact with affairs inside Greece. The Exile Government, even after its return to Cairo, never fully regained touch with the Greek people. Despite the Axis occupation, communication between Greece and the Middle East was not entirely interrupted. Persons who wished to pass into or out of Greece could often cross the Turkish frontier in Thrace; and a multitude of small vessels regularly plied the Aegean, and could put into Turkish ports and there take on or drop off passengers. Such travel was secret, of course. The Italians and Germans did their best to intercept persons trying to leave or enter the country from British areas. Despite their efforts, a sort of "underground railroad" came into existence. It became possible for a man to travel between Egypt and Greece with a reasonable amount of security, though not without great discomfort, expense and long delays.

By the time the Greek Government took up regular residence in Cairo, the Middle East end of this traffic had been gathered under British military control. During the years that followed, the British never relinquished their control. It followed that all communications between the Greek Government and persons in Greece were thenceforth subject to British censorship. The Greeks of Cairo were allowed almost no say in the dealings between British Headquarters and the

guerillas. This situation frequently galled the Greeks, but British officers felt small respect for the opinions of Greek civilians when they opposed their own. Efforts of the Greek Government to come directly into contact with resistance organizations outside British military channels were strenuously and effectively frowned upon. This was certainly high-handed treatment of a "sovereign" allied government, but when one considers the miscellaneous gathering of adventurers and heroes, patriots and crooks that by degrees collected around the Greek Government in Cairo, it is hard to criticize the British authorities for their insistence on the power of censorship and monopoly of military relations with the guerillas.

A second result of the extended travels of the Greek Government was that the Greek Army of the Middle East passed away from the control of the Greek Cabinet. Operationally there was never any question: Greek troops fought as a part of the Allied forces, and were subject to the orders of Allied commanders. Administratively, however, and especially in the matter of appointment of particular individuals to particular posts, the Greek Army became a strange sort of hybrid. No single authority had jurisdiction; rival cliques among the officers developed into rival secret leagues which, in turn, fomented mutiny, and repeatedly were able to compel changes in the Cabinet. Mutinies, of course, were nothing new in Greek military tradition, but it was the initial relaxation of the government's power, due to its absence from the scene during the first years of exile, that provided conditions in which sedition was free to spread among the soldiers.

The Government, when it first came to the Middle East, was the legal continuation of the Metaxas regime. Most of the members of the Cabinet were holdovers from the dictator's Government. At the very beginning, a bitter struggle developed between Prime Minister Tsouderos and the Minister for Interior, Maniadakis. As chief of the Metaxas police,

Maniadakis had come to represent all the most hated aspects of the dictatorship; and Tsouderos had a personal grudge against Maniadakis for the arrest to which he had been condemned. King George, however, was a man of strong personal loyalties. The King felt that Maniadakis had been a faithful servant and loyal supporter of the state, and at first refused to entertain the suggestion that he be dismissed. But dictatorships were scarcely reputable with the Allies; at least, when vocal opposition to them existed. The King could with difficulty defend dictatorial principles; and a few days after the Government arrived in Cairo, he yielded. Maniadakis was dismissed from the Cabinet along with some of his Metaxist colleagues, and the reorganized Cabinet became little more than a group of personal friends of the Prime Minister. It remained so until the return to Cairo in 1943.

From the point of view of the British, who provided the chief financial and political support of the Exile Government during its first years, King George and his Cabinet had two uses. They embodied the legal government of Greece, and had a symbolic value for propaganda during the occupation and still more for the time of liberation, when, presumably, the Exile Government would return to resume its just and proper powers. For the immediate present, the Government was in a position to raise troops from among the Greek communities scattered through the Middle East.

One of the first acts of the government was to declare a mobilization of all Greek citizens in Egypt and neighboring countries. The Greek community of Egypt was relatively large and prosperous. Under the Capitulation laws, nearly all Greeks had retained their nationality even though long resident in Egypt, and therefore came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Government. Nearly all of the Egyptian Greeks were engaged in commerce, accustomed to relatively easy living, and made poor soldiers as compared with Greeks from Greece. Some of the ever-recurrent troubles of the Greek Army

in the Middle East arose from this fact. Egyptian-born Greeks did not accept gladly the orders of officers who had gathered from odd corners of the world, or who escaped from Greece after the occupation. Greek officers were accustomed to dealing with a peasant soldiery, and habitually presumed upon their privileges and power in a way that seemed tyrannical to the city-born-and-bred Greeks of the Middle East.

As the months passed, a steady trickle of Greek refugees came to Egypt. Those of military age swelled the ranks of the Greek Army. Most of these came from the parts of Greece close to Turkey, for it was easier for them to escape than for the rest. But officers, and men who were well to do, were able to pay the cost of passage from other parts of Greece. Furthermore, officers had perhaps more reason to wish to escape than others. They were in greater or less degree marked men, and suspicious acts on their part were more seriously regarded by the occupation armies. Consequently the Greek Army in the Middle East was embarrassed by a great surplus of officers. From their idleness and jealousy arose much of the intrigue that came to honeycomb it.

Recruitment to the Army continued after the Government abandoned Cairo for South Africa and London. Altogether two brigades were formed (totaling perhaps eight thousand men). An equal or greater number of soldiers was distributed among various training centers and replacement depots. The First Brigade was organized and equipped by mid-1942 and took part in the battle of El Alamein, where it fought creditably. The Brigade joined in the pursuit of the Germans, and was not withdrawn until Tunis had been reached. It did not, however, take part in any serious fighting after Alamein. Another unit, the Sacred Squadron, composed exclusively of officers, went to the front in Tunis and fought under the command of the Free French almost until the time of German surrender in Tunisia.

This is virtually the sum of the combat service of the

Greek forces in the Middle East during the first three years of the war. Interminable training courses and long spells of guard duty filled in the rest of the time. Part of the reason for this fact was that British divisional and army commanders were reluctant to accept Greek troops under their command for active operations. Difficulties of language made effective coördination sometimes difficult. Moreover, most British commanders had an ingrained distrust of Greek units and tended to regard them as "native" troops. This bitterly offended Greek pride and was indeed quite unjustified by the performance of the Greeks in battle. But the fact of discrimination remained, and did nothing to improve the morale of the Greek troops.

The first of a long series of troubles broke out in the ranks of the Greek Middle East Army in March 1942. The quarrel was largely personal, and arose among a small number of senior officers. A few officers, who had served under Metaxas and taken part in the Albanian War, had made their way to Cairo in the first days of occupation and had taken over the chief commands of the newly formed Army. During the succeeding months, a number of others, mostly republican officers who had been exiled from Greece since the failure of the 1935 revolt, gravitated to Cairo; and some of them succeeded in regaining their commissions. Each group was deeply suspicious of the other. In March this suspicion broke out in bitter mutual recriminations and open insubordination. Prime Minister Tsouderos hastily came from London to settle the dispute. After listening to the accusations of both sides he compromised by removing a few of the top commanders and replacing them with men who were more or less neutral between the rival cliques.

This move restored peace for the time being. It did not, however, end the rivalry and distrust between the Metaxist and republican officers, but rather drove their intrigues underground. Secret military leagues were formed by both

groups, but, of the two, the Republican was the more active and became the more powerful. The handful of republicans was a small minority in the Greek officer corps of the Middle East. The leaders of the Republican League, therefore, decided to open it to soldiers of all ranks. The organization quickly became a league of privates and non-commissioned officers, led by a handful of senior officers. It had all the attraction to the Greek soldier of an association directed against the men who were in command over him. It had an additional source of strength in the discontent of the Egyptian-born Greeks, who generally felt themselves superior to the Greek officers who commanded them. During the year that followed, Greek troops were for the most part kept in routine garrison duty; and the Republican League grew apace, nourished by the dissatisfaction and idleness of the soldiers.

In the spring of 1943 the League felt itself strong enough to act. Mutiny broke out in nearly all the Greek Army units (the Sacred Squadron was a notable exception). The mutineers demanded that the Army be purged of Fascists, i. e., of Metaxist officers. The Government had no power to resist the soldiers, and most of the objectionable officers were removed. A new administration came to power in the Army, headed by the senior officers who had organized the Republican League; and a new War Minister, sympathetic to the republican cause, was added to the Cabinet.

Following this success, the leaders of the Republican League tended to relax their activities. They had now satisfied their personal ambition by winning control of the Greek Army. Consequently they began to take less interest in the soldiers' organization which had made their rise possible. A natural development ensued. Without formally repudiating the leadership of the senior republican officers, the members of the League began to come under the influence of EAM; and a new cadre of leaders, sympathetic to the Left, formed

under the republicans without displacing them from nominal leadership.

EAM in Greece was naturally concerned that the Government-in-Exile should not some day return to wreck their achievement. After mid-1943, EAM and ELAS were pretty well able to control the flow of persons to and from Greece at their end, just as the British did in the Middle East. Consequently, new recruits to the Greek Army were usually vetted by EAM before they were allowed to leave Greece. From 1943 onward EAM propagandists and organizers were systematically sent to the Middle East as recruits for the Army. They became privates for the most part, but were from that fact in a better position to talk with their fellow soldiers and win their confidence. They found the framework of the Republican League already established in the ranks, and speedily made use of it, joining and climbing, by their energy and skill, to positions of influence.

Thus it came about that in the spring of 1944 both old-line republicans and EAM-ites believed that they controlled the Republican League in the Army. The republicans knew of the EAM propagandists, but thought it wise to "use" them to gain their own ends. Exactly the same reasoning was used by the EAM representatives. In point of fact, there was much in common between the aims of the two groups. Each wanted to overthrow the King and establish a republic in Greece after the war. Thus the issue, King versus Republic, which had long distracted Greece, was revived and tore apart the Greek Middle East Army. It became at the same time the major question of emigré politics.

In Greece itself, it will be recalled, the King had become a generally unpopular figure. In March 1942 most of the leading prewar politicians had signed a manifesto suggesting that the King refrain from returning until after a plebiscite had been held. This suggestion was not welcome to King George. He had been born to rule, being the eldest son of Constantine,

and educated more or less in the German tradition. He had grown up in Greece when it still had a predominantly patriarchal type of government. As a youth he had trained for a year with the Prussian Foot Guards, where he acquired a lifelong interest in military matters and a liking, too, for military discipline. When his father, King Constantine, came into collision with the fiery genius of Venizelos, young George warmly espoused his father's side of the dispute. He was not a man of high intellectual abilities, and probably never was able to understand why his subjects turned from the traditional and proper loyalty which he felt they owed to him, their rightful sovereign. He tended to blame the whole republican movement on a handful of "bad" men who had succeeded in misleading the Greeks.

When he returned to the throne in 1935, he hoped that the corrupting influence of the republican leaders had been dissipated and that all would be right again. He fondly dreamed of an obedient people, willing subjects of a benevolent and constitutional monarch. When such proved not to be the case, he fell back on one of his father's old friends, a military man, General Metaxas; and found in his militarized government and discipline a sort of substitute for the patriarchal relation he had hoped to have toward his people. In exile again after 1941, King George felt that his right to rule was undiminished. Stubbornly, he did his best to close his ears to the voices that began to question his return.

Despite the fact that his Prime Minister, Tsouderos, was an old republican, the King's relations with him were relatively smooth and easy. The King formally announced the end of dictatorship in February 1942. He hoped to embark on another constitutional experiment such as the one of 1935, and believed that in Tsouderos he had found a prime minister with whom he could work harmoniously. The Protocol of 31 March, by which the leading politicians of Athens asked that he not return as a matter of right, must have come as a

rude blow to the King's hopes. It roused a streak of stubbornness in his nature, and he determined to do all in his power to resist so ungrateful an effort to unseat him.

As long as the prospect of liberation was distant, the question of the King's position was not pressing. Nevertheless, republican sentiment among the Greek emigré colony steadily mounted. A group of Liberal politicians, headed by Sophocles Venizelos, son of the illustrious founder of the party, collected in Cairo, and came into contact with the officers who headed the Republican League in the Army. They easily imagined a triumphant re-entry into Athens, with themselves at the head of the Government. A little plotting to displace Tsouderos and seat themselves in his place seemed all that was necessary to achieve this result. Under the circumstances, intrigue proliferated wildly.

By the fall of 1943 preponderance of republicanism both in and outside of Greece was unmistakable. In August delegates from the three principal guerilla organizations of Greece had come to Cairo, and put forward in the strongest terms their demand that King George not return before a plebiscite was held. The delegates received no immediate satisfaction, and returned, disgruntled, to Greece.

Soon after this visit, Prime Minister Tsouderos discreetly raised the question with King George, and in November the King wrote a letter in which he promised to "examine anew the question of my return to Greece." This letter was written in response to pressure from British officials who hoped to promote unity among the Greeks by putting off into an indefinite future a final decision on the question of the King's right to rule.

One of the forces which the King most heavily counted upon to guarantee his return to Greece was the support of the British Government. To assure this support, he decided to make a trip to England and there try to mend his political fences in person. Accordingly, in March 1944, he left Cairo

and the Greek Government behind him and went to London. In the British capital, King George found sympathetic ears. The British Government, in the person of Mr. Churchill at least, had a sentimental regard for the institution of kingship, and liked to imagine Greece in the postwar world, a firm friend and grateful ally of Great Britain, securely ruled by a constitutional monarch. Furthermore, King George had nominally headed the Greek Government at the time when Greece came into the war as Britain's only European ally, and Churchill no doubt felt an obligation to forward the King's cause in return for the help he had given in the dark days of 1940.

At lower levels, however, British official opinion was confused. To maintain their power in the Mediterranean, the British were anxious that postwar Greece should be friendly to Great Britain; but how best to guarantee such friendship was difficult for them to decide. Some British officials were convinced that only a republican government could be truly strong and popular. But EAM was the sole republican group that was in a position to take over the reins of power; and, after 1943, British observers became increasingly doubtful as to whether a Government established by EAM would in fact be friendly. Russian armies were already edging into the Balkans, and EAM's affection for Russia could easily turn into a cool, or even positively unfriendly attitude toward the British. Against such an eventuality the return of King George to his throne would be a guarantee; but there seemed small possibility that he would be able to return peacefully in view of EAM's bitter opposition and armed strength. In general, British officials in Cairo were more dubious of the King's political position than was the Foreign Office in London, and, as a result, British policy was lacking in clarity, and fluctuated between lukewarm support of the Greek King and an uneasy neutrality in the question.

The more sympathetic attitude of officials in London

encouraged King George to make no further concessions to republican pressure from Cairo and Greece. He took up residence in the British capital, and a coterie of Greek royalists quickly formed round him. Many of these men were clever, ambitious and unscrupulous. Either by intention or perhaps without realizing it, they cut the King off from accurate information as to the progress of affairs in Greece. He came to live in a sort of ivory tower, ignorant of what his opponents were doing and isolated from whatever elements in Greek life might have supported his claims.

The republican movement continued to gain momentum in the King's absence. In December 1943, Prime Minister Tsouderos sent a representative into Greece with the mission of sounding out political leaders within the country as to their opinions on the question of the postwar regime. What particularly he wanted was their reaction to the proposal that a regent be nominated secretly by the King in order to exercise the royal powers for an interim period immediately after liberation. The original suggestion for the establishment of a regency in Greece had come from individuals in the British Embassy near the Government of Greece which had been set up in Cairo in 1943. Tsouderos favored the idea of a regency, and the Athenian politicians, with whom his representatives discussed the matter, likewise approved of the proposal. All groups that were consulted, including the Communists, agreed that Damaskinos, Metropolitan of Athens and Archbishop of All Greece, should be the Regent. Throughout the occupation, Damaskinos had succeeded in keeping above party strife and was almost the only man in prominent position who could command the respect and confidence of both Left and Right.

When news of the favorable reaction of Greek political figures to the proposed regency reached the Prime Minister, he wrote a letter to King George urging him to sign a decree in secret, nominating Damaskinos as his temporary represent-

ative in Greece. The King refused to consider the proposal. From that time on, he began to regard Tsouderos with suspicion, seeing him as no more than the agent of a republican conspiracy against him.

The reaction to the King's refusal was not long delayed. EAM became convinced that strong measures would be necessary to prevent the King's return, and proceeded to set up the Provisional Government in the mountains in deliberate defiance of the royal emigré Government. At the same time, the Republican League in the Army redoubled its activities. Both EAM sympathizers and the Venizelist republicans took the King's refusal to appoint a regent as a gage of battle.

In March, the First Brigade of the Greek Middle East Army prepared to take ship for Italy where it was expected to take part in the fighting. To the antiroyalist conspirators, the departure of the Brigade meant a hitch in their plans; a mutiny in Egypt, which did not include the First Brigade in Italy, would fail to deprive the King of all his military support; and a mutiny in the front line would have been hard to start and harder still to justify in the eyes of the world. Consequently, on 1 April, only a few days before the Brigade was scheduled to embark, the Republican League gave orders to mutiny. Insubordination first broke out aboard the ships of the Greek Navy which were tied up in Alexandria Harbor. Within a week the mutiny spread to nearly all units of the Greek Army. As before, the Sacred Squadron was the only combat unit that remained obedient to the Cairo Government.

The mutiny was carried out with admirable efficiency. Groups of soldiers rose in the night, seized headquarters buildings and took prisoner those of their officers who protested. There was almost no bloodshed, although in some of the units a few shots were fired. Committees, drawn from the members of the Republican League, took command of each mutinous unit. Some of the leaders were officers, but many

were privates. The First Brigade, where the disorder came to be most widespread and lasted longest, fell under the command of a slight, intense private soldier, assisted by a pair of majors. In effect, EAM came into control. The old-line republican officers, who nominally headed the League, had agreed to, but had not actually organized the revolt, nor did they control it once it had begun.

The mutineers demanded that the Greek Government recognize the Political Committee which EAM had established in Greece, as the legitimate representative of the Greek people, and accept some or all of its members into the Cabinet. They further demanded the purge of Fascists from the Army and Navy, and an unequivocal statement that the King would not return without a plebiscite.

The mutiny came as a complete surprise to the British liaison officers who were attached to the various units of the Greek Army, and was equally unexpected by British Headquarters. Knowing little or nothing of the political struggles that lay behind the action, the British officer who was detailed to handle the situation in the First Brigade saw nothing but mutiny against duly constituted military authority. Accordingly, he declared the First Greek Brigade to be rebellious, and ordered all the soldiers to parade out from the camp where they were stationed and surrender their arms. This was a psychological mistake. During the first few days of the mutiny, only a minority of the soldiers had actively sided with the insurrection. There was a general state of confusion and uncertainty in the ranks. But when the order came to lay down their arms, it struck close to the Greek pride. Almost to a man the soldiers refused, and by that act associated themselves with the mutineers. In some of the other Greek camps less maladroit methods were used, and the mutinies died one by one. The Navy and First Brigade, however, remained adamant.

The Greek Navy, at the time when the mutiny broke out,

was in almost undisputed command of Alexandria Harbor. There was wild talk to the effect that, if the Greek Government and British military authorities did not yield to the rebel demands, the guns of the Greek fleet would be turned on the city. Nothing of the sort occurred, however. Within a few days British destroyers were brought into the harbor, and for over two weeks the two forces glowered at one another. Finally on 22 April, the Greek Admiralty organized boarding parties and took over the Greek ships one by one. On some of the ships there were gun fights and about half a dozen men were killed. The man who organized the boarding parties and brought the Navy back to obedience was Admiral Petros Voulgaris, newly appointed Commander in Chief. The reputation he gained by this action became the basis of his subsequent political career.

The First Brigade, meanwhile, had been surrounded by British troops. The siege lasted for eighteen days. When news of the surrender in the Navy reached the camp, the British sent an ultimatum threatening full-scale attack if the mutineers did not lay down their arms. No answer came to the ultimatum, and in the darkness of night, 23 April, British troops moved forward. They met with almost no resistance. The Greek soldiers surrendered three hours after the advance began, and next morning marched out from their camp without arms.

In Greek political circles in Cairo, the mutiny had drastic repercussions. Tsouderos resigned when the news came, and the republican coterie, under the leadership of Sophocles Venizelos, succeeded to power. To their surprise, however, the republican politicians found that the mutiny they had helped to start did not die down, even when the new Prime Minister ordered the rebels to desist. When it came to action, the few republican senior officers who had headed the Republican League found that they had no control over their followers. The EAM-ites who had climbed up from the ranks

directed the movement instead. It was a surprise to the republican Army officers to find themselves so powerless; and when Venizelos failed by his words to quell the trouble, despite his known connection with its fomentation, his prestige dropped almost to zero. The British Embassy began to look around for another prime minister. They found him in George Papandreou, leader of the Social Democratic Party.

Before we turn to Papandreou's career, and the efforts to find a satisfactory *modus vivendi* between the Government-in-Exile and the resistance organizations in Greece, it is convenient to recount the further development of the Greek Army in the Middle East.

When the last mutineers had been forced to yield, the whole organization of the Greek Army was in ruins. Hardly a single commanding officer had been able to maintain any hold on the troops under his command, and except for the Sacred Squadron, no unit was without its percentage of revolutionaries. At the time of the surrender, an effort was made to separate the soldiers into those who had taken active part in the mutiny and those who had not. In the case of the First Brigade, this was done simply by individual option: the men who agreed with the mutineers were ordered to fall out into one column and were thereupon marched off to a detention camp in the desert, while the remnant was taken to a different camp. By similar methods, the other units of the Greek Army were sifted, and altogether nearly ten thousand mutineers (about half of the total strength of the Greek forces in the Middle East) were segregated and interned. From the men who had not taken active part in the mutiny a new brigade was formed. It was named the Third Brigade, although there was of course no longer any First or Second in existence.

A few weeks after the mutiny, the general administration of the Greek Army was entrusted to Major General Constantine Vendiris. General Vendiris was a man of remarkable histrionic gifts and possessed resolute will and great ambition. He

had a turbulent career behind him when he took command. As a young regular officer he had joined the Venizelist insurrectionary Government in Salonika, and distinguished himself for his personal bravery in action. Through the peace he was generally considered an extreme republican. He took active part in the 1935 revolution and as a result was dismissed from the Army. Metaxas cherished a personal animosity against him, and refused his melodramatic offer to serve as a private in the ranks at the time of the Albanian War. During the occupation, Vendiris became head of a secret organization known as RAN. This was an irridentist group, taking its name from three geographical place names which were desired as the future frontiers of an enlarged Greece—Rumeli-Avalona-Nisi. The plan cherished by this organization was to equip secretly a force of patriotic Greeks who would leap to arms as the Germans withdrew, and follow behind, taking over border areas from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This scheme never got past the paper stage; but a number of influential Army officers and prominent civilians set themselves up as a sort of headquarters for the nonexistent army, and under General Vendiris' direction devoted themselves to making propaganda for a Greater Greece.

From his experience in Greece, General Vendiris had become bitterly anti-Communist. He believed Communists to be enemies of the nation, and looked upon the mutiny in the Middle East as a crowning blow struck against the glory of Greek arms. With the backing of British military authorities, he set about reconstituting the Greek Army. He was guided by two desires. He wanted to create an armed force that would be thoroughly proof against Communist infiltration, and he wanted to restore the Army quickly in order that some of its units might take part in the fighting in Italy and redeem the tarnished Greek military reputation.

To achieve these purposes, Vendiris combed out the Greek officer corps and retained on active duty only those men

whom he or his subordinates felt sure were anti-Communist. This meant in practice that he appointed royalist officers to command positions. Since a somewhat similar, though less careful selection of the common soldiers had taken place, the new units of the Greek Army became predominantly royalist, and uniformly anti-Communist.

By June 1944 the Third Brigade was organized. After a couple of months' strenuous training in the mountains of Lebanon, it was transported to Italy. There the Brigade joined the Eighth Army and after a week of brisk fighting succeeded in capturing the Italian town of Rimini. From this victory, it was afterward frequently known as the Rimini Brigade.

As for the soldiers who had elected to join the mutineers, they remained in detention camps until after the liberation of Greece. Some of them were formed into guard battalions, and others served in labor units, but many remained in a sort of imprisonment until finally transported to Greece in the spring of 1945. Twenty of the ringleaders of the mutiny were tried by court-martial. Some of them were sentenced to death, others to varying terms of imprisonment. The sentences, however, were suspended by the Greek Government from political considerations, and no one suffered execution as a result of his part in the mutiny.

VI

Efforts at Unity

IN 1944 the German armies were everywhere on the defensive. To the hopeful eyes of the Greeks, their power waned almost from day to day. In early spring the Greek people generally expected an Allied landing in force, but from month to month it failed to come. As the summer wore on it began to look as though the German garrison in Greece would either have to withdraw or allow itself to be cut off by the Russians, who were driving through the northern Balkans. Every German movement came to be rumored as withdrawal; but by late August it was unmistakable: units of the German garrison were moving northward. Through September the certainty grew. A steady stream of German soldiers passed from the islands to the mainland, until whole islands were abandoned. By degrees garrison posts in the southern part of the country were likewise given up, and all Greeks knew that the day of liberation was at hand.

Liberation was longed for by all the population save for a handful of out-and-out collaborators. Almost every Greek was animated by a deep hatred of the Germans who had ruled so harshly, killed so many innocent persons, and burnt so many of the villages. But this hatred was almost the only feeling common to all Greeks. The men of the Left looked forward confidently to the day of liberation as a time when Greece would enter on a new era and, under the political leadership of the resistance movement, slough off all that was evil

and unjust in the prewar social order. There was a tremendous buoyancy and faith in the EAM movement. Its members had no doubt that they were in the right and would be able to make all things new. They were, however, vague as to the exact steps that would be taken to realize the reforms they expected. They were definite only in two things: the King would not be allowed to come back and impose another Fascist dictatorship; and they, the members of EAM, would be the men and women who would take control of the country and direct it into democratic paths. What they meant by democratic it is hard to say; indeed it seems to me that the word had lost all independent meaning and had become equivalent in their mouths to their program of no King, and EAM in power. With governmental power in their hands, the members of EAM looked forward to elections, a new constitution and a new economic order. They had complete faith that in their hands the future of Greece would be safe; that they, being the people, could do no wrong and commit no folly. The whole movement had an element of religious crusade in it; one might carp and criticize from the outside, but once within the ranks all doubts faded and the world and its future seemed bright. In international matters, EAM advocated friendship with Greece's northern neighbors, and some of its members spoke of an eventual Balkan federal union that would include Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

By the time of liberation, EAM numbered about two million members, out of a total population of over seven million. They were incomparably superior to all rivals in their organization and enthusiasm, and had every reason to suppose that once the Germans were out of the way, they would be able to take over undisputed control. There seemed to be nothing that could hope to stand against them.

EAM was not, however, the sole political organization among the Greeks, nor did it represent the only strains of

political feeling. The traditional political parties were all in a state of suspended animation. A few politicians lived quietly in Athens, and had from time to time expressed an opinion or desire to the Government-in-Exile. But they were without any organization that could lend their words weight, and for the time being they enjoyed only a sort of traditional prestige which attached to their names. Other than that they had no power.

The enormous growth of EAM, and its intolerant attitude toward all who failed to join the National Liberation Front, aroused deep fears among many of the Greeks who refused to accept its leadership. In most of the country, opposition to EAM found no formulation. Anyone who spoke against the movement was effectively punished by fine, imprisonment or, in more serious cases, by death. In Athens and some of the other large towns, however, Right wing sentiment was free to develop.

The conservatives were caught in an embarrassing position. They did not like the Germans, and yet they could not hope by themselves to challenge the military power of ELAS. Most conservatives found this dilemma insoluble, and during the last months of occupation lived in high anxiety, hating the Germans and fearing EAM and ELAS. Personally, the majority refused active collaboration, but they began to condone and even to approve of the few who took active part against the Communists in German-sponsored organizations. Thus many of the politicians of the Liberal and Populist Parties looked with complacency on the formation of the Security Battalions in the fall of 1943, hoping that they would be able to counterbalance the power of ELAS in the period after liberation. Conservatives looked upon X in much the same way: a valuable counterweight to the ELAS Reserve of Athens, even though its manners were sometimes crude, and its methods of getting and using weapons best left in the dark.

The few who actually took the plunge and entered into

open military collaboration with the Germans against ELAS came from no one class or district. In later times, a casual observer could not have distinguished an ELAS Reservist from a member of X simply by looking at him or listening to his accent. Accident seems to have played a part in determining the political affiliation of many individuals. The death of a close relative at the hands of ELAS was enough to make many a peasant or townsman join the other side. In the Peloponnese, where traditions of private justice and blood feud remain strong, this probably accounted for most of the men who joined the Security Battalions. In the great cities, like Athens or Salonika, some men doubtless joined simply to make a living. Economic conditions grew rapidly worse from 1943 onward, and many must have found the prospect of food and clothing, mixed with the opportunities for plunder that came the way of a Security battalioneer, a strong attraction. The rank and file of both X and the Security Battalions came from the same social groups as did the ELAS-ites. The only difference lay in the leaders. X was commanded for the most part by former army officers; ELAS by a mixed group of students, workmen and professional revolutionaries.

During 1944 there was a perceptible hardening of Right wing sentiment in Athens. Propaganda against EAM was assiduously spread by word of mouth and through illegal newspapers as well. The accusations against the Left were many, but, of all, the most effective and most widely believed was that EAM sought to betray the Greek nation. "They call the Bulgars brothers" came to be a favorite damnation of the Left. Partly in reaction against the Left and partly for the inherent attraction of expansion, the Right began to revive the old dream of a Greater Greece. Territorial claims against Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were formulated on an extravagant scale, and, as we have seen, the proposal was seriously made that Greece should occupy the border lands as the Germans withdrew, thus giving the Greeks practical

possession of disputed areas when the time for making peace treaties came around. By degrees, the one effective rallying cry of the Right became "Greater Greece." On other questions they were divided among themselves between republicans and royalists, and could find no course to steer between the "democracy" of the Left and the tyranny of the German occupiers.

The striking fact of the Greek political scene on the eve of liberation was the lack of anything that could be called a Center. There were many persons who disliked both the intolerance of the Left and the reaction of the Right; but they had neither an organization nor a program, and in practical politics counted for next to nothing. The Liberal politicians aspired to lead this confused mass, but they were themselves confused. After 1943 the leader of the Liberal Party, octogenarian Themistocles Sofoulis, turned strongly against EAM. But he had no liking for the royalists of the extreme Right and remained almost solitary, quite unable to stay, or even seriously to influence the course of events.

George Papandreou, younger and more vigorous than Sofoulis, was likewise a politician of the Center and was, like his elder, without a party. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1944, British political observers came to pin their hopes on him. Papandreou had been one of the bright young men who congregated around the great Venizelos, and had held a number of Cabinet posts in the time of the republic. In 1928 he broke off from the Liberals to found his own Social Democratic Party. The new party never became large. In 1935 it won twenty-four seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This made it the largest of the republican splinter groups, but no more than that. During the occupation, Papandreou, like other politicians, took no active rôle. He flirted for a while with EAM but never joined it, and was among the signers of the Protocol of 31 March 1942 asking that the King's return be put off until after the plebiscite. In suc-

ceeding months, he never broke so openly with EAM as did Sofoulis, perhaps foreseeing some such mediating rôle as in fact came his way in 1944.

Papandreou's chief eminence was as a rhetorician. His speeches were eloquent, plausible and, by Western standards, interminable. He also had a keen sensitivity to the currents of public opinion; but careful attention to the public mood of the moment earned for him a reputation as an extraordinary twister and fence sitter. His public announcements of policy were always cloudy, capable of more than one interpretation, and enveloped in such a multitude of words that one could read into them almost any opinion. Papandreou was something more than this, however. He was a great egoist, and in the early months of 1944 convinced himself that he had been, as it were, supernaturally commissioned to bring order out of chaos and lead Greece through the difficulties of the liberation period. This sense of mission may partly have been assumed for the benefit of the public, but probably Papandreou himself sincerely believed that he was a chosen instrument, the only man in Greece who could bring reconciliation to the warring factions that divided the country. He had been in touch with British agents from time to time during the occupation, and early in 1944 he convinced some of them that he could join Left and Right in a National Union that would tide over the period of liberation.

Accordingly, when the mutiny broke out in Egypt, the British decided to send for Papandreou. Soon after his arrival in Cairo, the Liberal coterie that had taken over the Government after Tsouderos' resignation, was persuaded to resign in its turn. On April 23 Papandreou succeeded Sophocles Venizelos as Prime Minister of the Exile Government. He came to power with the program of uniting all parties and resistance organizations in support of a coalition Government. This idea had been current in Cairo before

his arrival, and the Venizelos Government had issued formal invitations to the parties and organizations in Greece to come to a conference in the Middle East. Such a conference, it was hoped by both British and Greeks, would be able to resolve the quarrels that threatened to break out into bloodshed upon the Germans' departure.

It took some weeks for all the delegates to be transported safely to the Middle East. Finally, on May 17, the conference met near Beirut in the Lebanon. Altogether twenty-five delegates were present, representing the politicians of Cairo, and nearly all the parties and resistance organizations of Greece. EAM was represented by six men, of whom only one was a Communist. The head of the EAM delegation was Alexander Svolos, formerly Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of Athens. Svolos had only recently made public his membership in EAM, leaving Athens for the mountains in April 1944. He was a figure of considerable distinction, with a high reputation in intellectual and legal circles. He was quickly appointed to the presidency of the Provisional Government, replacing Colonel Bakirdjis, who went north and took command of ELAS in Macedonia and Thrace. Svolos was a theoretical Marxist of the Socialist persuasion, and a man of unquestioned good will. He came to the Lebanon Conference with sincere hope of making a workable coalition Government.

His relation to the Communists of EAM is difficult to comprehend. They probably accepted him as a useful "front man" for the movement; he, however, took seriously the democratic professions of EAM, and conceived of democracy more along Western lines than was the case with other EAM-ites. He was willing to admit other points of view and did not automatically condemn all dissent as traitorous. At the same time, he was convinced that EAM did represent the overwhelming proportion of the Greek people, and expected to win for it a preponderance in the Government of National

Unity. The other members of the EAM delegation were likewise moderates, and the Communist representative, Miltiades Porfyrogennis, did not stand out irreconcilably against their attitude of compromise.

It is interesting to speculate as to why EAM sent such a delegation to the Lebanon Conference. By its very composition, some sort of agreement on a Government of National Union was assured, and such must have been the intention of the Central Committee that selected the delegates. It seems probable, from the shape of subsequent events, that the Communist leaders of EAM decided that their power needed the cover of formal legality, and shied away from an open and irreparable break with the Government-in-Exile. Probably they calculated that a Government of National Unity could at any time be bent to their will by the superior force of ELAS which, in the last analysis, would hold the power in Greece after the liberation. Another factor that may have governed the Communists' policy was the threat of British intervention. If no Government of National Unity emerged from the Lebanon Conference, there seemed a lively possibility that the British would land troops in Greece and restore the Government-in-Exile, even though it were without any representatives of the Left. Such an event would put the leftists in a difficult position. They would have either to fight against the liberating British Army or else knuckle under to a hostile Government. With such a possibility hanging over them, it must have seemed prudent to join the Government-in-Exile and hope to bend it toward the Left. The overwhelming preponderance which EAM had achieved in the country could reasonably be expected to make possible alterations in the Cabinet that would assure leftist control; and the British would have small excuse to intervene in the internal affairs of the Government once it had been safely reestablished on Greek soil.

Such I believe to have been the sort of thinking that

guided the Communist leaders in their decisions. That they had suffered a sudden change of heart and sincerely welcomed EAM's coöperation with the Right wing and Center, or renounced EAM's claim to exclusive representation of the Greek people, seems entirely improbable. The move was rather in the nature of a tactical retreat. The ultimate goal, to establish an EAM Government and through it, a Communist regime, remained unaltered. At the same time, it must be recognized that a large element in EAM was not Communist and did not share the Communist ideals. To them participation in an ecumenical Government seemed a natural step. It proved EAM's good faith, and seemed to hold promise of future peace and quiet for the country. This was the group in EAM which Svolos and his Socialist colleagues represented, and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity.

The Right wing was sparsely represented at Lebanon. The Popular Party had a single delegate from Greece, and General Vendiris was present as representative of RAN. For them there was small question. A Government in which they were represented was better than the most probable alternative: a solidly leftist, revolutionary regime in Greece, made desperate by the threat of forcible intervention by the British. Perhaps even at the time of the Conference, some of the rightists counted on British support once the Government of National Unity had established itself in Greece. Whether they saw so far into the future or not, a coalition seemed the best possible arrangement they could make, and no difficulties arose from the Right.

The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile, Reginald Leeper, played an important rôle in the deliberations. He did not actually attend the sessions of the Conference, but he did come up from Cairo to be close to the scene of action, and he was in constant touch with the chief delegates. He urged conciliation and agreement on all

parties, and strove by all means in his power to make the Conference a success. In view of the British position vis-à-vis the Greek Government, his advice carried much weight; so much so that the agreement which emerged from the Conference generally reflected the British view.

The major quarrel in the Conference was between the representatives of the Liberal politicians of Cairo and Prime Minister Papandreou. The Liberals felt that Papandreou represented nobody but himself, and that they, as representatives of the great traditional party of the Center, should hold the largest bloc of seats in the Cabinet. Papandreou, on the other hand, was anxious to consolidate his own personal position as chief of the Government and wanted to put as many of his friends into the Cabinet as he could.

After some days of discussion, general agreement was reached among all the delegates. Papandreou was confirmed as Prime Minister of a Government of National Unity. EAM was accorded a quarter of the seats in the Cabinet (five); the Liberals were assigned an equal number; the Popular Party got three; and the balance was divided between small parties and groups, many of them personal friends of Papandreou.

The basis of the new Government was the so-called Lebanon Charter. This document comprised eight resolutions that were to guide the policy of the new Government. They may be summarized as follows:

1. Reorganization and disciplining of the Greek forces of the Middle East.
2. Unification of guerilla forces and the eventual formation of a national army free from any party influence.
3. End of terrorism in Greece, and the insurance of full political liberties after the German withdrawal.
4. Shipment of food and medicines to Greece.
5. Insurance of order and liberty in Greece at the time of liberation in order that the people might freely decide on the political and social regime to prevail in postwar Greece and install a Government of their choice.

6. Severe punishment of all traitors and exploiters of the people's misery.
7. Immediate satisfaction of the material needs of the people.
8. Full satisfaction of national territorial claims.

This was obviously a compromise document, and some of its provisions were subject to a wide variety of interpretations. The third clause was aimed at ELAS; the sixth at the extreme Right; but the crucial and most controversial was the fifth. It was phrased to cover the question of the King's return but failed to commit the Government to anything definite. EAM regarded this clause as a guarantee that it would be able to take power after liberation. The other political groups, however, interpreted "order and liberty" to mean the cessation of most of EAM's activities in order that their own partisans might organize and be able to install a Government of their choice. With such wide variations in interpretation, the Lebanon Charter was a frail basis upon which to form a truly united Government. It was the best that could be produced under the circumstances, however, and did serve as the foundation of government during the following six months.

After the conclusion of the Conference, the Government returned to Cairo and representatives of the Liberal and other parties were duly inducted into the Cabinet. The EAM delegation, however, returned to Greece in order to secure ratification of its decisions, so that for the time being no representatives of the Left joined the Government of National Unity.

The course of the new Government was not smooth. A sense of overwhelming urgency dominated the times, for the day of liberation was obviously approaching fast. But internal quarrels, and the embarrassing absence of the representatives of what was, after all, the most powerful group in the country, made it almost impossible for the Govern-

ment to prepare serious plans for the postwar settlement and administration of Greece. Only one item in the agenda of the Lebanon Charter proceeded smoothly; the reorganization of the Army in the Middle East, and that was carried on more or less independently of the Government, in defiance of the wishes of the Liberal members of the Cabinet, who saw their friends among the Army officers unceremoniously cashiered for having taken part in the mutiny. Even so uncontroversial a matter as the organization of relief for the liberated country was hampered by jurisdictional quarrels between the Greek Government and UNRRA officials. The Greeks wanted to have full control over relief distribution; UNRRA insisted on guarantees that relief supplies would not be used as a political weapon to favor one party against another, and proposed that perfect neutrality be assured by their taking over responsibility for the internal distribution. A deadlock resulted which was not resolved until several months after the liberation.

Actually, the Cabinet's attention was devoted principally to its own internal quarrels. The largest question was EAM: would or would not the leftist representatives join the Cabinet and participate in the Government? When Svolos and his fellow delegates returned to Greece from Lebanon, some at least of the leaders of EAM felt that they had come away with a bad bargain. EAM was far stronger in Greece than was the Liberal Party, yet the two had equal representation in Papandreou's Cabinet. Such a distribution of seats must have seemed little short of absurd to the leaders of EAM. They could, however, scarcely reopen the bargaining and ask for greater representation. Moreover, Svolos and his fellow delegates argued that the Cabinet would be re-organized soon after the Government's return to Greece (fifth resolution of the Lebanon Charter), and held out great hopes of redressing the balance in favor of EAM at that time.

During the following month, Papandreou's actions in

Cairo began to cause the EAM leaders to doubt his willingness to fall in with their plans. Papandreou exhibited almost complete subservience to British suggestions and wishes, and showed unmistakably that he believed himself uniquely suited to lead Greece through the difficult time ahead of her. EAM leaders felt equally that they alone were ordained to the leadership and resented British influence. Accordingly, on 29 July 1944, EAM sent a telegram to Papandreou demanding that he resign before their representatives would join the Government. After discussion with the Cabinet, Papandreou returned a soft answer, saying that his person would never stand in the way of national unity. Simultaneously, the Liberal members of the Government sent a telegram to EAM in which they recommended that no insistence be made that Papandreou resign at the moment. They told, however, of a plan they cherished for substituting their own leader, Themistocles Sofoulis, as Prime Minister as soon as the Government arrived in Greece. This reassured EAM, for with Liberal support they believed they would have no difficulty in forcing a reorganization of the Cabinet that would give the Left a larger share in the Government.

But before the EAM Ministers came to Cairo, a second point was raised. The new Government had not clearly committed itself on the question of the Security Battalions, and EAM now demanded a categorical denunciation of these organizations as traitorous. The conservatives in the Cabinet believed that the Security Battalions were a valuable and necessary makeweight to the armed power of ELAS, and hoped that they would survive the liberation to lend the Government military support in the event of trouble with the Left. But Papandreou and most of the Center could not approve of organizations which had committed so many atrocities against Greek villages and had served as willing tools of the Germans. The Right was overruled, and the Government agreed to denounce them. Accordingly on 7 September

the Security Battalions were formally and publicly declared traitorous. The German evacuation of Greece had already begun, and the members of the Security Battalions, hearing that the new Government would consider them as enemies, began to drift off to their homes. By the time the liberation was accomplished only small remnants of the original force continued to exist and ELAS easily destroyed them all.

With these two questions out of the way, EAM became reconciled to joining the Government in Cairo. Accordingly, five men were chosen as ministers, two of them Communists and the others drawn from the Socialist wing of the movement. They arrived in Cairo 1 September and were sworn in the next day. A few days later the Provisional Government of the Mountains was formally dissolved.

Meanwhile, the Liberals in the Cabinet had quarrelled with Prime Minister Papandreou and, on the eve of the arrival of the EAM representatives in Cairo, had resigned from the Government (31 August). It seems certain that the Liberals expected to come into contact with the members of the EAM delegation upon their arrival from Greece and, in conjunction with them, compel an immediate change in the person of the Prime Minister. But when they arrived, the EAM leaders did not fall in with the plans of Sophocles Venizelos and his fellow politicians. Instead of balking at the behavior of Papandreou, the Leftists entered the Cabinet without delay, leaving the Liberal politicians in the lurch.

According to Alexander Svolos, who had been appointed as one of the Ministers to represent EAM in Papandreou's Cabinet, the reason for this action was that his two Communist colleagues went to the Russian Legation in Cairo and were there advised to join the Cabinet without further bargaining. There is no reason to doubt Svolos' word, or that he was in a position to know of the action of his fellow Ministers. It raises the interesting question of the general

relation between the EAM movement and the Russian Government.

Until Russian troops had driven the Germans from the Black Sea coast, direct communication between Russia and Greece seems to have been practically impossible. There is no evidence that EAM or the Greek Communist Party received any instructions from Russia during the first years of the war. As we have seen, the EAM movement was dominated by Communists; and in the Greek Communist Party there was a small group of professional revolutionaries who had received special training in Russia before the war. Their number was very small, but their influence in EAM was profound. It seems probable that the remarkable parallel between events in Greece and Yugoslavia may be accounted for by the fact that the Partisan movement, too, was directed by Russian-trained revolutionaries, and both movements followed the textbook directions of the Russian teachers. This seems to have been the limit of Russian control over EAM. Except for the intervention in Cairo, there is no evidence of Russian advice affecting the day-to-day policy of the Greek resistance movement.

In August 1944 a small group of Russian Army officers dropped by parachute into ELAS Headquarters. Their sudden arrival came as a complete and unwelcome surprise to the British. The Russians actually came from Tito's Headquarters, not from Russia directly; and so far as could be observed, took no active part in directing ELAS policy during the ensuing months. The members of this military mission remained in Greece after the liberation, acting as an intelligence team and evacuating Russian prisoners of war. They stayed in Athens throughout the civil war, living in British army billets, and made no gesture to assist the Greek Communists by word or deed.

Though the Russians seem to have exercised no direct

control over the movement, EAM certainly held Russia in high esteem, and in propaganda always emphasized the Red Army's preponderant part in the war against Germany. It seems certain that if it had ultimately gained control, EAM would have brought Greece into the Russian sphere, as the Partisans have done in Yugoslavia. In such an event, British and American influence would have been largely excluded from the country.

But in the summer of 1944 such issues lay still buried in the future. The immediate problem was to make preparations for the imminent liberation of Greece. The United States declined to take an equal share in the expedition that would liberate Greece, and American military participation was limited to a share in relief administration. The military undertaking thus became almost wholly a British responsibility. No serious effort to attack the German garrison or to cut off its retreat was contemplated. Troops for an attack were not easily available in the Mediterranean area, and a landing in force would bring no great advantage since the Germans were already leaving of their own accord. Consequently AFHQ assigned only a token force of approximately four thousand men for the landing in Greece.

It was obviously necessary to concert plans with the Greek Government, but British military authorities were very reluctant to confide in the Cabinet, for some of the Ministers were incurable chatterboxes, and regularly discussed state secrets with members of the Greek community in Cairo over their afternoon coffee on the porch of Shepheard's Hotel. Consequently in mid-August Prime Minister Papandreou agreed to feign illness, and was declared to be unable to see visitors. Actually he went secretly to Italy where he met Churchill and discussed plans for the liberation of Greece with the British Prime Minister. It was this circumvention of the Greek Cabinet that precipitated the resignation of the Liberal Ministers on 31 August.

Exactly what passed between Papandreou and Churchill at their secret meeting in Italy has never been fully divulged. Upon his return to Cairo, Papandreou let it be known that they had agreed that King George II should not return to Greece immediately upon the liberation of the country but should wait in London until a plebiscite had been held; that the Government should be reorganized upon arriving in Greece; and that it should immediately transfer its seat from Cairo to Italy as a preparatory move for re-entering Greece. It is sure that military plans for the landing were discussed and agreed upon by the Greek and British Prime Ministers. In addition, the Liberals and EAM accused Papandreou of having agreed to more than this, saying that he promised to favor the King's return and prevent the Left from coming into undisputed power. Whether these suspicions were well founded only Papandreou and Churchill can say, and neither of the two men has found it fitting to tell more than was announced at the time.

Early in September the Greek Government transferred its seat to Salerno, Italy, where it was effectually divorced from the talkative Greek colony of Cairo and subject to no outside pressures save that of British military advice. The great task was to get ready for liberation. Members of the Cabinet were detailed to go to various outlying parts of the country that had already been freed of the Germans. The main body of the Cabinet, however, with Prime Minister Papandreou and the EAM Ministers, remained in Italy and travelled to Athens by sea.

Toward the end of September an agreement was made between the British and Greeks to regulate the military aspects of the liberation. General Sarafis, Commander in Chief of ELAS, General Zervas, Chief of the EDES guerillas, Prime Minister Papandreou and two British generals, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and Ronald Scobie were present at the Conference which drew up what was afterward called the

Caserta Agreement. By this Agreement the guerilla forces in Greece acknowledged the headship of Papandreou's Government, and that Government in turn put all the Greek forces at its disposal under the command of General Scobie, as representative of the Allied High Command in Greece. It was further agreed that the guerilla forces would not make any attempt to seize power at the time of liberation, but would form a national union between themselves through which to coördinate their activities against the enemy. It was expressly stated that the Security Battalions were not a part of the forces under the Greek Government but were enemy formations.

Supplementary to the Agreement was a series of operational orders issued by General Scobie. In these Scobie stated his aim: to help to reconstruct Greece under the guidance of the Greek Government. In the original draft of his order, General Scobie said he aimed to restore law and order. This met with an objection from Sarafis, who insisted that law and order were an internal matter which concerned only the Greek Government. General Scobie accepted the objection and changed the wording of his order accordingly. Additional provisions of the operational order made the guerilla commanders responsible for the observance of good order in Greece immediately after liberation and marked out the operational boundaries between ELAS and EDES along the same line as that fixed by the Plaka Agreement. One important territorial change was introduced. Athens and the district around it were exempted from ELAS control, and put under the command of General Panagiotis Spiiotopoulos instead. Spiiotopoulos was a friend and former subordinate of General Vendiris who was at this time the Commander in Chief of the Greek Middle East Army. In effect, then, this provision handed the capital over to the military control of Vendiris, and the conservative, nationalist political opinion he represented.

One may say in general that the Caserta Agreement was drawn up at a time when the future political control of Greece was in the forefront of everyone's mind. The British were determined not to let the Government pass into the sole control of the Left; ELAS and EAM were equally determined to gain complete control of the country. Both sides in a sense were playing for time. EAM leaders expected that once the liberation had been accomplished their monopoly of political organization in the country and the widespread popular support they commanded would compel the Government to move more and more to the Left. The conservatives and the British felt that no break with the Left could be risked at the moment and were content to establish a Government in which EAM held only a minority position and let events guide their action afterward.

Such then was the political situation when the Germans at last abandoned Athens, and the Greek Government was able to return to its long-lost capital city. There had been no real meeting of minds between the extremes, nor any successful effort toward honest compromise. Within the country the two sides, EAM and the enemies of EAM, were as deeply estranged as ever. The Government of National Unity was a frail fabric, barely disguising the chasms which yawned between the constituent factions of the Cabinet. No one but a blind man or a foolish optimist could have expected the future to run smoothly.

The Government arrived in Athens on 18 October 1944. British troops had landed in Greece three weeks earlier, coming ashore on the mainland first at Patras. Several small skirmishes took place between the advance guard of the British force and the tail of the German column. Zervas harassed the German retreat through Epirus and assaulted Jannina before the last Germans had time to escape. ELAS likewise harried the retreating Germans, but devoted most of its power to destroying the remnants of the Security Bat-

talions. As the Germans withdrew, the guerillas came down from the hills to the towns and enjoyed the sweets of a more civilized life than they had known in the remote villages of the back country. In some places there was a little bloodshed, notably at Kalamata in the southern Peloponnese where ELAS executed about thirty persons; but through most of Greece the guerillas obeyed the order of General Scobie that there should be no wholesale punishment of collaborators. EAM governments were set up in all the towns of the ELAS area; a special corps of ELAS took over town police duties; taxes were assessed on those who were suspected of having profited during the occupation, and collected by force if necessary. In the city of Athens there were frequent shots by night; but the majority of them were fired into the air and only expressed the high spirits of the guerilla who pressed the trigger. Peace and order were on the whole remarkably well maintained.

General Scobie sent a brigade of paratroopers northward on the heels of the Germans. By 30 October the German evacuation was complete, and all Greece was finally free. British troops visited the main centers of Greece as far as Salonika, "showing the flag." Everywhere they met with warm welcome as liberators, and joint ELAS-British parades were organized in several towns. The general spirit of the people was one of rejoicing, and for the first few days of the liberation there was little thought of the morrow or the problems it would bring. Everyone believed that better times lay ahead, and forgot the bitter quarrels that divided them against each other.

In late October two brigades of the Fourth Indian Division came to Greece after hard service on the Italian front. The plan was that Greece should serve a sort of rest area for British troops. It was intended to keep about one division in the country as a garrison force and insurance against trouble with ELAS. Upon the arrival of the Indian brigades, the para-

troopers and raiding forces, which had first landed in the country, were concentrated in Athens and Patras for reshipment to Italy. Raiding forces actually left the country in November; but the paratroopers were retained at the last minute when threatening political tension developed between ELAS and the British-supported Government. They were destined to take the leading part in the Battle of Athens.

After the first days of rejoicing, political tension was not slow to manifest itself. Papandreou's Government faced truly colossal difficulties, and could not forget its bitter internal quarrels. A week after reaching Athens, the Cabinet was reshuffled; but contrary to the hopes of the Left, no significant change in the political balance of the Government took place. Papandreou remained as Prime Minister, and EAM was accorded only six seats in the Cabinet. Four representatives of the Populist Party came into the reorganized Government, but the Liberal Party remained aloof. Representing an almost nonexistent Center, the Liberal politicians found themselves in a difficult position. Themistocles Sofoulis, leader of the Liberal Party, refused to accept the plan of the Left (and of some of his own followers) whereby he would become Prime Minister in a Cabinet dominated by EAM; but at the same time, he declined to come into a Government headed by his old-time subordinate, Papandreou. He decided instead to wait and see.

The reorganized Government faced a country in economic ruin; a people whose moral habits had been corrupted; a nation divided against itself politically, in which the governmental administrative machine had almost totally collapsed. Such difficulties might well have staggered a strong government. The divided Cabinet over which Papandreou presided proved itself quite unable to meet any of the difficulties that now confronted it.

In economic matters, the immediate problem was currency. A wild inflation had taken place during the last months of the

occupation, and by November one hundred billion drachma notes had become worthless and could be seen blowing in the wind across the sidewalks of Athens. Economic exchange had reverted to barter, although for large transactions, the gold pounds, which had been supplied so copiously to various resistance organizations, provided a medium of exchange. Alexander Svolos, the Minister of Finance, declared the old currency no longer legal tender, and redeemed it with a new issue supplied from England at the rate of two hundred billion drachma to one. To start factories and restore communication and transport was far more difficult. In this direction the Papandreou Government accomplished practically nothing. Some emergency road repair was done by the British Army units so that the main roads became passable to wheeled vehicles. Otherwise nothing.

The political problem was equally beyond settlement. In the country, except for the area controlled by Zervas, there was only one vocal party. EAM was in control and it permitted no opposition. In Athens, however, the Right wing took courage, founded newspapers, and became more outspoken every day. EAM for its part staged a series of large demonstrations in the heart of the city. The demonstrations had various themes. One demanded an immediate purge of collaborators from the Government; another celebrated the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Communist Party; and a third paraded the corpses of some EAM followers who had been slain in a brawl.

Perhaps the deepest and most difficult of all the problems that beset Greece was the general breakdown of habit and morals that the war and occupation had brought about. When men had existed for years at a stretch under constant fear of sudden and unprovoked attack, normal living became almost impossible. Under a Government so unpopular as the quisling, sabotage and malingering became twisted into a patriotic duty and grew to be a fixed habit of mind and action among

large sections of the population. In factories, honest work became the rare exception. An attitude of distrust and defiance of authority spread to all parts of the city population. Large numbers of families had lived on the charity of the Red Cross through the last years of the war, and, lacking the opportunity, had lost the will to work. Stealing had become patriotic, when it was done from the Germans; and many of the Greeks retained the habit after the Germans had gone. These attitudes combined to make Greek society grossly inefficient. Much-needed work, such as the unloading of relief ships in Pireus or the repair of roads, could be organized only with the greatest difficulty, required far greater numbers of men than normally would have been the case, and without constant and minute supervision, theft and idling on the job kept results to a minimum.

In brief, the machine which EAM had perfected for sabotage of the occupation regime continued to operate after the liberation. Perhaps had EAM succeeded in taking over the Government many of these inefficiencies would have been reduced. Insofar as it was organized deliberately, the sabotage would of course have stopped; but much was not organized. It had become an ingrained habit which only intensive propaganda and changed conditions of living could overcome. Neither came to Greece; and the country continued to suffer from a tremendous and crippling social inefficiency. Economic privation accentuated all these moral difficulties; but in turn, inefficiency accentuated economic privation. It became a sort of vicious circle from which it was hard to see any easy escape.

Such matters lay far beyond the scope of the Government when it first returned to Greece. The immediate problem to which the Cabinet addressed itself was the establishment of a governmental machine that would be able to exercise power in the provinces. In particular, plans were proposed for the organization of an armed force that would be able to guard

the public peace. In this, the Government ran headlong into opposition from EAM. Almost every man suggested for a governmental post by one side was automatically found unacceptable by the other. The net result was that only a few top administrative posts in the provinces were filled, and then only by colorless weaklings who usually proved to be no match for the EAM administrators already on the ground.

Much quarreling arose over the question of collaboration. The Left pressed for prompt and dire punishment, and wanted to organize special courts with special abbreviated rules of procedure to try persons accused. The Right was reluctant. It feared that such courts would accept EAM's definition of collaboration by which most of the conservative political leaders and many of their prospective followers would be classed as collaborators. Such courts, set up over all Greece, could easily be made into an effective weapon against anyone who dared to criticize EAM, for plausible charges could be drawn against almost every man in Greece unless the definition of collaboration were made clear and narrow. With such a division in the Cabinet, judicial progress against collaborators was slow, and no one was actually condemned in the time during which Papandreou held power. This fact infuriated many honest Greeks, and became one of the principal items in leftist propaganda against the Government.

An equally stubborn controversy developed over the question of the organization of a police force. The gendarmery which had served under Metaxas and the quisling Governments had largely broken up, and was in any case totally unacceptable to EAM. The Government decided to concentrate its remaining members in Athens and there screen them, accepting for continued service only those whose record could be proven blameless. In the meanwhile, a special National Guard was to be raised by calling to active service one of the prewar classes of the Army Reserve. The problem of finding officers for this organization who would be acceptable

to both Left and Right proved very difficult. By the time the Guard was called to service (24 November) only about a third of the necessary officers had been appointed. For this and other reasons, it never actually took over police work until much later, when the whole balance of power in Greece had been changed by civil war.

Before any makeshift police force had been organized, another problem arose which quickly obscured all others. ELAS and EDES had originally been formed to resist the Germans. Rightists in the Cabinet and outside it now argued that since the Germans had gone, ELAS and the other guerilla forces had accomplished their purpose, and should disband. They further stated that it was intolerable for a private army to exist within a sovereign state, and that, before the Government could consider any of the questions of reconstruction, the threat which the existence of ELAS constantly held over the head of any who ventured to disagree with the Left, must be lifted. EAM accepted this reasoning, agreed that ELAS had accomplished its task, but insisted that all armed organizations of the Right should be disbanded simultaneously.

This argument was aimed at the Third (or Rimini) Brigade which had come from Italy to Athens, arriving 9 November. In leftist circles it was rumored that the Brigade had come from the battle in Italy in order to put down EAM and bring the King back by force. As we have seen, the Third Brigade was predominantly composed of royalists, and its members were inspired by a deep hatred of EAM and the Communists. That the Brigade would have been able to bring the King back by force seems, however, highly doubtful. King George was living in London, and he would scarcely have been able to leave without the knowledge and permission of the British Government. And the British, though they tended to favor the King's cause, would certainly not have allowed him to be installed on his throne by force of arms. It is, however, per-

fectly true that a Government, supported militarily by the Third Brigade, would have been able to put into effect measures favoring the King's return. It is even conceivable, though hardly probable, that a plebiscite could have been so administered within two or three months as to nullify EAM's popular strength and bring a majority in favor of the King. There seems small doubt that the King commanded only a minority of actively loyal subjects in Greece at the time of the liberation. The royalists lacked any sort of organized following in the provinces, and without a strong political machine, the most royalist of Governments could hardly have manipulated the ballots successfully. Furthermore, Papandreou's Government was far from royalist. The largest single bloc in the Government—EAM—was fanatically opposed to any restoration of the King, and it is difficult to see how fake elections could have been carried through as long as EAM Ministers remained in the Cabinet.

Such speculation is hardly to the point, for EAM was in no mood to accept what the rightists and the British wanted. They refused to agree to the retention of the Third Brigade as a cadre for the new Army, and to the total dissolution of all guerilla groups. It is easy to sympathize with EAM's position. They had risen to supremacy in Greece during the years of occupation through hard work, danger and suffering. They saw no reason why they should of their own will relinquish the power which they had won, and give to the Right a chance to organize itself in the countryside and challenge their supremacy in the land.

The Right claimed that EAM's power was based on terror, which in some part it was. Few dissidents dared to raise their voices in the villages and provincial towns in the fall of 1944; and because so few dared, overt acts of terrorism were also few, so that the outward seeming of the country was surprisingly peaceful and calm. Nevertheless, government officials and emissaries of the conservative political organizations were

not allowed to travel out from Athens, being turned back by ELAS guards who were posted along the highways. Under such constraints, the Right justifiably claimed that there was no freedom in Greece, and that they could not conduct their activities nor organize their supporters until ELAS had been dissolved.

The leftists rebutted such arguments by observing that their opponents were rotten through and through with collaboration, and should not be granted the right to propagandize their errors and break down the unity of the people. Passionately they claimed, and most of them believed, that they *were* the people. They believed that they, the people, had risen in righteous wrath against the men who for so long had betrayed and swindled them; boldly they asserted that the people would never again permit Fascist collaborators and economic tyrants to rule over them.

The institutions and practices of liberal democracy of the Western style do not work in such a climate of opinion. There was no meeting place, no common ground between the Left and Right. Counting of heads or of ballots cannot resolve such antagonisms. The losing side will not accept the verdict, but will challenge the honesty of the election and sabotage the resulting Government by every means in its power, using whatever violence it can command. Under such circumstances, force is the only arbiter. Certainly, it was force that prevailed in Greece.

Events moved quickly toward their climax when once the issue of disarmament of ELAS had come up. Details of the proposals and counterproposals that ensued are much disputed, for in the negotiations that preceded the outbreak of war, each side sought to fix the blame on the other. Contradictory and variant accounts of happenings during the last two weeks of November have been published. What follows here can only claim to be an effort to sift the truth.

On 22 November Prime Minister Papandreou declared

that he favored the demobilization of all volunteer units. The Left understood that the phrase "volunteer units" included the Third Brigade, and Papandreou probably intended to include the royalist brigade in the phrase. But it was ambiguous, for one could argue that the Third Brigade was not volunteer, but the conscript Army of the Government of Greece, which in part it was. All Papandreou's skill in vague phraseology could not bridge the gap between the insistence of the Right (backed powerfully by the British Ambassador and General Scobie), that the Third Mountain Brigade be retained in service; and the equally definite insistence from the Left that the Brigade be disbanded.

A compromise was suggested after some days, and seems for a brief while to have been agreed to by all factions in the Cabinet. The proposal was this: that ELAS disband and disarm, save for a number of men equal to the combined strength of the Third Mountain Brigade, Sacred Squadron and a corps, of undetermined size, from the EDES guerrillas. This arrangement, while seeming to give ELAS an equal advantage in the struggle for power, actually would have greatly weakened the position of the leftists, for ELAS was not equal man for man to the well-trained and equipped troops that had come from the Middle East. Voluntary demobilization of their greatly superior numbers would merely deprive the party for which ELAS stood of its peculiar advantage in the political scramble. Perhaps not realizing these military facts, the EAM Ministers in the Cabinet at first agreed to the proposal of partial disarmament of ELAS; then withdrew their assent two days later (29 November).

Tired of the endless bickering and indecision of the Greek Cabinet, General Scobie thereupon ordered Sarafis and Zervas to disband their forces by 10 December. In issuing this order, Scobie was acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief of all Allied Forces in Greece. He was certainly stretching the powers he had been accorded by the Caserta Agree-

ment when he thus ordered the disbandment of a part of the forces that had been put under his control.

Zervas promptly professed willingness to obey, but Sarafis refused point blank to disband ELAS, saying that any such order would have to come from the Greek Government. Scobie countered this defiance with a proclamation addressed to the rank and file of ELAS, ordering disbandment on 10 December "in accord with the Greek Government's instruction."

It is far from clear whether the Greek Government had in fact ever ordered the disbandment of the guerilla forces. A reasonable guess is that General Scobie chose to consider the leftists' initial acceptance of the proposal to disarm (save for a corps equal in numerical strength to Right wing armed units) as an official decision of the Greek Government. For a space of two days, it appears that the proposal had been concurred in by all members of the Cabinet. Even so, legal formalities had not been complied with, for no decision of the Greek Government becomes official until published in the government *Gazette*, and no order for the disarmament of the guerillas had been so published. Actually, General Scobie probably took small account of such technicalities. As he saw it, the leftists had agreed to disarm and then had violated their word. He was determined to finish the dispute and keep to the schedule that had been set up, which called for the National Guard to begin police work on 1 December and ELAS to demobilize ten days later.

EAM looked at the situation very differently. To them, the interference of a British general in Greek internal politics was intolerable. He had no right, they felt, to disregard their Ministers' change of mind; still less to make proclamations to their troops in the name of the Greek Government. Accordingly, when news of General Scobie's proclamation reached them, the EAM Ministers resigned from the Government, in the small hours of the morning, 2 December.

As Siantos himself said later, this resignation did not arise solely from the controversy over the disarmament of ELAS. That question was merely the occasion for bringing into the open a split which irreconcilably divided the Greek Cabinet and paralyzed all important decision. Governmental inaction was as intolerable to EAM as to everyone else concerned. Papandreou had proved himself little more than a weather-cock, yielding to the Left, only to contradict himself later by yielding to the Right. Between the two, he had in the end, after repeated vacillations, always come over into the conservative camp. Papandreou made it his habit to consult the British Ambassador, Mr. Reginald Leeper, on every issue. Leeper was no novice in Greek affairs, having followed the tortuous path of Greek politics in Cairo since 1943. He was a clever man, rather austere and forbidding in manner, and sometimes offended the Greeks by an air of haughtiness. Papandreou's dependence on the British Ambassador confirmed all EAM's suspicions against the Prime Minister, and after six weeks' trial, they resolved to overthrow his Government. The disarmament question was only the stimulus for an open collision of what had long been irreconcilable wills.

By the maneuver of resignation, EAM expected to provoke a Government crisis and bring about the overthrow of Papandreou and his Cabinet. The leftists were, perhaps, a bit surprised at the boldness and scale of British intervention in Greek affairs, but believed that a show of resolution and the discreet threat of force would compel General Scobie and Ambassador Leeper to yield. In the immediate crisis, they hoped to be able to win the support of the Liberal politicians, who had stood on the sidelines of the controversy. EAM leaders expected to be able to form a new Cabinet, consisting largely of Liberals and leftists, with the aged politician, Themistocles Sofoulis, as Prime Minister. But the event was to betray their expectations. Within a week, Athens was plunged into civil war.

VII

Civil War

PUBLIC excitement mounted steadily in Athens through the last weeks of November. Alarmist rumors were in the air. Left and Right freely accused each other of plotting a coup d'état, of terrorism, of collaboration. There was almost no crime which was not attributed by each side to the other. By this time the original joy of liberation had worn off and most persons, looking around them, found life no better than under the Germans, their clothes still rags, food scarce, and medicines almost unobtainable. Military relief had been organized long before the liberation, but difficulties of unloading from ships, of transport, and of distribution made actual delivery of supplies lag far behind the eager expectation of the Greeks. There was a feeling of disillusionment among many Athenians. The great day, the long-looked-for liberation had come and gone, leaving them with almost the same problems and discomforts as before.

Political partisanship fed on this spirit. The Right blamed EAM and EAM blamed the Right for obstructing true and complete liberation. The principal accusation made against the Right was that it sought to bring the King back by force, establish a new dictatorship, and protect collaborationists from just punishment. The Left was accused of betraying Greece to the Bulgars, of exercising terrorism in the provinces, and of planning to establish a Communist dictatorship by guile or, if necessary, by force. None of these accusations

is exactly true; but all had enough color of truth to confirm the suspicions and increase the fear and hatred of each side for the other.

The British, I believe, would have liked to see a liberal society and government emerge from this welter. Their first and principal concern was that the Government of Greece should always be friendly toward them; and the men who shaped British policy for Greece were by this time firmly convinced that an EAM Government would not be friendly. Exactly what "friendly" meant was not clear. Probably it meant in part the reestablishment of economic concessions to British-owned public utility and other companies; but in last analysis and far more important, it meant a Government in Greece that would side with Great Britain in case of another war. To assure a friendly Government, the British on the whole liked the idea of restoring King George. He might be personally grateful; certainly would be no friend of the Left which had attacked him so virulently. But there were important reservations in the British support of the King. Particularly among the officials of the Embassy in Athens, there was doubt as to whether King George could win enough popular support to be able to retain his throne except by strongarm methods of government. This the British would have been reluctant to see. Furthermore, the King's return threatened to drive the Liberal Party and many middle-of-the road Greeks into the arms of the extreme Left. This would have been a disaster from the point of view of the British Embassy, and they were not willing to back the King's return if it seemed to mean such an outcome. On the other hand, the British saw small hope of a peaceful and secure republic rising from the bitter party factionalism that prevailed in Greece. With serious doubts of the King and even deeper distrust of a republic, the British policy in practice was little more than one of wait and see, meanwhile keeping the Left from exclusive power.

The resignation of the EAM Ministers on the night of 1-2 December sent a tremor of excitement through all Athens. The issue between Left and Right had been joined at last. The Government would have to move decisively either one way or the other. The leaders of EAM were confident that it would move in their direction. The resignations had taken place Friday night. The next morning EAM asked and was granted permission to hold a demonstration in the center of Athens at Constitution Square on Sunday, 3 December. Large-scale preparations were immediately begun. Bands of young men went through all the streets of the city shouting orders and threats through megaphones, instructing all members of EAM to come to the demonstration, and warning all who stayed away that they would be considered enemies of the people. Large numbers of posters were prepared, calling for punishment of collaborators and the overthrow of Papandreou. Trucks were sent into the country round about to bring EAM members from the villages near the capital. The demonstration was intended to show the popular support EAM could command and convince the British and the Right that no Government without representatives of the Left could possibly rule Greece.

EAM made still other and more ominous preparations. A special committee was established to take command of ELAS forces in and around Athens. The members of the Committee were "General" Emmanuel Mandakas, George Siantos and a retired general, Michael Hadjimachalis. Both Mandakas and Siantos were Communists; Hadjimachalis represented the "Left Liberals." The Committee was established on Saturday, 2 December, and on the same day it ordered the Athens and Pireus ELAS Reserve to mobilize. As word was passed round, the members of the Reserve proceeded to uncache their weapons and concentrate themselves at pre-arranged spots, mostly in school buildings and the like.

A general strike was declared for Monday, 4 December.

In fact, the call-up of the ELAS Reserve, and EAM's use of manpower for other preparations, cut deeply into the working force of many plants and factories even before the strike officially began. There was no doubt that when it was called, the general strike would be effective.

The Papandreou Government was in a state of near panic. It could in its own right command no military or police support except for the thinned ranks of the Athens police. This force was almost unchanged from the time of occupation. It had not been deeply implicated with the Germans, and had on many occasions tipped off Greeks who were about to be arrested, thereby giving them a chance to hide away in time. Because of this, and the lack of any alternative corps to direct traffic and keep order, the Athens police had been allowed to continue its duties. It was badly demoralized, however, and numbered only a few hundred men. Yet this police force was the only support on which the Government could count, except for the troops under General Scobie's command. Under these circumstances, when the threat of violence and revolution against the Government was unmistakable, Papandreou and his Ministers became wholly dependent on the decisions of the man who controlled the only force that could hope to stand against ELAS.

That man was Lieutenant General Ronald Scobie. General Scobie was a professional soldier, an officer and a gentleman of the peculiarly narrow British military tradition. His manner was suave, his appearance handsome; and he was thoroughly at ease in a polite drawing room. His military career had been neither brilliant nor the reverse, but as a senior officer he had filled chiefly staff and administrative positions so that he had little experience as a field commander. Despite the prominence which his name came to have in connection with the civil war in Athens, he actually played only a small part in the events. British policy was decided by the Ambassador, Mr. Leeper—and Churchill—

while Scobie contended himself with doing what he conceived to be his duty as a soldier, implementing the decisions handed down to him. When it came to open fighting, operational command of most of the British troops was taken from him, and another, more experienced field commander, General Hawkesworthy, came from Italy to direct the battle. Scobie of course remained as Commander in Chief, and all negotiations between the leftists, the Greek Government and the British Ambassador were conducted through his office. In actual fact, however, he was always more a symbol than a prime mover in the tangled skein of Greek affairs.


On Saturday evening, as the scope and magnitude of EAM preparation became evident, the British took alarm, fearing that if the demonstration came off as scheduled it might generate intense excitement and get far out of hand. When general tension in the city was so great, it seemed wise to try to prevent any demonstration from taking place. Accordingly, in the evening of 2 December after consultation with the British, the Greek Government informed the leaders of EAM that permission to hold their demonstration had been withdrawn. The leftists were indignant, and replied that their preparations had already gone so far that it was not possible for them to notify their followers in the remote parts of the city and cancel the demonstration. The leftist contention was undoubtedly true. They could not have called their demonstration off even had they wished to. But they did not wish to do so, and to the last minute worked feverishly to make it as large and impressive a show of their popular support against the Right as lay within their power.

On the morning of 3 December crowds of EAM demonstrators began to gather in all the suburbs of Athens. They raised their flags and banners and set off marching toward the middle of the town. Some of the columns came for miles on foot. A few marched in from Pireus. Others arrived in the outskirts of the city by truck, formed their columns, and

started walking while the trucks went back for more. The mood of the crowds was angry. They were convinced that dark plots were afoot among the Fascist reactionaries. They believed that the people's liberty was endangered. Yet there was also a spirit of holiday excitement, rapid talk, violent gesticulation, craning necks, and much singing of spirited marching songs as the mass of people moved onward toward Constitution Square. Women and children predominated in the crowds for the able-bodied men had been called to duty with the ELAS Reserve.

The Athens police were afraid. They had been ordered to prevent the demonstrators from getting to the Square. Cordons, two and three men deep, had been thrown across all the streets leading into the Square. The police carried arms: Italian carbines. Their magazines were loaded with blank rounds, and orders were to fire the blanks if it became necessary in order to break up the crowds and turn them back. Some of the police had small confidence in blank ammunition. A few, or perhaps only one man, substituted live rounds for the blanks that had been issued. The act was to have wide repercussions.

The demonstration was scheduled to begin at 11 o'clock. The first columns began to arrive in the center of the city about 10:30 and were surprised and angry at finding their path blocked. Some of the columns stopped and retreated or milled around in confusion when they met the police barrier. But as more and more demonstrators accumulated, the pressure and excitement mounted in the streets, and attempts were made to break through the police lines. Scuffling ensued, and some persons had their heads cracked. Several wounded policemen were brought into Police Headquarters building adjoining Constitution Square. The sight of their wounded fellow policemen instilled a spirit of intense fear into the handful of men that guarded the front of Police Headquarters. They easily believed that the demonstrators were



out to lynch them. For better protection, the group moved across the street, taking shelter behind a breast-high stone wall that faced out onto the Square.

About 10:45 one group of demonstrators broke through the police cordon that had tried to block Syngrou Boulevard, leading up from Pireus. (See map.) A triumphant and excited crowd started to move across the Square heading directly toward Police Headquarters. The crowd was unarmed, and probably intended no more than a highly emotional demonstration against collaborators and the Papandreou Government. It numbered perhaps six hundred persons, close packed, and nearly all women and youngsters. They were an angry mass of human beings, and certainly had no respect or liking for the police. To the fifteen or twenty policemen who stood behind the wall in front of the Headquarters building, the advancing crowd was terrifying. When it had approached to within one hundred feet of where they stood, panic ran down the single line of grey-clad police. At this moment a man dressed in military uniform, but not in the grey of the police, suddenly ran out from the Headquarters building, shouted "Shoot the bastards," crouched on one knee beyond the end of the wall, and began to fire his gun. The noise of gunshots and his example decided the wavering police. They too unslung their carbines, leveled them at the advancing crowd, and fired a veritable fusillade into the mass in front of them.

The crowd was taken completely by surprise. Their banners fell like grain before a sickle as they threw themselves onto the pavement. Some ran for refuge to the sides of the Square where walls and trees offered shelter. After a few minutes the police stopped firing, probably only because their ammunition had run out. When this lull came, the crowd hastily ran from the road where they had thrown themselves down. They left their banners behind them; left also some twelve to fifteen bodies prone on the pavement. Of these some

were only wounded, but at least seven were killed. That so few were hurt can only be explained by supposing that most of the policemen fired blanks. Perhaps only one man—perhaps the man who had run out at the last minute and started the shooting—fired to kill. A single carbine could easily have done all the execution of that morning. If all of the police had fired live rounds, not fifteen but at least a hundred would have been hit, for the crowd was close and entirely unprotected.

When the smoke had cleared, a few brave individuals from the crowd returned to succor the wounded and remove the dead. They dragged them from the Square and carried the limp bodies away. The police continued to fire occasional rounds across the Square, whenever a cluster of people formed. The crowd remained scattered on either side of the street, dazed and angry.

Meanwhile the police cordon across Kifissia Boulevard, about two blocks away, had been attacked by a similar EAM crowd, and had resorted to gunfire to drive the people back. Hundreds of shots were fired, but when it was all over, there were no casualties. In this instance, there is no doubt that the police used blanks.

The deadlock in Constitution Square was broken by the arrival of another crowd of demonstrators. Coming from the west, up Hermes Street, this crowd had, like the first, broken through the police cordon and arrived triumphant a few minutes after 11 o'clock. The unnerved policemen in front of the Headquarters building did not fire a second time. They withdrew inside the gates and locked themselves in. During the next half-hour the remaining police cordons disintegrated. Most of the policemen took refuge in private homes; some few made their way in safety to the Headquarters; but others were caught by the indignant crowd and in a few cases were killed and torn literally limb from limb.

When the new arrivals discovered what had happened to

the first group of demonstrators in Constitution Square, their anger and excitement rose to a paroxysm. With the collapse of the police cordons, great numbers flowed into the Square, and within a few minutes it became densely packed. Still other masses filled the neighboring streets, struggling to get into the center of things. For the next three hours the crowd milled round the Square, waving banners; shouting slogans, and hurling imprecations against the cowering policemen who hid within the walls of the Headquarters building. Around the spots on the pavement where their fellows had been slaughtered, little borders of flowers and twigs were erected, and hundreds of persons bent down to dip their handkerchiefs in the blood which lay fresh on the pavement. These were made into banners, which were paraded through the crowd while their bearers exhorted all around them to touch the blood-stained rag and swear vengeance against the men who had made the slaughter.

It was the greatest demonstration that Athens had ever seen. Perhaps sixty thousand persons jammed the Square, and other thousands stood outside. The excitement was indescribable and the anger which exuded from the crowd seemed almost palpable. A tiny wizened woman, dressed in widow's weeds, came up in front of the Police Headquarters, a wooden stick in her hand, and remained there for half an hour, the very image of wrath. She hurled threats and spat out curses, gesticulating with her whole body. She must have struck a chord of fear in the heart of any policemen who heard or saw her. Young girls, scarcely more than fourteen years old, paraded with the hems of their skirts dipped in blood from the pools on the street. Some boys raised an American Army officer, who had tried to walk through the crowd, up on their shoulders and carried him more than forty yards before he kicked his way free. The crowd made a definite effort to distinguish between the American and British policy. They shouted "Roosevelt, Roosevelt," constantly, and

carried vast numbers of American flags. There were also many Greek flags, a few Russian, but no British. Banners in English exhorted British soldiers not to interfere in Greek affairs, and reproached General Scobie and Ambassador Leeper for what they had done.

Somewhat after two o'clock in the afternoon a company of British paratroopers arrived on the scene. They dismounted from trucks and quickly formed a cordon, one man deep, across the Square. The crowd showed no hostility toward them, and with remarkable good humor obeyed the soldiers' gestures that forbade walking through their line. The cordon moved slowly across the Square, herding the demonstrators in front of it. By this time the demonstration had pretty well worn itself out in any case. The EAM-ites must have been tired from the physical exertions and from the emotional intensity of the morning. They moved off, singing, down the main streets leading away from the Square, and filtered back to their homes. Within twenty minutes of the arrival of the British troops, the Square was empty, and a strange silence descended upon its pavements.

The violent events of Sunday, 3 December, were a prelude to civil war. When news of the action of the police reached the ELAS Committee, the order was sent out to attack all police stations. Beleaguerment began the same night. One by one the peripheral police stations were captured by ELAS and their inmates executed. When news of this action reached British Headquarters, relief parties of British troops were organized and sent to those of the police stations that still held out. ELAS made no active resistance to these columns, and more than half of the Athens police force was rescued.

On December 4 the corpses of the people who had been killed in the demonstration the day before were paraded through the central streets of Athens. A great crowd of mourners followed their biers, and the occasion turned into a second, though smaller, EAM demonstration. This time,

British tanks and armored cars were stationed at the street corners near the center of the city, and no further violence occurred, although the crowd showed a more hostile attitude toward the British soldiers than before.

The same day, ELAS began to attack the stronghold of the X organization in the Theseon area of Athens. A small-scale battle developed. Several buildings were set on fire. The lurid color of flame was reflected from low hanging clouds, and illumined Athens at night. Electric power had been cut off by the general strike, and the red glow of the flames seemed appropriate illumination for the fateful time. The X organization was not numerous, and after a day of stubborn fighting, in the course of which ELAS used mortars for the first time, the rightists began to get the worst of it. They were saved from extermination by a British relief party, which, as in the case of the police rescues, was not resisted by ELAS, although stray shots were fired near, if not at, British vehicles.

Meanwhile, the political scene had suffered violent fluctuations. Papandreou was alarmed at the action of the Athens police and still more by the reaction of EAM and its army, ELAS. On Monday, 4 December, he offered his resignation. Negotiations between various politicians in Athens were begun with the purpose of forming another Cabinet over which Themistocles Sofoulis would, by general consent, preside. By Monday afternoon fairly definite arrangements had been made for Sofoulis to take over, although the all-important question of the share EAM would have in the new Cabinet was not settled. But Athens did not have the only or ultimate say in the matter. King George was in London, and by constitutional procedure, only he could accept a Prime Minister's resignation or authorize another man to form a new Cabinet.

Telegrams were consequently sent off to King George asking his approval for the proposed change in Prime Ministers. Other telegrams were sent to the British Foreign Office de-

scribing the situation which had developed in Athens and the steps which had been proposed to meet it. The question was brought to Churchill. He was adamant against any concession to EAM, and declared that Papandreou must stay. Accordingly, a telegram was despatched to the British Ambassador instructing him to urge Papandreou to withdraw his resignation. The substance of this communication was delivered to Papandreou, who quickly enough agreed not to resign, and thereby saved King George from the embarrassment of making a decision. Sofoulis was informed that his services would not after all be required. He took the information without comment, but refused to lend his support to Papandreou's Government, declaring that it was nothing more than a disguised dictatorship.

Churchill certainly could not have known the difficult details of the situation in Greece when he made this fateful decision. He was probably influenced by the favorable impression he had gained from his interview with the Greek Prime Minister in August. Likewise, to allow Sofoulis to take over the Government would mean an end of any chance of restoring King George to his throne. Churchill had fewer doubts about the Greek King than did his Ambassador in Athens. He was relatively ignorant of the opposition that the King aroused among his subjects, and indeed it seems probable that Churchill scarcely conceived how different was the institution of kingship in Greece from its counterpart in Great Britain. A third consideration, and perhaps the most compelling, was Churchill's estimate that any change in Prime Ministers would mean concession to EAM. He probably believed that any concession would mean a complete leftist victory, if not immediately, then in the early future; and, as we have seen, the whole policy of the British Government was directed toward preventing EAM from taking over control of the Government of Greece. Churchill no doubt thought that a show of resolution would bring the leftists to

heel. Probably it scarcely crossed his mind that British troops might find themselves embroiled in a civil war as a result of his decision.

When Papandreou withdrew his resignation, EAM found itself in a critical position. The whole tactical plan had gone askew. If they were to gain their end, and change the Government, then obviously more strenuous efforts and greater violence were required. Their problem was made no easier by an order which General Scobie issued in the name of the Greek Government early in the morning of 4 December. By this order he commanded all ELAS units to withdraw from Athens and Pireus within seventy-two hours, and ordered them to desist from attacking police stations. As Allied Commander in Chief and duly commissioned deputy of the Greek Government, General Scobie unquestionably had the legal power to issue such orders. To defy them would mean an open break with British military power. ELAS was not yet willing to risk battle with the British, and returned a temporizing answer suggesting that the wishes of the Papandreou Government should no longer be considered as the expression of the will of the Greek people, and expressing the hope that the British would "remain neutral in the fight waged by the Greek people for the safeguarding of their liberties."

The counsels of EAM were seriously divided. The Communists were strongly in favor of continuing the battle, if necessary even against British soldiers. They calculated that the superior numbers of ELAS were sufficient to overcome not only the Right-wing Greeks, but the British as well. The Socialist element in EAM was reluctant to resort to unlimited violence. They were still looking for a compromise, and wished to reopen negotiations with Papandreou and the British. The argument between the two groups was heated but did not spread to the rank and file of the movement, for the differences of the leaders were kept within closed doors.

After hours of uncertainty, a sort of compromise was reached. It was agreed that ELAS would not obey General Scobie's ultimatum to evacuate the town; but, leaving British troops scrupulously alone, would launch an attack on the main governmental buildings in the center of Athens. The leftist plan seems to have been to present General Scobie with a *fait accompli*. On the morning of 6 December, when the ultimatum for withdrawal would expire, they hoped to be able to say to the British General: "We are now the Greek Government. We hold all Greece and all Athens, including the government buildings. Consequently you will no longer pay attention to the wishes of the former Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou."

In the grey light of dawn on the sixth of December ELAS made its attack. Men clad in civilian clothes and equipped only with rifles, made their way through the Royal Gardens, climbed the iron fence and started across Kifissia Boulevard, a broad avenue along which lay the Foreign Office, the Ministry of War and other key government buildings. The attack failed. One reason was that it was delivered halfheartedly, and by relatively few men. A more important reason was that when the attackers arrived near their goal they were thrown into confusion by the unexpected presence of British soldiers. Perhaps General Scobie had knowledge of the leftist's intentions. Whether he did or not, a few hours before the attack was started, British sentries were posted in front of all the principal government buildings. ELAS had no instructions to attack the British, and many of its members had no wish to do so. Consequently, when in the early morning light they saw the figure of a lone British soldier in front of each building, they did not know what to do. Some of the more reckless spirits pressed on, regardless; others hung back. The attack was consequently weak and easily repulsed by the police detachments which had been assigned to guard the buildings.

The British sentries joined in the battle. Thus for the first time ELAS and British soldiers fired at one another, and began open warfare.

When the battle began, it was to the surprise and despite the intention of both parties. The British were not prepared. Small detachments of soldiers were scattered all through Athens, quartered in various public buildings, guarding supply depots, and the like. Most of the British soldiers were not combat troops, being headquarters personnel, supply men, etc. There were, however, three combat units in Athens under Scobie's command: the paratroop brigade which had made the original landing in Greece, an armored brigade, and the Third Greek Brigade. Their total fighting strength was less than six thousand men. Of course in emergency this number could be increased by using the services of non-combat troops. Counting these, General Scobie had about ten thousand men available in Athens and Pireus. He had some twenty-four tanks and two squadrons of armored cars. As air force, a Spitfire squadron was stationed near by at Hassani airfield.

ELAS for its part was almost equally unprepared for any prolonged battle. The main concentration of seasoned ELAS troops was in Thessaly, where they had come down from the Pindus after the liberation. Near the capital were two divisions, totalling perhaps eight thousand men. Within the city the ELAS Reserve numbered between ten and fifteen thousand, but its members were unused to battle and the organization was necessarily imperfect. The Reserve had never before been mobilized, and most of its members knew only their immediate superior in the chain of command. In the confusion of battle, such a system is likely to break down, one man not knowing who is in authority or whom he should obey.

The ELAS Committee in Athens had sent out an order for reinforcements sometime prior to 5 December. A single

brigade (about 2,000 men) from the Peloponnese, under the command of the redoubtable Ares, arrived in Athens on the 5 or 6 December. Other reinforcements began to come from Thessaly on the fifth. Unfortunately for the revolutionists' plans, it required about eleven days of marching for troops to come from Thessaly to Athens. Once the battle had been joined, British airplanes patrolled the roads by day and shot up anything that looked like ELAS troops on the march. In consequence, the ELAS reinforcements from the north could move only at night, and in fact did not arrive in time to take any part in the fighting.

Not all of ELAS strength was devoted to the battle in Athens. Large concentrations surrounded the British garrisons in Salonika and Patras, where a precarious armed truce lasted throughout the period of hostilities in the capital. Furthermore, ELAS chose this time to attack Zervas again. EDES troops had infringed on the territory assigned to ELAS by the Plaka Bridge and Caserta Agreements during the last days of November. This ELAS took as a challenge to battle, and the High Command decided to eliminate the threat to their rear which the existence of Zervas' forces constantly offered. Hostilities began 19 December. Three ELAS divisions marched over the Pindus into Epirus, one of them going through Albania in order to turn EDES' flank. The attack was powerful and well executed. Within ten days of its opening, Zervas was driven to the sea. About half of his force escaped to the island of Corfu, thanks to the British Navy, which evacuated the EDES soldiers. By this victory, ELAS gained control of all of Greece, save for a patch of land in the center of Athens, another stretch along the Bay of Phaleron, and two small zones in Salonika and Patras. Success in Athens would have sealed their victory.

In Athens, confusion reigned on both sides after the attack of 6 December had been repulsed. EAM was still reluctant to fight against the British, and, for the next three days, tried

by proclamation to keep the British neutral. General Scobie for his part held that ELAS had disregarded his orders, and as he had threatened, proceeded to treat the armed leftists as rebels and enemies. Early in the morning of 6 December he ordered British airplanes to strafe Ardetos Hill, a park which overlooks the center of Athens on which ELAS had concentrated some troops. Other open areas held by ELAS were attacked from the air during the course of the day. It is impossible to be perfectly accurate with air attack, and some civilian houses were hit and civilian lives lost by this strafing. The reaction among the leftists of Athens was strong, and it is probable that the deaths from British airplanes did much to harden the feelings of the moderate elements in EAM and make them willing to accept the Communist revolutionary lead.

At this stage of the battle, British military circles seriously underestimated the resistance they had to deal with. Armored cars and tanks were able to move freely through the streets, and no systematic resistance was made to British troops. Most Britishers thought that the leftists would yield after a few days, when they had seen British strength and determination. The first disillusionment came when the Greek Third Brigade was ordered to clear the southeast suburbs and capture Ardetos Hill. The Greek soldiers met with heavy sniping, especially in the Communist suburb of Kaiseriani, and were unable to reach Ardetos Hill save with a few mortar shells. This the British wrote down to Greek inefficiency. The real disillusionment did not come until 10 December when British troops, supported by armored cars and tanks, moved northward and occupied the Army Cadet College. This advance was made only after overcoming some sharp resistance. A small garrison was left in the cadet school. Next morning to their dismay the British found that the garrison was cut off. ELAS had laid mines in the streets leading to the school, and had lined the houses along the way with snipers. Only after

losing several tanks and armored cars by mines did the British succeed in fighting their way to the school and rescuing the garrison. It was promptly evacuated. From this time onward the British soldiers seldom went beyond their lines.

On the other side, ELAS faced serious problems at the beginning of hostilities. Even after 6 December, the leftists were not united on the question of fighting the British. The Communists, as before, argued for an all-out effort, but the Socialists held back. The moderates had no practicable alternative to offer, however, and in the end, after long and heated debates, the Communists won the upper hand. By 10 December EAM had definitely determined that, if no political settlement could be reached, they would fight not only the Right-wing Greeks but the British as well.

Leaders of the moderate wing of EAM never fully made up their minds in the emergency. Alexander Svolos, EAM's leading intellectual Socialist, decided on 5 December that he would not support an open revolution; but he did not announce his decision nor make a public break with the extreme leaders of the movement. Instead he retired to his home and waited to see how events would turn out. A similar disquiet troubled many in the rank and file who were Socialists or merely republicans. They felt somehow that they had become cat's-paws of the Communists, but saw no clear path by which they could escape from the dilemma in which they found themselves. They could not join the Right, and they dared not stand by themselves, against both Communists and conservatives. Their reluctance undoubtedly weakened the force of the ELAS attack and reduced the Left's chance of success.

Until about the 12 or 13 December EAM leaders still hoped for a diplomatic settlement. Terms of agreement were discussed between Siantos and Scobie on one of these two days. The Communist leader was relatively conciliatory but General Scobie insisted on the full measure of his original

demands: evacuation of Athens and the disarmament of ELAS throughout the country as had been ordered. Such terms were not acceptable to Siantos and the interview broke off without accomplishing anything.

On the military front, ELAS was also beset with difficulties. The Reserve was an unreliable military instrument. It was organized on a territorial basis. When its members were defending their own home district, they sometimes fought very bravely and effectively. When called to another part of the city, however, their discipline was untrustworthy. Individuals were likely to slip away to their homes from time to time in order to make sure that all was well with their families. Privates tended to question their commanders' decisions, doubting their superior military skill and experience. In these and other respects they showed an independence incompatible with full military effectiveness. The ELAS regulars were much better disciplined and more experienced in fighting. After the first few days it was they who bore the real brunt of the battle against the British and Greek rightist forces. The Reserve did little but snipe; this, although troublesome at times, never amounted to more than a serious nuisance to the British.

Since the ELAS Reserve wore no sort of uniform, its members could convert themselves from innocent civilian to hidden sniper with the greatest of ease. All that was necessary was to take a gun from its hiding place and poke the muzzle out of the window. This made sniping difficult for the British to deal with. Even in the heart of the city, where British troops were concentrated, sniping was incessant during the early days. Many times careful search of a building in which a sniper had been seen revealed nothing. The sniper need simply hide his gun and assume an innocent expression when the search party came through; or perhaps invent a story about a man whom he had seen running off over the roof tops in this or that direction. The British met the sniping nuisance

in two ways. They arrested large numbers of persons on suspicion, and when it became impossible to keep them in Athens, they were transported to a vacated army camp in North Africa. The other and more effective step was the expansion of a Greek National Guard.

The National Guard, which had been formed in November from one class of the Army Reserve, had almost entirely disintegrated when ELAS attacked the government. In Athens, some few men remained. When the British began to feel the need for help against snipers, they determined to reestablish and expand the National Guard, by calling up and equipping additional reservists. Obedient to the British suggestion, Papandreou and his Cabinet issued a decree calling into active service Army Reserve classes from 1934 to 1940. As these men reported, they were given rifles and uniforms and formed into National Guard battalions. When uniforms gave out, arm bands were used, so that by the end of the battle it was a common sight to see bedraggled men in civilian clothing carrying rifles over their shoulders with only a blue and white armband to distinguish them from the ELAS reservists.

Inasmuch as the writ of the Papandreou Government ran only where British arms prevailed, recruits to the National Guard came at first only from a small district in the center of Athens. With confusion so great, the "conscription" amounted to little more than a legal framework for the formation of volunteer units. Nobody looked too closely at the men who offered themselves for service. That they should be strictly within the age limits, nobody cared; nor did anyone examine the past record of the recruits. This inevitable haste and carelessness resulted in difficulties later. Many rough-necks and criminals hastened to join the new National Guard. Veterans of the Security Battalions did the same. The gendarmes, who had been brought to Athens to be screened, were incorporated into the National Guard in a body without any pretense at checking their individual records for collabora-

tion. As the original pressure for men relaxed, more care was taken to enroll only those who legally belonged to the Guard. The battalions formed during the latter part of December were thus generally better disciplined and less extreme in their political partisanship than was the case with those formed earliest. Nevertheless, all the battalions that were raised during the fighting in Athens were rowdy and strongly anti-Communist. They came later to be known over most of Greece as the "Athens Battalions" and their reputation was no better than one would expect from the method of their formation.

Recruits for the National Guard battalions came in fast even in the earliest days. By the end of December, thirty-six battalions had been formed and equipped, with a total strength of more than nineteen thousand men. They were used chiefly to police the rear areas. By dint of numbers, they were able to check ELAS infiltration behind the lines and pretty well stopped the sniping which had so bothered the British during the early days.

From 8 to 12 December the scale of ELAS operations steadily increased. The Reserve was gradually whipped into shape, supplies of mines were brought into the city and strewn in the principal streets, and the ELAS Regulars came from the hills and took up positions as close to British troops as they could. During this time various isolated British units were withdrawn into the center, and some valuable supply dumps were abandoned in Pireus and elsewhere. Considerable stores of food thus became available to ELAS, and much of the rations which the ELAS soldiers ate while fighting in Athens came from these abandoned British dumps.

One detachment, RAF Headquarters, was not withdrawn. It was located in Kifissia, a suburb of Athens, and the RAF commander pooh-poohed General Scobie's suggestion that his men be brought inside the British perimeter. On 18 December ELAS attacked the buildings in which the RAF was

billeted, and, after a two-day fight, captured them, taking several hundred prisoners. This was perhaps the greatest success ELAS won against the British. It was certainly the largest single haul of prisoners they made.

The Greek Third Brigade was quartered outside Athens when the fighting began, and remained there until near the end. It was surrounded by ELAS troops, bombarded by mortars, and subject to constant small arms fire. No attack was launched on the barracks, however. After the unpleasant experiences of the first days, when the Brigade had failed to take Ardetos Hill, it remained on the defensive. Some considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining communication with the British-held center of Athens. Special convoys carried food and other supplies out to the Greek troops at night, but they were subject to constant harassment by ELAS, and until the last days of the battle, the Brigade's supply situation remained precarious.

The British forces were divided between three separate areas. A small number of men retreated to the tip of the peninsula in Pireus where they were cut off from all communication except by sea. Another slightly larger garrison occupied the airfield at Hassani and the shore toward Phaleron Bay. But the main body of British troops was located in central Athens. When the lines finally became more or less definitely fixed, about 12 December, the area held by the British was small indeed. It was about two miles long, and five or six blocks wide, extending from the barracks where the armored brigade was stationed on the east to the British Military Headquarters building on the west. The area embraced Constitution Square, the main government buildings and part of the central business district. All the rest of the city lay in the hands of ELAS.

Such a distribution of forces was ill suited for either defense or attack. The main difficulty that troubled the British commander was an imminent shortage of supplies. Much had

been abandoned during the early days of the fighting and it was difficult to distribute what remained to the three pockets of troops. At one time, the British in central Athens had only a single day's ration of food on hand, and their supplies of gasoline were likewise nearly exhausted. Rumor had it that General Scobie at one time considered evacuating Athens, but decided against it because he had not enough trucks to carry out the withdrawal speedily and in (comparative) safety.

On 11 December Field Marshal Alexander, who had taken command of the Mediterranean Theater, flew to Athens to make a personal reconnaissance of the situation. He quickly decided that reinforcements were necessary. Within two days the first troops arrived by air from Italy, and during the next two weeks a total of two complete British divisions came to the Athens area, as well as a brigade of the Fourth Indian Division and several miscellaneous battalions. These reinforcements were grouped under General Hawkesworthy's command. They took up a defense position along Phaleron Bay, and proceeded to relieve the beleaguered British force in Pireus after some hard fighting.

When the prospect of diplomatic settlement had vanished (about 13 December), ELAS prepared for an all-out attack on the British position in central Athens. British reinforcements were already beginning to arrive, and the ELAS Committee realized that they must strike immediately or lose all chance of success. Their own reinforcements had not arrived from Thessaly, and political difficulties within their ranks had not been fully overcome. Nevertheless, it was decided to make a concerted attack in the hope of compelling the British to retreat entirely from Athens. The plan of attack called for a simultaneous assault on the British lines from three directions. Unfortunately for the attackers, their synchronization broke down. When on the night of 15-16 December, the attacks were launched, they did not come exactly at the same

time. As a result, British armored cars and tanks were able to rush from one front to another, to support the infantry line. In this way, each assault was repulsed in turn. Only on the east flank of the British position did ELAS succeed in breaking through. The leftists entered the barracks where the armored brigade was quartered, burnt most of the gasoline which was stored there, and captured and destroyed the military switchboard, killing the civilian operators. Before they were able to advance farther, however, the tanks arrived, and were able to drive the invaders back. The failure of this attack marked the turning point of the battle. Thereafter, British strength grew steadily as the reinforcements arrived in increasing numbers, and ELAS power gradually decreased as individuals gave up the struggle and returned to their homes.

The British did not attack at once with their newfound superiority. Political considerations held them back. The repercussions of the outbreak of fighting between British and Greek troops in Athens had been world-wide. Newspaper correspondents generally reported the events in Athens in a tone highly critical of the British action. A storm of popular disapproval resulted in both the United States and Great Britain. Churchill was severely criticized for his imperialist policy by members of Parliament and by the press. He himself was probably surprised by the turn affairs had taken, and decided to make an effort to bring a political settlement of the dispute. Accordingly, on Christmas Day he and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, flew to Athens.

Upon his arrival, Churchill called a meeting of the most prominent politicians of Athens. Arrangements were made for the safe-conduct of EAM leaders to the conference, and all the other traditional parties and leading political figures were present. Churchill hoped that some sort of agreement could be reached that would end the fighting immediately. He hoped for something like a new Lebanon Agreement; and

as candidate for the headship of a new Government, the British had fixed upon General Nicholas Plastiras.

Plastiras had been persuaded to come from his exile in France some days previously. British political advisers pinned great hopes on his return, for they thought him to be the one man who might bring peace between Left and Right. Plastiras had a political record that fitted him admirably for such a mediating rôle. He had begun his career as a professional soldier, joined the Venizelist insurrectionary movement in Salonika in 1916, and later, in 1922, led the revolt against King Constantine which forced him into exile. Plastiras was personally popular among the refugee population which formed the principal support of the EAM movement in Athens. He was an uncompromising republican, and could by no stretch of the imagination be accused of wanting to impose a royal Government on an unwilling people. He would thus, as head of the Government, be able to win the confidence of many of the supporters of EAM. At the same time, he was a conservative, and disapproved of the Communists and their methods in the most emphatic manner. He would never willingly see established a Communist Government in Greece, nor permit Greece to move into the Russian orbit. A man combining such qualities seemed to the British an ideal choice to head a new coalition Government, and pacify the Left.

But the political atmosphere in Athens did not favor agreement. The royalists and men of the Right were delighted to see British soldiers fighting their battles for them. They were anxious that the Communists be utterly overthrown before peace should come, and were consequently in no mood to compromise. The Left too could not bring itself to yield. The British terms remained unchanged—that ELAS should agree to disarmament and evacuate the Athens area—but Siantos and his fellow Communists were not willing to give up the struggle or admit military defeat. Up to the time of the con-

ference, the British had made no serious offensive move, and it is possible that the leftists were ignorant of the scale of British reinforcement.

A notable fact at the conference was the firmness with which the old-line republican leaders turned their backs on the Left. Social revolution played no part in the political ideas of Sofoulis or the other Liberal leaders; and a close look at revolution as practiced by ELAS soldiers made them react against it violently. In this they reflected a revulsion that spread over much of the population of Athens. ELAS had indulged in atrocities to which the people of Athens were scarcely inured. People's courts were established in various suburbs to try persons accused of treason or collaboration. Their procedure was summary and punishment severe. After peace had come, several hundred bodies were exhumed from a cemetery in the suburb of Peristeri, where most of the executions had taken place. Corpses showed unmistakable signs of torture and mutilation that were horrible to see.

Still another psychological mistake was made by the leftists when they decided to take hostages. Horror stories circulated among the members of EAM retailing the brutalities of British and Greek soldiers against the captured ELAS-ites, and on 16 December the ELAS Committee officially decided to take an equal number of hostages from the part of Athens they controlled. Fifteen thousand hostages were seized. When the ELAS retreat began, the hostages were driven northward on foot, despite inadequate clothing and bitter winter weather. Laggards were frequently shot out of hand, and in all, about four thousand perished. The cruel treatment to which the hostages were subjected, and the injustice of the whole procedure, turned many former sympathizers against EAM and the Communists who ordered such deeds.

When the political representatives gathered together for conference (25-26 December), they agreed only on one point. All parties thought it wise that a regent should be appointed

to exercise the powers of the King until such time as a plebiscite could be held to decide whether King George should return. On everything else, agreement proved impossible. Siantos demanded, as the conditions on which he would desist from battle, that EAM be given forty to fifty per cent of the seats in a new Cabinet; that collaborationists be purged from the state machinery; and that the gendarmes and Third Brigade be disbanded. Only when this had been done would ELAS agree to surrender its arms to the Government. Plastiras refused even to consider these terms. The representatives of the Popular Party walked out, exclaiming that such action would mean communizing the country.

Churchill had waited impatiently in Athens for the conclusion of the conference. He was nettled by the failure of the Greek leaders to come to any sort of understanding, and departed immediately for London. In leaving he made some rather ill-tempered remarks belittling Greek political capacity, and threatened that if the Greeks did not succeed "in laying democratic foundations which are satisfactory and inspire confidence, it will probably be necessary that you be placed temporarily under international trusteeship of some form."

His experience in Athens had nevertheless convinced Churchill of two things. He decided that King George was hopelessly unpopular, at least for the time being, and determined to bring all the pressure he could command to persuade the Greek King to agree to the appointment of a regent. Secondly, he concluded that the leftists would have to be crushed by superior weight of arms before they would accept terms satisfactory either to the British or to the other political leaders of Greece. Accordingly he ordered the British generals in Greece to begin a full-scale offensive as soon as possible.

The offensive began on the very next day, 27 December. British troops moved northward from their Phaleron base,

and the Greek Third Brigade attacked southward from their barracks. ELAS had no strength to stand against the superior numbers, equipment and discipline of the attacking troops. Within three days the whole southern half of the city was cleared of ELAS soldiers, and much of Pireus had been captured from the leftists as well. Following this success, the British stopped their advance for a couple of days, regrouping and resting their forces. On 3 January the attack was resumed on the northern part of the town and the advance continued, though in the face of stout resistance. By this time the ELAS Committee realized that their forces could no longer hope to hold Athens. On the night of 4-5 January a general withdrawal was ordered, and ELAS began to evacuate the city.

The retreat was carried out in reasonably good order. Rear guard detachments systematically dynamited buildings along the road of retreat and used the rubble as barricades from which to stand off the advancing British troops. By January 6 the last ELAS units had left Athens. Many of the Reserve betook themselves to their homes, and for the most part it was only the Regular ELAS troops that withdrew from the city. They were not closely pursued. The British wanted first to search the newly won areas to prevent any outbreak of sniping in their rear. By 8 January pursuit was organized, and, in the following week, advance British units penetrated as far north as Lamia and as far south as Corinth.

ELAS had been beaten. On 11 January delegates from ELAS Headquarters came to General Scobie and arranged an armistice. The leftists agreed to evacuate all troops from Attica, Beotia and a part of Phocia, and to abandon an area within a twenty-mile radius of Salonika. It was provided that ELAS troops should return to the part of the country to which they were native, thus preventing any concentration of strength in the north of Greece for a future resumption of the struggle. Release of all prisoners was prescribed, and arrangements for relief parties to come to the succor of the hostages

were also included in the terms of truce. It was further provided that terms of surrender were to be negotiated between ELAS and the Greek Government at the earliest possible date.

On 15 January hostilities came to an end as agreed by the truce. The power of ELAS had been broken; the revolution had failed; all the enthusiasm and ardor of the EAM movement had come to disaster. Many former followers had become bitterly disillusioned, and the leaders of the Left were compelled to admit defeat. It remained for a new political balance to be struck, and a start made toward reconstruction of the war-torn country.

VIII

Reaction

BEFORE the final military overthrow of ELAS, two steps of the greatest importance had been taken toward the political pacification of Greece. On New Year's Day, 1945, His Beatitude, Damaskinos, Metropolitan of Athens and Archbishop of All Greece, became Regent. Three days later, General Nicholas Plastiras was appointed Prime Minister. This change in regime undoubtedly attracted many of the EAM moderates away from their Communist leaders, and made possible the early end of the civil war. From the point of view of the British, who had in large part engineered the transfer of power, the move was therefore a success.

When Churchill returned from his Christmas visit to Athens, he promptly interviewed King George II. The Greek King still cherished a stubborn determination not to yield one jot or tittle of his rightful powers; but brief and forceful argument changed his mind. Churchill insisted, and the King unwillingly agreed to authorize Archbishop Damaskinos to become Regent. A telegram was despatched to Athens announcing King George's decision. Accordingly a hasty ceremony was arranged in an upper room of the Foreign Office, at which the Archbishop-Regent took an oath to exercise the royal power in accordance with the Constitution.

The new Regent was a striking figure of a man. He stood well over six feet, and was broad in proportion. The flowing robes and high mitre, which he wore by virtue of his episcopal

office, exaggerated his height, and assured that his mere physical presence dominated any ordinary gathering of men. His face was coarse featured but majestic. His nose, which had been broken and thickened at the root, served as visible reminder that Damaskinos' early career and first fame came as a wrestler where his extraordinary size and strength served him well.

While still a young man Damaskinos gave up the wrestling ring and became a monk, which, in the Orthodox Church, is the normal prelude to a prelate's career. His imposing physical appearance, keen intelligence and general good sense assured him of preferment. In 1922 he was appointed Bishop of Corinth. Five years later, a great earthquake devastated the town, and Damaskinos undertook a trip to the United States to raise money from the Greeks of America for the rebuilding of the destroyed city. He was very successful, gathering several million dollars, which helped to rebuild Corinth on a new site some three miles from the old town.

Damaskinos rapidly rose to a leading place in the Greek Church. In 1936 he again travelled to America, this time on a political mission in connection with the election to the patriarchate of Constantinople which occurred in that year. He went to drum up support among the Orthodox Church leaders of the United States for the candidate favored by the Greek bishops. In the same year, the incumbent Archbishop of All Greece died, and the council of bishops assembled to elect a successor. There were two candidates: Damaskinos and another bishop named Chrysanthos. The election was closely contested, but Damaskinos was finally elected by the margin of a single vote.

This outcome displeased Dictator John Metaxas. Damaskinos was generally known to be republican. He was no great friend or supporter of the King, and openly disapproved of the reactionary and extra-legal acts of the dictatorial Govern-

ment. Consequently, on the ground that one of the participating bishops had been unqualified to vote, the Government declared the election invalid. The bishops met again, and a new vote gave a majority for Chrysanthos. To remove a troublesome personality from the public eye, Metaxas thereupon sent Damaskinos into retirement in a provincial monastery.

He remained there until after the Germans had occupied Athens. Thinking to gain a grateful supporter, the quisling Government in 1941 annulled the election of Chrysanthos and declared Damaskinos to be the rightful head of the Church. Chrysanthos in his turn retired, taking up private residence in Athens; and Damaskinos came to the capital and assumed the robes of office. Despite the circumstances of his accession to power, Archbishop Damaskinos never truckled to the quisling Governments. He busied himself with organizing relief for the people of Athens, and gathered around himself a group of earnest young men who conducted summer camps, helped suspects escape to the Middle East, carried blankets and other supplies to freshly burnt villages, and in other ways tried to reduce the hardships of the occupation for the people. During most of 1944 he was kept under house arrest by the Germans, but was not molested otherwise.

Damaskinos was able to remain almost entirely above the strife of factions which tore Greece apart during the later years of occupation. He never denounced EAM, although strong pressure was brought to bear upon him to do so. EAM reciprocated by refraining from denouncing him, and indeed the majesty of his robes and sacred office held a strong power over the imaginations of most of the rank and file of the movement. Despite this, conservatives never accused the Archbishop of being a leftist, although some of them thought he was overly inclined to sympathize with republicanism. He was thus in a thoroughly unique position among prominent Greeks, and it was for this reason that he had been fixed upon

by common consent as far back as 1943 as candidate for the office of Regent.

The personal character of Damaskinos was kindly. He is said to have been ambitious and scheming as a young man; but, having arrived at so high a place, ambition no longer goaded him. His education, save in theology, was not extensive; but experience and native good sense have made him wise in the ways of men, a capable administrator and a practical politician. Such a man was surely well chosen to preside over the destiny of Greece in troubled times.

As soon as the Regent had been sworn in, Papandreou submitted his resignation. It was accepted and the Regent commissioned General Plastiras to form a new Cabinet. By 3 January Plastiras had selected a Cabinet, and took office. For the most part he relied on old friends of 1922 and 1933, who were all associated with the Liberal Party, but he gave his Cabinet a flavor of coalition by including two representatives from the republican wing of the Popular Party. The Government was thus solidly anti-royalist. It was also anti-Communist and was committed to carry on the struggle against ELAS.

When the truce between ELAS and General Scobie was signed, the most pressing problem before the Government became the negotiation of a definitive settlement with the leftists, who remained in control of more than half the country. At the time, many persons in Athens expected a resumption of hostilities. From grossly underestimating the power of ELAS, the pendulum had swung to the extreme of overestimation. In actual fact, the Communists had shot their bolt. Within the ranks of ELAS, strong criticism was raised against the way their leaders had conducted the revolution. As late as 14 December, ELAS guerillas coming to join the fight in Athens were told that they were to fight against Greek Fascists, and when they found themselves opposing British troops, they were grievously surprised, and some few deserted

or allowed themselves unnecessarily to be taken prisoner. After the truce, Siantos and his colleagues no longer could have ordered their men to resume the fight, had they so wished.

Despite this fact, peace negotiations were long drawn out. There was bickering about the representatives, the Government insisting that members of the Communist Party be sent, while EAM preferred to accredit men who were not Communists. At length the Government had its way, and, at the beginning of February, a three-man delegation, headed by Siantos, arrived in Athens to negotiate peace. After a week's bargaining, agreement was reached on 12 February. From the name of the village near which the meeting took place, it was called the Varkiza Agreement. By its terms ELAS agreed to surrender all arms, and quotas for the various types of weapons were established as a means of assuring that actual disarmament took place. With the exception of a few small guard detachments, disbandment of ELAS was to be completed within two weeks. Weapons were to be concentrated at specified points, and handed over to British officers appointed by General Scobie to collect them.

In return for this concession, the Government agreed to maintain and uphold civil liberties and to publish an amnesty which would cover all "political" crimes committed during the civil war. The Government further promised to purge the state bureaucracy by means of special boards, but the criteria on which judgment was to be based were only vaguely recorded. The Army was to be recruited by age groups, but it was expressly provided that professional soldiers and reservists specially trained in modern weapons could be retained in service. This in practice meant that the Third Brigade and Sacred Squadron would remain to form the core of a new Greek Army. The final provision was as follows:

At the earliest possible date, and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and

with every care for its genuineness, a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will, the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

The elections, promised by this clause, were to become one of the main issues of Greek politics during the following year. In view of the later changes, it is interesting to note that the leftists pressed for an early election date at this time. They evidently still believed themselves to command a safe majority in the country, and hoped through fair elections to resume some or all of the power they had lost. Six months later they had lost their confidence, and, fearing defeat, used all the devices at their command to postpone the holding of elections. This striking change in tactics was brought about by a widespread popular reaction against the Left which began to show itself as soon as the military power of ELAS had been dissipated. We must now follow the manifestations of that reaction.

Despite some misgivings among British officers and Greek conservatives, ELAS punctually and faithfully carried out most of the military prescriptions of the Varkiza Agreement. Arms were duly collected into dumps, and the soldiers of ELAS were sent home with formal discharge certificates. A few ELAS-ites, however, either feared or disliked the prospect of returning to their native villages. One small band of irreconcilables under the leadership of Ares took to the familiar mountains of the Pindus, and defied both the Greek Government and the orders of the Communist Party. Three months later the band was hunted down by detachments of the National Guard. After a brisk battle, the rebels were overpowered. Most of them were killed on the spot, and only

three or four succeeded in escaping. Ares was among the dead. His head was cut off and brought to the town of Trikala where it was barbarously displayed in the market place for all to see. Others from the ranks of ELAS, numbering perhaps three or four thousand in all, crossed the border into Yugoslavia where they found refuge from the vindictiveness of the Greek Right, and lived to stir up future trouble in Greek Macedonia.

The British originally planned to occupy ELAS territory slowly, but the unexpected completeness of the disarmament, and the outbreak of disorders in some of the remote areas of the country, persuaded them to accelerate their movements. By 1 April detachments of British troops had penetrated to all the principal towns of Greece, and had quieted most of the incipient disorder. The first care of the British was to take over the arms dumps where ELAS had concentrated its weapons. By the Varkiza Agreement, 41,500 rifles and a proportionate number of other weapons had been set as the minimum to be turned over by ELAS. Actually ELAS surrendered more of every weapon than had been required. Despite this surplus, not all the leftists' arms were given up, as had been stipulated in the peace terms. Some of their best weapons were secreted in caches and singly. During the next six months, British and Greek troops searched out as many of these hidden arms as they could. The total actually discovered and reported amounted to about four thousand additional small arms. Many more were actually found by the Greek troops and never reported, being used to equip civilian sympathizers of the Right.

The National Guard, which had been formed so hastily in Athens during the battle, was the organization to which fell the task of policing the newly occupied areas. The Greek units followed behind the British more slowly, and it was not until May 15 that National Guardsmen had spread the power of the Greek Government to all parts of the country. As the

guard advanced, new battalions were raised from the local inhabitants by the call up of a single class of the Army Reserve. The Athens Battalions served as a sort of advance party, occupying new areas progressively, moving on only after local battalions had been formed. Consequently, it was the Athens Battalions that came first to each part of the territory that had been occupied by ELAS. These battalions contained many disreputable characters. Their officers and soldiers were fanatically opposed to communism, and were generally ignorant of the law. As a result, they freely disregarded the civil liberties which had been promised by the Varkiza Agreement. In point of fact, the machinery for legal arrest and trial did not exist in the provinces, and the only alternatives were either complete inaction or infraction of the niceties of law. Nevertheless, the Athens Battalions indulged in unnecessary and provocative acts against the Left, and, partly as a result, frequently became engaged in local affrays and public brawls.

When a National Guard detachment first arrived in a village or town which had previously been under leftist control, the Guardsmen first conducted a search for hidden weapons, and regularly found a goodly number. Their methods were rough. Most of the caches which they found were discovered by confessions wrung from local leaders of the Left by beatings and other strong-arm methods. Sometimes the weapons were turned in to the British, but a proportion they regularly kept out and gave to their political friends, that is, to men of the Right. As soon as the Left had been thus disarmed, a swarm of informers descended on the Guard commander, accusing the local leftists of all sorts of crimes. Most of these accusations were never acted upon, but a proportion of them resulted in arrests. Jails were primitive and soon became terribly overcrowded. Since judges were few and legal procedure incredibly dilatory, many persons languished in prison for months on end without coming up for trial. After some months, the Government was compelled to pass a series of

amnesty laws which cleared the prisons of most of the persons who had been incarcerated. By this, innocent and guilty alike were freed, and in parts of Greece private vengeance was thereupon brought into play to remedy the undeniable defects of legal justice.

Despite the handicaps under which they labored once the National Guard had come to town, EAM and Communist newspapers generally continued to appear as before. A favorite pastime of some of the National Guardsmen came to be breaking up the leftist printing shops. On many occasions, a group of soldiers in their off-duty hours invaded the premises where the printing was done, scattered the type fonts and smashed as much as they could of the presses. The editors, if caught, were beaten.

Not all battalions indulged in such rowdiness. Their conduct varied according to the officers who led them. Much, too, depended on how close the unit found itself to British troops, who uniformly exercised a moderating influence. On several occasions British officers made prison inspections and compelled improvements in what were truly appalling conditions. The British looked with the strongest disapproval on the practice of arming civilians with the weapons seized from leftists, so that in the larger towns where British troops were also stationed, this practice was a good deal less open than elsewhere.

As the National Guard spread out through the countryside of Greece, a sort of miniature counter-revolution followed in its wake. The rightists of each village and town came into the open, and proceeded to do all in their power to turn the tables, and silence their opponents. A rash of self-styled Nationalist organizations grew up within a matter of weeks. Many of them were nothing but an ambitious letterhead or a cabal of a few would-be politicians. As time went on, the local organizations tended to affiliate themselves with nationwide societies, chief among which was X. By fall, Colonel

Grivas, the leader of the X organization, claimed a membership of two hundred thousand. In actual fact, however, much of the membership was nominal. The rightist organizations never succeeded in mobilizing the same enthusiastic energy as had the Left, nor did they ever come to dominate the daily life of the population with speeches, demonstrations, lectures, etc., to the same extent as the Left had done. Furthermore, the Government was officially committed to an advocacy of civil liberties. EAM had been trammelled by no such compunctions and had permitted no dissident newspapers to appear, nor any rival political organizations to form under its regime.

It followed that the relative inefficiency of the Right in its organization and propaganda, supplemented by an official policy of toleration, made political life freer in 1945 than it had been under the Left a year before. In most villages, save for the northern parts of Greece, EAM organization and activities pretty well ceased. In the larger towns, great numbers of EAM followers deserted the movement, but the organizational core remained, and was able to continue propaganda, organize strikes, and even hold public demonstrations. During the first months after the disarmament of ELAS, the Communist party line was pacific. By a careful obedience to the law, the party leaders hoped to make possible an early election which would, they believed, return a majority for EAM. But in calculating thus, the Communists underestimated the reaction against them.

In March the two leading figures of the Socialist movement, Elias Tsirimokos and Professor Alexander Svolos, announced their withdrawal from EAM, and by degrees drew all Socialist groups into a new United Socialist Party. In breaking off they spoke harsh words against the Communists, accusing them of having dominated and perverted the whole EAM movement. How many of the EAM rank and file followed the Socialist leaders, it is impossible to say. Socialism has always

been a comparatively weak movement in Greece, and the actual number of persons who deserted EAM with Svolos and Tsirimokos may have been small. Nevertheless, their action had a certain importance since it made the Communists the sole supporters of EAM. Its pretensions to be a National Front representing the whole Greek people from this time on lacked all plausibility.

Marked regional variations in the political pattern of the Greek countryside developed in the course of the first year of rule by the Athens Government. In the south generally, and especially in the Peloponnese, the Right gained almost unchallenged control. Leftists were severely persecuted, and many were hunted down and killed by armed rightists. Revenge for murders committed by leftists during the preceding years probably constituted the principal motive in most such killings, for in the Peloponnese it is still counted a family duty to kill the murderer of a close relative. In central Greece and Thessaly, the Left remained much stronger. Most villages passed under rightist domination, but the towns became divided between rival political organizations, and small-scale disorders were not uncommon between the extremes.

In Epirus, Zervas' followers, demobilized after 1 January in Corfu, returned to the mainland and dominated both town and country. On the ground that Albanians persecuted Greeks on the other side of the border, Zervas' bravos harried about fifteen thousand Albanian peasants from their ancestral villages and compelled them to flee from Greece to Albania. The fact that the Chams, as these Albanians were called, had coöperated with the Germans during the occupation and had used their favored position to abuse their Greek neighbors, partly accounts for this vengeful act.

Western and Central Macedonia, on the other hand, remained strongly influenced by the Left. Many villagers met the new National Guard with hostile sullenness; and the rightists among them never achieved an unchallenged su-

premacy such as was general in the south. The major reason for this difference was probably the relatively good record EAM and ELAS had made in the north. The EAM movement there had won general support from the population, and consequently the leftists did not find it necessary to use violent or terroristic methods. Conversely, the Right, finding less support than elsewhere, committed more outrages in Macedonia than in the other parts of Greece during the first days of its new-found power.

In Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, provinces which had been occupied by the Bulgars during the war, the state of public feeling and balance of political organization was quite different from that of the neighboring sections of Macedonia. The EAM movement had penetrated that area late (hardly before 1944) and never consolidated its hold on the population so firmly as elsewhere. Remnants of Anton Tsaous' band came down from hiding in the hills after ELAS had laid down its arms, and, for a brief while, more or less took over control of towns such as Drama and Serres. Even after regular units of the National Guard had arrived on the scene, Tsaous' guerillas continued to carry arms for several weeks; and the band became the framework for a sort of local nationalist political machine. The influence of Tsaous' band was made possible by the state of political feeling among the people at large, which turned strongly against the Left, identifying the Communists with a policy of conciliation toward the hated Bulgars. Even towns such as Kavalla, the chief center of tobacco manipulation in Greece, which had been a stronghold of communism before the war, showed a much more conservative spirit than was the case in industrial towns in other parts of the country.

The greater cities of Greece—that is, Athens, Pireus, Salonika, Patras, and Volos—differed from the country that lay around them in that political antagonism there had a real base in social class distinctions. A proletariat, largely unemployed

and existing chiefly on the goods supplied by relief agencies, remained generally loyal to the Communist leaders. Against them, merchants, capitalists, as well as a host of small entrepreneurs, were almost solidly arrayed as members of one or another of the "nationalist" parties. Intellectuals and professional men divided between the two extremes.

By slow degrees the civil administration of the central Government was reestablished in the provinces. Governors and prefects were appointed and despatched to their posts, but after they had arrived they found themselves faced with innumerable difficulties. There was an almost total lack of supplies and transport. Even the simplest items such as paper to write on or the pencil wherewith to write were unobtainable, or could only be acquired after days of effort. No sort of civil service existed, of course; and the local officials were seldom empowered to make any but the most petty expenditures without special authority from Athens. In practice, the top administrators spent most of their time in the capital, trying to force decisions from the central Government, and perforce neglected the day-to-day management of the provinces assigned to their care.

As soon as possible, the gendarmery was reorganized and despatched to the provinces to relieve the National Guard of police duty. The gendarmes who had served during the occupation formed the core of the new force. Only a few hundred were refused reinstatement because of collaboration with the Germans; but all were put through an abbreviated training course organized by a British Police Mission, were reequipped with uniforms and carbines, and hurried out to the provinces. By 15 May the gendarmes had taken over police responsibility everywhere, although they were not numerous enough to relieve the National Guard in the more remote areas until some months later. After the gendarmery had arrived in the provinces, the National Guard became merely a frontier police, with the exception of a dozen battalions which remained in

the interior as a sort of reserve in case of disorders too great for the gendarmery to cope with.

In general the reorganized gendarmery made a better record than the National Guard had done. The force was definitely rightist. No known or suspected Communists were admitted to its ranks, and many gendarmes were closely associated with, or even became members of, extreme rightist organizations such as X. Despite this bias, the processes of law were better observed by the gendarmery, and they committed fewer illegal acts of violence against the Left than the National Guard had done.

The central Government itself suffered from many of the same difficulties that plagued its local representatives. The plethora of civil servants who had been given jobs during the occupation nearly all remained on the Government's payroll, although many, perhaps even most of them, were half idle or performed useless tasks. Frequent changes in Cabinet Ministers, and corresponding shifts in the top administrators, seriously interfered with the smooth functioning of most government offices. Graft and favoritism were scarcely checked, especially when a new inflation began to develop and the civil servants' salaries became entirely inadequate to sustain life.

Two agencies almost independent of the Government began to take over many of the functions which normally would have fallen to the central administration. In economic matters, UNRRA guided and largely controlled Greek Government officials; in military matters, the Greek General Staff, supported by a British Military Mission, achieved a marked degree of independence.

Civilian relief was under military control for the first six months of liberation. A special organization known as Military Liaison, Greece, headed by an American brigadier general, Percy L. Sadler, assumed initial responsibility for relief distribution. The Athens fighting delayed operations for about two months, but during the reduced time, about

ninety per cent of the amount of supplies originally scheduled was brought into the country. The chief item was food, for Greece was even less able than before the war to feed its population.

UNRRA took over the responsibility for relief in April 1945, with the expectation of administering a two-year program ending 1 January 1947. The scale of its operation was very large. A foreign staff of over seven hundred persons, nearly all American and British, was supplemented by several thousand Greeks. The controversy which had begun in Cairo was ended in April when UNRRA at length signed an agreement with the Greek Government, by which it took responsibility only for discharging supplies on the docks. Officials of the Government were to supervise delivery and distribution. UNRRA, however, was accorded the right of inspection to make sure that flagrant abuses did not develop. In practice this right of inspection came to be greatly expanded, and in many instances, the Greek governmental officials became almost wholly dependent on UNRRA's "advice."

Most of UNRRA deliveries to Greece during 1945 were designed for relief rather than rehabilitation. Its purchases for Greece during the second-half of 1945 were as follows:

Food	\$100,000,000
Seed and agricultural equipment	14,000,000
Clothing	21,000,000
Industrial rehabilitation	26,000,000
Hygiene	10,000,000
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Total	\$171,000,000

During the first full year's operation no less than 1,400,000 tons of food were imported by UNRRA into Greece, in addition to which Military Liaison brought 387,000 tons to the country. This amounted to about four hundred pounds for every single person in Greece, more than a pound per day.

Such a quantity of food prevented any real starvation, but many persons were undernourished, especially since it became common practice for poor families to sell a part of their UNRRA ration on the black market to provide themselves with ready cash.

During 1946, the emphasis of the UNRRA program shifted from immediate relief toward longer range reconstruction. Consequently, food and clothing shipments were reduced and a larger amount of machinery and industrial raw material was fed into the Greek economy. The results were perceptible. Agriculture, the great economic base of the country, recovered most promptly and, thanks to an unusually favorable growing season, the wheat crop of 1946 was almost equal to average prewar production.

Industrial recovery was much slower. Financial and labor difficulties powerfully abetted damaged and worn-out machinery to keep production at a small fraction of prewar figures. Industry, however, had never been of central importance in the over-all picture of Greek economy. A more serious and crippling problem was the difficulty of transportation. UNRRA brought about six thousand trucks to distribute relief supplies, but was unable to help much with the repair of the railroads, which, it is estimated, will take two years from 1 January 1946 under the most favorable circumstances. During 1946 the narrow gauge railroad in the Peloponnese was repaired and the important link between Salonika and Constantinople was reopened. Some stretches of the main line from Athens to Salonika were likewise rebuilt, but UNRRA could not supply the materials necessary for the repair of some difficult tunnels and bridges between Thessaly and Botia. Equally, if not more, important was the shortage of sea transport, which had carried much of the freight in prewar Greece. About eighty per cent of the small coasting vessels had been sunk during the war, and wood to build new ones was very scarce and expensive. Lack of

adequate transportation put a steady drag on the functioning of the Greek economy, increased local food shortages, and hindered all forms of industrial activity.

UNRRA was an international organization, and as such was properly independent of the Greek Government. The Greek General Staff, on the other hand, was of course nominally subject to the control of the Government through the Ministry of War. In practice, however, it was able to assert a great deal of independence and gained a control over Army administration and policies almost apart from the wishes of the Government. The major reason for this was a British-directed effort to make the Greek Army free from "politics." British Police and Military Missions were established during the early months of 1945, having been requested by the Papandreou Government at the time of the civil war to assist in reorganizing the police and army. The Police Mission was accorded mandatory powers, so that its chief was able to veto promotions and transfers proposed by the Minister of Interior if they seemed to him deleterious to the service. The Military Mission, however, had only advisory powers; but its advice proved to have nearly the force of command.

In the new Greek Army, men trained in the Middle East and already familiar with the British methods and organization were in a key position. Veterans of the Third Brigade constituted the principal cadres for new units, and their conservative spirit came to dominate the Army completely. Plastiras, as an old soldier and veteran of two military revolutions, had an especial interest in the Army. He appointed his personal friends and former republican confederates to the top commands; but despite the fact that the generals were nearly all republican, the Army itself became strongly royalist. General Constantine Vendiris, who was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff, became the key figure of the Greek Army in this anomalous situation. He was in the confidence of the British advisers, and was able to sur-

round himself with a personal following of relatively senior officers. These officers were fanatically anti-Communist, and looked on King George II as the best stay against the Red menace. Vendiris and his friends gained authority to make appointments in the whole Army, and by that power, came to control it.

This development in the Army was profoundly disturbing to Prime Minister Plastiras. With a royalist Army holding the ultimate power in the state, he saw small chance of establishing the republic which he hoped for. He tried to interfere, but only came into collision with the British Mission which accused him of playing politics with the Army. In this contention, the British officers of the Mission were undoubtedly sincere. They did not fully realize the political bias of the Army they were helping to create, and regarded any interference with their work as mere political meddling. The British Military Mission was able to enlist the support of the British Ambassador and General Scobie. And its desires in general prevailed, even against the will of the Prime Minister.

At the same time, in the country at large, royalism gained steadily at the expense of republicanism. Generally, anyone who disliked the Communists and their methods came also to distrust republican government. The royalists harped steadily on the theme that Greece's only effective safeguard against the Left was the return of the King; and few Greeks could believe that a liberal republican Government would be able to survive the machinations of the Communists. The Liberal party limped along under the direction of a few old men. Themistocles Sofoulis, now eighty-three years old, remained as head of the party, and his following consisted mostly of men whose political ideas had been fixed at the time of the bitter quarrel between Constantine and Venizelos, during the First World War. They cherished an unquenchable dislike for the royal house and for the person of George II, but equally abhorred the new ideas and violent methods of the Left. The younger

generation of Liberals had deserted, drifting either to Left or Right. All the dynamism which had once driven the Liberal Party to power and palace revolution was departed. The patriotic appeal of "Greater Greece" had been inherited by royalists of the Right; and Liberal social reformism had been transmuted into the revolutionary aspirations of EAM.

Plastiras, as an old republican and stout conservative, found himself in an uncomfortable position. As the royalists spread their organization over the country and gained popular support, they began vociferously to accuse him of using his position as Prime Minister to forward party ends. In the Army too, the royalists had control, and Plastiras' efforts to unseat them were thwarted by the British Mission and the Greek General Staff. Thus he found himself without any important following.

In March, royalist circles began to agitate for the establishment of a "service" Government. By this they meant a Government of men who had no traditional or clear-cut associations with any political party. They argued that only such a Government could prepare the way with perfect fairness for the election which would at last set up a normal Government in Greece. Plastiras did not take kindly to the suggestion that he surrender the reins of office. Accordingly, at the beginning of April a royalist newspaper published a letter that he had written in 1941 in which he declared that further resistance to the Germans was useless. Royalists proclaimed this loudly as proof of collaboration. (The Germans had tried to bring Plastiras back to Greece and install him as head of the quisling Government, but after some hesitation, he refused.) This embarrassment, in combination with his quarrels with the British and his lack of success in making secure a republican Government, persuaded Plastiras to resign, 7 April.

Plastiras was succeeded by a "service" Government, headed by Admiral Petros Voulgaris. His Ministers were largely Army and Navy officers, relieved by a sprinkling of university

professors. Voulgaris himself was a former republican. He had taken part in the 1935 revolt and had been put into retirement as a result. During the next years, he worked as a plant manager for one of the great industrialists of Greece, Bodossakis Athanassiades, generally known simply by his first name.

Bodossakis was an extraordinary individual, and his career illustrates something of the part private capitalists have been able to play in Greek political affairs. Native to Asia Minor, he came of a poor family and boasted almost no formal education. He was, however, shrewd and utterly unscrupulous, and devoted his talents to making money. The foundation of his fortune came from selling supplies to the Greek and Turkish armies during the war of 1920-1922. Forced to flee with the rest of the Greeks, he lost most of his gains, but salvaged enough to begin industrial operations in Pireus. From small beginnings, he succeeded in building up an industrial empire. By 1940 he controlled the munitions industry of Greece, from which he made a fortune during the Spanish civil war and in the Albanian War. In addition he dominated Greek shipbuilding, the wine and spirits industry, owned the only artificial silk factory in Greece, and developed other business interests outside the country.

Once he had become rich, Bodossakis' ambition turned from the simple accumulation of money to the exercise of power. He had the temperament that delights in secrecy; his favorite pastime was to watch the human puppets dance on the political stage of Greece while secretly pulling some at least of the strings by which they moved. It is perhaps a fallacy to overestimate his power. He is reputed to have had connections with every political party, thanks to his generous contributions of money. An elaborate private intelligence system gave him access to a great many of the government's official secrets, and in fact most of his wealth probably came from competitive advantages he enjoyed by virtue of governmental

favours. In the Middle East, he was implicated in the April mutiny of 1944, but no proof was ever found of his rôle. Though the Left-Liberal group failed to take power, when he reappeared on the scene in Greece in 1945, he was firmly ensconced in the good graces of the royalists. Yet at the same time he continued to make contributions to the Communist Party, perhaps as insurance against some future day.

Bodossakis was a tremendous gambler in business deals. Against a rival he was ruthless, and all men he treated as instruments. He learned to play upon them with a masterly touch. He exercised a strange fascination on his associates, and was able to gather to himself some of the most capable technicians of Greece, who, though they distrusted his honesty, admired his sinuous, daring character. Bodossakis' influence and power had played a real part in the history of Greece during the past twenty-five years. It did not diminish when his protégé, Admiral Voulgaris, became Prime Minister.

By comparison, Voulgaris was a small man. He had won prominence by organizing the boarding parties which brought the mutiny in the Greek Navy to an end in April 1944. Thereafter he had been Commander in Chief of the Navy, and, like Vendiris, had carried through a purge of all who sympathized with the mutineers. After the purge, the Navy became predominantly royalist, although on the whole its partisanship was less than the Army's. Like so many other former republicans, Voulgaris had reacted strongly against communism, and he found himself, though perhaps without warm conviction, in the royalist camp. The Government which he headed shared his views. It became in fact, though not in name, a Government of the reaction.

One of the most pressing problems which confronted the Government was the unhappy state of the Greek economy. Despite the ever-increasing flow of relief supplies from UNRRA, recovery was painfully slow. There were material difficulties. Sometimes the lack of a single small part would

stop a complicated piece of machinery. Since most of the machinery in Greece had come from Germany, spares were hard to get, and the local machine shops were themselves short of steel and other necessities for effective improvisation. Lack of transport multiplied all these difficulties. The major hindrance to recovery, however, was social disorganization. Strikes broke out at frequent intervals, and few workmen regained prewar habits of industrious labor. They were exposed to a steady bombardment of propaganda from EAM urging them not to work for the bosses and to demand a living wage. The propaganda was the more effective because inflation early began to cut into Government-fixed wages. The Government spent approximately twice what it took in from taxes, and financed the deficit by printing paper. With continuing scarcity of goods, inflation was rapid. The new drachma when first introduced in November 1944 was assigned an exchange value of 149 to the dollar. In June 1945, the official rate was changed to 500 to 1; but the black-market rate continued to rise, and after six months (January 1946) a new exchange was set at 5,000 to 1. Wages and salaries inevitably lagged behind prices, and the gap inflicted real and severe hardship on all workmen and salaried persons.

Inflation and political insecurity had a further disastrous consequence. What capital individual Greeks possessed, they hid. Most of their surplus cash was converted to gold or other tangible stocks. In consequence, the price of gold in Greece rose far above the world market, and such items as continued to be produced, steadily disappeared from the market into private warehouses where they were hoarded as a form of investment for surplus capital. Constructive investment was at a minimum. Men simply were afraid to risk their resources for fear of losing all they had. Consequently, some factories which could have been reopened if the owners had been willing to make expenditures, were kept closed, and new construction was at a minimum.

UNRRA, for all its bounty, had a curiously blighting effect on governmental economic policy. In the hope that UNRRA might supply all needs *gratis*, foreign exchange for the purchase of many items, which private persons were anxious to import, was refused. For this reason much-needed hospital supplies, railroad equipment, and other such items were delayed in reaching Greece.

Unemployment continued high, and uneconomic self-employment became absurdly widespread. Little stands displaying half a dozen eggs or a few shoe laces, etc., were set up by the thousand all through Athens and other towns, competing one against the other and providing only a miserable half-living for their proprietors. Yet in the midst of all the poverty, luxury existed. If one had enough money, one could buy anything in Athens. No sort of rationing was in force and lavish meals could be had for extremely high prices in the restaurants.

To improve this unsatisfactory economic situation, the Voulgaris Government tried to introduce rationing and price control. Kyriakos Varvaressos, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Supply, and it was he who planned and directed the attempt. Varvaressos' intention was to stop inflation by bringing the state budget nearly into balance through direct taxation on real estate, and at the same time to assure a more even distribution of food and other consumer goods by rationing the whole population and fixing prices. Government boards were set up to determine just prices, and a market police was organized to enforce the price-maximums. After a couple of months of seeming success, the effort failed, Varvaressos resigned, and the measures were withdrawn. A strange combination defeated the program. A few large merchants and industrialists objected to paying direct taxes and selling at fixed prices, and organized a sort of selling strike, hoarding their stocks. The Communists, perhaps fearing a

genuine economic settlement, took the occasion to organize a widespread series of strikes, demanding a one hundred per cent increase in wages and the inclusion of EAM in the Government. As a result, food almost disappeared from the Athens market for several days. Newspapers of all political shades laid the blame on Varvaressos, and he at length resigned in bitter anger.

Even apart from the maneuvers that overthrew the scheme, it is questionable whether the plan could have been a success. The Government did not have the personnel to administer and enforce price ceilings, and serious injustices were done by the Government boards which assessed the taxes and set the maximum prices. The scheme was too ambitious, and was bound to collapse from the lack of flexibility and honest enforcement.

The failure of Voulgaris' economic program was a great blow to the Government's prestige. Liberal and leftist criticism mounted steadily. Furthermore, with the victory of the Labor Party in Great Britain (end of July), it was generally assumed that there would be a sharp change in British policy toward Greece. These considerations led Admiral Voulgaris to resign in the early days of August. For some days negotiations were carried on between the Liberal and Popular parties in an effort to form a coalition Government between the two. The Populists, however, were well content with the way things were going under Voulgaris. They stubbornly refused to enter into any sort of coalition with the republicans of the Liberal Party, and extolled the virtues of "nonpartisan" government. After a week's uncertainty, the Regent prevailed upon Voulgaris to resume office. There were some changes in the Cabinet, designed to bring into it a stronger republican influence, but the new Ministers proved unable to change the drift toward royalism and reaction, and in fact made small difference in the policies of the Government.

The principal purpose for which the Voulgaris "service"

Government had taken office was to organize elections. In June, the Government had ordered a revision of the election registers which had last been used in 1936. It was decreed that voters must register in their prewar place of residence. This decision was taken partly in the hope of inducing some of the refugees who had flooded into Athens and other large cities to return to their former homes. A more important reason was the administrative impossibility of completely re-compiling the registers. It had the effect, however, of disfranchising a large number of potential voters. Registration was rather difficult in the cities, for voters had to present certificates of birth and residence, and pay a small fee before being put on the lists. In the villages it was simpler, for there a committee, consisting of the priest, a villager and a representative of the government Civil Service inscribed the names of the voters without any individual application.

The Varkiza Agreement had provided that an Allied mission be invited to observe the elections. Voulgaris accordingly sent invitations to Britain, France, the United States and Russia. Probably fearing that a precedent might be set for elections in her own satellite countries, Russia declined the invitation on the ground that such a mission was an unjustifiable intervention in the domestic affairs of an independent country. The other three Allied nations, however, agreed to send observers, and undertook to bear the expense of the mission themselves.

The Varkiza Agreement had likewise provided that a plebiscite to determine the constitutional issue would precede elections for a constitutive assembly. The changed political balance in Greece, however, coupled with a change in British policy, resulted in a transposition: it was decided to hold elections first, and postpone the plebiscite until after a Government based on an elected Chamber of Deputies had come to power.

By the early fall of 1945 the Left was convinced that it

could not any longer command a majority of the voters, and so ceased to urge a speedy plebiscite. The conservatives and royalists, on the contrary, believed that they would be able to win, and called loudly for an immediate vote. When Churchill's Government suffered defeat in Great Britain and the Labor Party came to power, all Greeks wondered what would be the effect on British policy in their country, and, at the beginning of September, the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, undertook a trip to London for the purpose of sounding out the new British Government. In particular, he discussed the problem of organizing elections in Greece.

Unlike Mr. Churchill, the Laborites were generally unsympathetic to King George of Greece, believing that his partisans were reactionaries and unworthy of their support. But equally, they disliked the Greek Communists who seemed to be the only serious contender for political power in Greece. In such a dilemma, the British advisers decided that a prolonged cooling-off period was desirable. If the constitutional question could be postponed until some measure of economic recovery could be brought to Greece, and a strong Center have time to build itself up, then, they believed, a "sounder" expression of the people's will could be had, and the question of the King's return settled once and for all. Meanwhile, Greece obviously needed a Government that was based directly on the popular franchise, for the Cabinets that had governed Greece since the time of Metaxas could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as democratically chosen.

The British, then, advised Archbishop Damaskinos that the plebiscite should be postponed, and recommended 1947 or 1948 as a good time for it to be held. The Greek Regent, realizing the power of the Right in Greece and its anxiety to hold a plebiscite at the earliest possible moment, was reluctant to announce such a drastic change in schedule, saying that he would lay himself open to charges of trying to prolong

his own tenure of power. Consequently, the British took the matter up with the American and French Foreign Ministers (who were conveniently gathered in London at a meeting of the Big Four) and persuaded them to join in making a proclamation to the world which ran in part as follows:

The three Governments [of Great Britain, the United States and France] hold the firm opinion that elections for a revisionary assembly should be held as soon as possible. . . . Thus a government would be formed which would be based on the wishes of the people and Parliament. The formation of such a Government would facilitate the restoration of conditions of stable tranquillity in Greece. Only when these conditions are, in due course, firmly established will it become possible to hold a free and genuine plebiscite to decide on the future regime in Greece.

This statement was received submissively enough in Greece, although the royalists protested briefly. They were confident of winning either election or plebiscite, and if the Great Allies wanted the election first, they were willing to yield. The Left, for its part, largely neglected the question, but welcomed what was obviously a cooling of British affection for the cause of King George.

When it became evident that Britain and the United States were pressing for early elections, a vigorous controversy arose in Greek political circles. The royalists warmly agreed that elections should be hastened; the Liberals and the Left, on the contrary, realized their weakness, and insisted that the state of public disorder and terrorism in the country was such that honest elections could not be held. For some weeks, Voulgaris hesitated between the two pressures. At length, at the beginning of October, he announced elections for 20 January 1946. Within a day, EAM and the Liberal Party both proclaimed that they would refuse to participate in elections held under prevailing conditions. It became apparent that only the royalists would vote. Such a situation

would make the elections a farce, and, having come to such an impasse, Voulgaris resigned.

A month of crisis followed. For nearly three weeks Greece had no Cabinet. The deadlock was the same as in August. The royalists refused to join in any coalition with the Liberals; and the Regent, recognizing the power of the Right and distrusting the Left, refused to agree to a Cabinet drawn only from the Liberal Party. A coalition of leftists and Liberals was never considered. The Liberals, although republican, liked the Communists no better than did the royalists, and refused even to entertain such a possibility.

The lack of any titular head to the Government created a feeling of public nervousness in Greece. For some days there were rumors of an impending coup d'état from the Right, and in fact it seems to be true that some rightists considered such action. Its vehicle would have been the X organization, which by this time claimed wide membership and support. Success, however, could only be assured by the coöperation of the Greek Army. The hotheads of the X organization counted on the assistance of General Vendiris, and of a secret military league which he headed. This league had been formed in the Middle East after the mutiny of April 1944, and was designed to serve as a sort of extraordinary chain of command which would be called into operation only in the event of a second Communist mutiny. In the present instance, there was no immediate danger of a Communist uprising. The Communists were relatively weak, and were careful to make no provocative move. Consequently, Vendiris refused to support a coup from the extreme fringe of the Right, and the plot petered out into a demonstration on Constitution Square, held despite an emergency decree forbidding public assemblage.

At length, on 17 October, the Regent himself took over the office of Prime Minister as a stop-gap measure. The Ministers who had served with Voulgaris were asked to remain at

their posts to give an appearance of solidity to the administration. Public apprehension was in some degree quieted thereby. For two weeks this extraordinary Government endured. The Regent replaced it on 1 November by a Government of University professors and disabled politicians, who were brought together by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos.

This Government had perhaps the ablest collection of brains of any of the postwar Governments of Greece. But it lacked any vestige of political support. Kanellopoulos was neither flesh nor fowl; neither definitely a royalist nor definitely a republican. He preferred a republic on theoretical grounds, but was not convinced that republican government was well suited to Greece under the extraordinary difficulties of the time. He asserted that he would become either one or the other, obedient to the verdict of people. Such an avoidance of the key issue in Greek politics won him no political friends. Both republicans and royalists declined to support his Government, so that good intentions and a high-minded program came to nothing.

Throughout the month of October, inflation advanced by leaps and bounds. Prices on the Athens market almost doubled within the single month, and the black-market exchange rate of the drachma sank to about three thousand to the dollar. Heroic remedies for the economic and political crisis were needed. In the emergency, the Greeks turned to Great Britain, and the Labor Government was forced to take another and closer look into Greek affairs. The resultant British intervention set the mould for Greek politics during the following four months and finally brought about the long promised postwar elections. To the intricacies of the election question we must now turn.

IX

Elections

THE situation of Greece, when it came so urgently to the attention of the Labor Government, was an embarrassing one for the British. A year of liberation had not sufficed to establish anything that could reasonably be considered recovery. Uncertainty and distress still plagued the country. The Government held power only by a sort of constitutional fiction, being based neither on elections nor on any theory of dictatorship.

Hector McNeil, Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, was assigned the task of trying to set things to rights. He arrived in Athens, 13 November, and after some days of discussion with Greek politicians and officials of the British Embassy, he formulated a definite plan. First of all, he wanted a reorganization of the Cabinet to make it representative of a coalition of political parties. To assist such a Government, he proposed the appointment of British or Allied committees to advise in matters of economic administration and policy. In return, he held out hope of a substantial loan from Great Britain with which the Greek currency could perhaps be stabilized.

When it came to putting this program into effect, the British emissary found the Popular Party as unwilling as ever to take any part in a coalition Government. After some vain negotiation, he decided that a coalition of center parties was a practicable alternative. Accordingly, the Liberal leader, Sofoulis, prepared a Cabinet composed only of republican

politicians. The Regent distrusted such a solution, believing that the royalists were the strongest political group in the country and should be represented in any real or effective coalition. When McNeil insisted, Archbishop Damaskinos felt his dignity and authority had been disregarded, and in a tumultuous all-night scene, he resigned from his post as Regent. Only after heated argument did he agree to swear in the new Sofoulis Government; and it was three days before the advice of the American Ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, persuaded the Archbishop to resume his regency.

Such high-handed intervention in the affairs of the "sovereign" state of Greece was reminiscent of the methods Churchill had used in dealing with Papandreou. In December 1944 the British Government had been severely criticized for its intervention, and during the following months the British made an effort to keep their hands off Greek politics. Obedient to this policy, the British Ambassador had rebuffed frequent appeals from the Regent during the prolonged crisis of October. On a lower level, British influence had of course been uninterrupted. The Military Mission and the Police Mission exercised continuous and decisive influence in determining military policy, and, as we have seen, operated in fact to assist the royalist faction, while trying, according to the lights of the British officers who staffed the missions, to make the armed forces nonpolitical. By this dichotomy, the British effort at nonintervention on the narrowly political plane was effectively annulled. British influence remained pre-eminent in Greece, and inaction by the Ambassador in time of political crisis merely intensified the state of indecision.

The basis of British influence in Greece is not far to seek. Most Greeks had reacted strongly against communism as practiced by EAM, but they saw themselves faced with a constant menace from the Communists within their own country, and still more by the solidly Communist countries north of them. Fear of Communist-Slavic inundation became

widespread and deep-seated. It seemed clear to all anti-Communist Greeks that only the power and prestige of Great Britain could stave off the danger which threatened their country. British troops had originally come to Greece as a liberating force. Within three months they were formed into a sort of extraordinary police force which took over control of the country where EAM had ruled. In May 1945 British troops withdrew from active policing, leaving it to the Greek gendarmery. Thereafter the British forces were concentrated in or near the principal centers of population, and confined their activities to training their own replacements, and lending aid to the training of the Greek Army. But British troops remained in Greece. Their function had imperceptibly changed from that of an internal police force to a guard against foreign invasion. The Greeks who controlled the Government, and the British Cabinet likewise, calculated that the mere presence of British troops would forestall any Communist intervention from Yugoslavia or Bulgaria on behalf of fellow leftists in Greece.

Thus the Greek internal struggle became involved in the larger international rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. Whether they liked it or not, and the Greek rightists did not always like the British attitude of superiority toward themselves, the anti-Communists of Greece felt that they needed British protection against the danger that threatened them. They felt they must please the British, and it followed that British advice came to have almost mandatory force, not only in military but in all other matters.

The British were often embarrassed by the responsibilities which such a relation thrust upon them; but such half-hearted efforts as they made to escape from active intervention in Greek affairs proved unavailing against the growing shadow of international distrust between Russia and the West. Unless they decided to abandon Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean to the Russians, the British were compelled to

maintain a "friendly" Government in Greece; and a friendly Government asked, indeed pleaded, for British troops as a physical and moral protection against the Slavic threat to its power. Thus the little cockpit of Greek internal politics during 1945 came to be inseparably mixed into the world struggle of the Great Powers; and by the same token, the British became inextricably tangled in the quicksands of Greek political strife. The development had been foreseen neither by Greeks nor British at the time of liberation. It made of Greece a client-state, quite apart from the deliberate intention of either the British government or the Greek Right, and effectively limited (one might almost say terminated) the sovereignty of the Greek Government.

When news of the British intervention in favor of Sofoulis and the Center reached the royalists, they became furious. A few hotheads spoke of making a coup d'état, but calmer leaders realized that such an act would alienate the support of the British which they felt they desperately needed. Consequently all organized violence was repressed. The royalists instead concentrated all their strength to press for an early election. They were confident that a vote would give them the undivided power over the Greek Government which they sought. Events were to prove them correct.

Throughout the next four months, Sofoulis and the British were hopeful that a Center Government would be able to gather together the shattered strength of the center parties. Their hopes were vain. Conservative republicanism had no appeal for the Greek people, for nearly all conservatives had come to believe that a republican Government would prove only the first step toward communism.

The Left had at first been pleased by the British intervention on behalf of Sofoulis. EAM and the Communist Party announced that they would accord the new government moral support, and began to press for release of prisoners, purge of Army and police, and the inclusion of EAM in the

Government. By this time, the Communist Party had recovered much of its lost morale, and the strength of the Left was rising once more. In October a General Congress of the Communist Party took place in Athens. At this congress, a new Political Committee was elected, and the lines of a new and aggressive policy were laid down. Zachariades had returned from Dachau in May, and immediately took over control of the party despite the fact that he had no official position. At the Congress this defect was remedied; he was elected Secretary General of the Political Bureau in place of Siantos, and his personal supporters gained control of the whole Communist organization. Siantos remained a member of the Political Bureau, but his influence was much reduced. It became fashionable in Communist circles to decry his wisdom, and accuse him of having muffed the chance of seizing power at the time of liberation.

Absurd misunderstanding was common among all Greeks as to the nature of the Labor Party in Great Britain. With its victory in July, Greek leftists assumed that the workers of Great Britain would now come to their succor and put them in power. The tardy intervention in November was regarded as a half-step in this direction, and was accepted as such by many Greek Communists. It speedily appeared, however, that Sofoulis was no Communist, and that his efforts to republicanize the Army and police were still being thwarted by the British Mission. When this state of affairs became clear to the leaders of the Left, they embarked on a bitter campaign against the British. Quite correctly, they estimated that the presence of British troops in Greece was the major factor obstructing their rise to power in the land. Accordingly, a propaganda campaign, more calumnious and intense than any the Left had launched since the defeat of January 1945, was unleashed against the British occupation. The campaign began in December 1945, and was echoed by the Russian demand for British retirement from Greece, made at the first

meeting of the United Nations Security Council in February.

The Sofoulis Cabinet faced two pressing problems when it came to power. Economic dislocation, consequent upon a snowballing inflation, threatened serious disaster; and elections, so long promised, had to be organized before the Greek Government could be plausibly counted democratic, or find itself securely based on the popular will.

At his accession to power, Sofoulis had been given to understand that a British loan would be promptly forthcoming by means of which the inflation of the currency could be checked. In fact, hitches developed in the negotiations. The British government sent an Economic Mission to look over the ground in Greece, and what they found was not encouraging. Government waste and inefficiency had scarcely been reduced from the time of the quisling Governments. Thousands of useless civil servants burdened the budget; and the two largest single items in the Government's expenses, upkeep of the armed forces (30%) and pensions (15%), were economically unproductive. Taxation was nearly all indirect and dishonestly administered. As inflation advanced, the government's expenditures mounted steadily. Salaries of civil servants were raised to compensate for the debasement of the currency, and other costs increased proportionately. Tax income, however, failed to keep pace, and by January, the Government was spending over three times its receipts. Without a thorough housecleaning, it seemed to the British economists that a loan would simply pour money down the drain, postponing, but not solving, the economic problems that bedeviled the country.

Consequently, prolonged discussions were entered upon as to the steps which could be taken to reduce expenditures of the Government and improve revenues. Two of the leading ministers of the Cabinet went to London to conduct the negotiations, and not until 25 January was an agreement finally reached. By the terms of this agreement, the British

Government relaxed restrictions that had been placed during the war on Greek funds deposited in London, and granted a loan of ten million pounds to the Greek Government. Gold, which had in practice become the basis of prices, was legalized, and 500,000 sovereigns were imported from Britain. The Bank of Greece fixed the price of sovereigns and undertook to sell them to the public. By this means, devaluation of the paper currency was halted for the time, although not before the drachma had depreciated to an exchange value of about six thousand to one dollar. But the agreement also provided for the establishment of a British Economic Mission with wide powers. Furthermore, the issuance of currency was subjected to the veto of an Anglo-American financial commission. Such an agreement was not received with any great enthusiasm by the Greeks. The terms were less generous than they had expected, and the establishment of foreign economic and financial advisors seemed to threaten Greece with a semicolonial status. The Left attacked the agreement bitterly; while the Right felt Greece's dignity had suffered damage. Nevertheless, it worked: prices ceased to rise. This was a substantial success for the Sofoulis Government, and unquestionably helped it to survive.

Progress toward elections was slower. Sofoulis believed that a necessary preliminary to elections was a purge of royalist leaders from the Army and police. Sweeping changes in the top commands were suggested by the Minister of War, but as before, such measures were strenuously opposed by the British Military and Police Missions. The controversy came to settle around the figure of General Vendiris, Assistant Chief of Staff. He was accused by republicans, both conservative and leftist, of being the leader of the royalist clique in the Army. In December, the Minister of War "removed" Vendiris from his post, but the General remained at his desk during the next few weeks until a sort of compromise was arranged. Instead of being dismissed outright, Vendiris was posted to a

provincial command. With the exception of this single victory, the Liberal effort to purge the Army was successfully parried by the Greek General Staff, acting with the British Military Mission.

The failure to transform the Army from royalist to republican disturbed the Liberals. They could not bring themselves to believe the protestations of the Greek officers and of the British Mission that the Army had become divorced from politics. Among themselves they accused the British of duplicity, seeking to restore the King while professing neutrality on the constitutional issue.

The rights and wrongs of the quarrel over the Army are not simple. The republican officers were nearly all old men, who, like Sofoulis himself, had fixed their political conceptions thirty years before. They had been out of military service since 1935, and were, as a whole, comparatively inefficient and antipathetic to new ideas and British advice. They tended to look upon the Army as an instrument of political power within the state, and were at less pains to hide their attitude than were the royalists, who verbally at least, fell in enthusiastically with the British program for a nonpolitical Army. An Army with officers chosen purely on the basis of professional competence automatically favored the royalists, since most of the competent officers were also supporters of the King. Thus the British Mission had a real justification for its strong stand against republican tampering with military appointments.

In effect, one may say that the failure of the republicans to gain control of the Army was another manifestation of the collapse of the Center in Greek life. Young conservative republicans, whether in the Army or out of it, scarcely existed. The only competent republican officers were veterans of ELAS, and neither Sofoulis nor the royalists contemplated incorporating them into the Regular Army. ELAS officers were driven into the arms of the Communists by this policy,

and many individuals, who in January 1945 had been disgusted with their Communist leaders, began to gravitate back toward the party, seeing in it their only chance of a career. The Communist Party was substantially strengthened by this fact.

The Sofoulis Government also insisted that a necessary preliminary to elections was the establishment of peace and order in the countryside. The economic hardships of the inflation, the impatience of royalist extremists, and the policy of the Communist Party all combined to increase the public disorders in Greece during the fall and winter months. In the Peloponnese and in parts of Thessaly, royalist bands began to form. They devoted themselves to attacking leftists, and lived as outlaws in the tradition of the Greek *klefti*. In January a royalist band entered Kalamata in the southern Peloponnese, and took over the town for a couple of days. They released some of their fellows who had been jailed on criminal charges, and took the occasion to settle scores with a number of local leftists. The Government promptly declared martial law and sent a detachment of the Army to the district; but the bandits easily escaped, especially since neither the local gendarmes nor the Army officers wanted to arrest them.

Simultaneously, the Communists, feeling themselves stronger, adopted an aggressive policy. So-called "self-defense groups" were formed in the principal cities, and began to prowl the streets at night where they engaged in riots and small-scale battles with rival rightist gangs. In Macedonia two or three leftist bands came into permanent existence in the mountains. They made a practice of visiting remote villages, threatening their political opponents with the imminence of a "third round" when the Left would revenge itself for the defeat of January 1945. Isolated gendarme posts were attacked on several occasions, and a few prominent nationalist civilians assassinated.

Such conditions could plausibly be advanced as evidence

that free elections could not be held in Greece. Unfortunately, there seemed no likelihood that these disorders would quickly come to an end, or that the level of public peace would soon improve. It seemed possible that a popularly elected government might be able to reduce in some degree the prevalence of violence. In any action against illegal armed bands an elected Government would at least have the sanction of popular support, such as no appointed Government could claim. Consequently, when the advance party of the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections (AMFOGE) arrived in Greece at the end of November, its numbers were not impressed by Prime Minister Sofoulis' arguments against holding elections at an early date. After considerable pressure had been brought to bear by the leaders of the Mission, Sofoulis reluctantly set the election date for 31 March, and the Mission proceeded to lay plans on that basis.

For many months thereafter, rumors that the elections would be postponed again were in the air. The Liberals did not want them held, since they realized their weakness. The Left, too, was reluctant, and after some uncertainty, declared that it would refuse participation, on the ground that the state of terrorism was such that the result could not be anything but a travesty. In making this decision, two considerations probably guided the Communists. For one thing, persecution of leftists in most of Greece was real, and under the prevailing conditions, the Communists could not expect to bring the full number of their supporters and sympathizers to the polls. All the penumbra of the leftist movement, the lukewarm sympathizers and fellow-travellers, would shy away from exposing themselves to rightist retaliation. In addition to this, the leaders of the Left did not wish to reveal the fact that they had only a minority following. Abstaining from the election, they could claim not only their own adherents, but also all the persons who failed to vote for other reasons: the sick, indifferent and dead.

The state of the Greek election registers was such that many persons long deceased appeared as eligible voters. The Voulgaris Government had ordered a revision of the lists, but the order had been imperfectly obeyed. In many communities, names of men who had come of age since 1936 were added, but names of those who had died were not erased. The reason for this was largely sloth and inefficiency, but there was another factor which contributed to the distortion of the lists. According to the election law, a man voted in the community where he had been resident in 1940. Many persons had moved their domiciles during the years of occupation, and many such refugees had died. But in their original communities, sure information was often lacking, and to cut a name off the list on the presumption that the man had died was of course illegal.

Still another important factor that kept the election registers swollen was the fact that politicians of the Right thought they might be able to cast ballots for the absent ones. As we shall see, the activities of the Election Mission were on such a scale as to reduce falsification to a minimum, but in the days before the Mission arrived on the scene, many politicians anticipated the possibility that they might be able to rig the election, as had so often been done before in Greek history. In some election districts, false names were deliberately inserted on the lists under the Voulgaris Administration. Consequently, Sofoulis reopened the registration lists, and many of these irregularities were removed. Thereafter, the efforts of the Election Mission and of the Government prevented any large-scale systematic falsification. The names of many dead and displaced persons remained on the rolls, however, and in due course were claimed by EAM as supporters of the Left.

Prolonged dispute next arose over the question of representation. The royalists, being stronger, advocated the majority system such as is used in Great Britain or the United States. The weaker parties wanted a proportional system whereby the

minority votes of each district would also be given representation in the elected Chamber. After some weeks of debate, Sofoulis declared that the proportional system would be followed.

By February it was clear that elections would in fact be held, despite the obvious reluctance of the Government to face the polls. The Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections arrived on the scene in force. It comprised over twelve hundred persons, of whom almost half were Americans. The observer teams were all headed by Army and Navy officers who were generally quite ignorant of Greek affairs. They depended entirely on a hastily gathered staff of interpreters, and it is probable that in some cases the observers allowed themselves to be hoodwinked, and failed to discover the true state of affairs due to their interpreters' distortion of question and answer. All arrangements had perforce to be made in haste, and sufficient allowance for the peculiarities of the Greek national character and political scene was not always made.

Despite these handicaps and shortcomings, the Mission made a serious effort to check the accuracy of the registration lists and the regularity of the procedure. Two hundred and forty field teams were organized. They visited over half of all the polling places in the country, sampled the registration lists, observed the physical preparations of polling booths, and on the day of election itself watched the proceedings at as many of the polling places as possible. The scope and sincerity of the effort impressed the Greeks, and undoubtedly made the election better, more honest and freer than it would otherwise have been.

The proportional system of counting election results made party coalitions meaningless. There was no need for joint slates, when the votes for each minority candidate were counted also, and given a proportionate share of representation in the Chamber. Consequently the parties separated,

and each conducted its own independent campaign. Nine major parties took part in the election, of which four were royalist, two republican and three declared that they would accept either a kingdom or a republic, according to the decision of the plebiscite. The chief royalist party was the Popular, headed by a three-man Committee. The others were the Reformist Party of Apostolis Alexandris, the National Liberal Party led by Stylianos Gonatas (outgrowth of the Athens EDES), and the National Party of Greece which Napoleon Zervas had founded on the basis of his guerilla force. Out-and-out republican parties were limited to the Liberal Party led by Themistocles Sofoulis, and the Agrarian Party of Alexander Mylonas. In between, the personal followings of the former Prime Ministers, George Papandreou, Sophocles Venizelos (who had broken away from the Liberal Party in January), and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, formed three more parties. These three politicians shared a sentimental inclination toward republicanism, but announced that they would abide by the outcome of the plebiscite, and become royalist or republican according to the verdict of the people.

Campaigning followed patterns familiar in the United States. Election posters, bearing the photographs of candidates, decorated the walls of Athens and the chief provincial towns. Candidates embarked on a flurry of speechmaking, and promised all things to all men. The leading politicians undertook tours through the provinces to drum up support, endorse local candidates, and jack up their political machines. Strangely enough, the Left was in the forefront of the electioneering, urging all and sundry to abstain from voting.

On the eve of election, Constitution Square in Athens presented an extraordinary sight. Three rival political rallies took place simultaneously. From one building, former Prime Minister Papandreou promised his followers a Greater Greece; across the Square, royalists promised the return of

King George II; and diagonally, Siantos and other speakers for EAM instructed all democrats to abstain. Cordons of unarmed policemen separated the three crowds, permitting the passage of individuals from one group to the other, but deflecting mass movements. The meetings broke up without rioting. In all Athens only one murder occurred on election eve.

So far as the Allied observers saw, there was little overt terrorism used by either side to influence the result of the election. Acts of physical violence were few, although in parts of the country it proved difficult or impossible for the minority parties to make an open campaign. In Epirus, Zervas and his former guerillas prevented all rivals from circulating freely in the countryside for electioneering purposes by setting up check posts on the roads; and in the Peloponnese, the Popular Party was able to treat republican propagandists almost the same way. As a general rule, and over most of Greece, however, threats of future retaliation took the place of actual physical restraints. In the areas of the country where the extremes were strongest, threats certainly carried considerable weight in the minds of ordinary citizens who, as always, chiefly desired to keep out of trouble. In certain districts of Athens and Pireus where EAM was firmly entrenched, anyone who went to the polls on election day became a marked man. In such districts as much as eighty-five per cent abstention took place. In parts of Macedonia the same conditions existed, and abstention ran above fifty per cent. Conversely, in the Peloponnese and Epirus, pressure to vote was strong, and only men who were already known as EAM-ites dared to stay away. Nevertheless, nothing could prevent a man from casting a blank ballot if he wished to abstain, so that the psychological pressure of the Right was less efficacious than that of the Left in distorting the result of the election.

When election day came round, it passed off fairly peace-

fully. In a single village in Macedonia the voting was interrupted when a band of leftists descended from the hills, attacked the gendarme station and broke up the election booth. In some of the other provincial towns disturbances took place, but not on a scale to interrupt the voting. In Athens the royalists persuaded the Military Governor to keep polls open past the legal time for closure in some districts. Their purpose was to allow certain persons to vote who feared to approach the polling places during daylight, when they could easily be seen and identified by Communists of their neighborhood.

Despite these irregularities most Greeks felt that their election had been as free and honest as circumstances would permit. Illegal and plural voting was at a minimum. Errors in the registration lists were estimated at no more than two per cent of the voters by AMFOGE. There was a spirit of quiet exultation among the people of Athens. A peaceful election reminded many of prewar times, and they fondly hoped that Greece at last was returning to normal and peaceful political life. Such an election, they felt, raised Greece above her neighbors, where Communist democracy had uniformly and almost unanimously endorsed the monolithic state. A free election seemed to put Greece on a plane with Great Britain or the United States, and stood a proof of the democratic, Western spirit of the people.

Final results of the elections were not known for several days, but it speedily became evident that the royalists had won. When the count was finally in, they emerged with an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Out of a total of 354 seats, the royalists won 231 places. The Popular Party constituted by far the largest proportion of this total; but it is impossible to give an exact figure, due to the fact that once the election was over, all the royalist groups, with the exception of Zervas' party, merged into a single bloc, and particular party affiliation of individual royalist deputies

became lost. Against this crushing majority, out-and-out republicans numbered only 51, divided between the Liberals' 48 seats and the Agrarian Party's 3. The three parties which had straddled the constitutional issue won a total of 67 places in the Chamber. In addition, there were three independents.

The Left did what it could to discredit the election result. Only forty-nine per cent of the persons whose names appeared on the registration lists had voted, and the Left jubilantly claimed the balance, fifty-one per cent, as its followers. The leftists derided their opponents, saying that they represented only a minority of the people, and declared the assumption of power by the royalists to be illegal. The logical force of this propaganda was hurt by the fact that, before the election, the Left had loudly proclaimed the falsity of the election lists.

It is difficult to discover how great was the actual following of the Left. The AMFOGE report on the election estimated that only 9.3 per cent of the electorate abstained for political reasons; but this figure was received with general incredulity in Greece, and exposed the Election Mission to the charge of partisanship and deliberate falsification against the Left. The percentage had been arrived at by sampling public opinion just before election. Every precaution was taken to make the sampling statistically correct, but unfortunately for the reputation of the Allied Mission, proper account of the peculiarities of the Greek psychology was not taken. The sampling was done by interview of persons selected at scientific random from the registration lists. The interviews were made by American, British and French Army officers. It seems almost certain that some of the people whom they questioned answered, as is the wont of the Greeks, not according to what they felt, but as they believed their interlocutor to desire. Consequently it is safe to assume that a good number of persons, who in their hearts intended to abstain, told the interviewers that they would vote. The

actual number of EAM and Communist followers can only be estimated. As a guess, one may set the correct figure at about twenty per cent of the voters.

When the royalist victory became certain, Sofoulis resigned. A coalition Government took over for a few days until the count had been completed, when the newly elected leader of the Popular Party, Constantine Tsaldaris, became Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister was a nephew of Panagiotis Tsaldaris, prewar leader of the Popular Party. He was an undistinguished man and his political fortunes depended on his name and on the fact that his mediocrity had made him fewer enemies than was the case with rivals for the party leadership. His Cabinet was drawn largely from the ranks of his own party, but included representatives of all other royalist groups with the exception of Zervas' party.

The Popular Party which had won the election was ill consolidated. In January 1945 it had existed only as a few dozen professional politicians in Athens. A year later, it was able to nominate candidates in almost every electoral district of Greece, and to win a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This rapid growth was not based upon any solid, disciplined organization. When EAM had ruled the country, the leftist political machine had been able to repress all dissent and opposition, even after a reaction against it had begun to set in. Partly for this reason, when finally unleashed by military events, the reaction went further than it would otherwise have done. Thus the Right in a sense profited from the thoroughness of the Left. But the royalists lacked a political machine that could equal what EAM's had been. To be sure, there were widespread royalist societies, such as X, which aspired to a totalitarian control over the people at large; but these societies were never wholly coördinated with the Popular Party (Colonel Grivas, leader of X, had split with the Populists just before the election), and they lacked both

funds and evangelistic enthusiasm with which to achieve a totalitarian reactionary state.

The power of the Popular Party was consequently less firmly based than EAM's had been. Even parliamentary discipline among the royalist deputies was imperfect. A group of young men tended to form a clique which demanded quick and drastic action. They frequently criticized the governmental leaders for too great caution and dependence on British advice. Being extremists, in their fanatic bitterness against the Communists they often advocated measures that could plausibly be called Fascist. As against the republicans, this group of young proto-Fascists of course supported the Government; but the republican bloc was so small that their votes were not needed to assure a royalist majority, and on many issues the extremists acted almost like an Opposition of the Right, showing scant respect for the wisdom or wishes of the older men who headed the Popular Party.

The existence of such a group in the Chamber of Deputies was, in a sense, made possible by the absention of the extreme Left from the election. Had the Left voted, and won some twenty per cent of the seats in the Chamber, then the royalist majority would have been smaller, and it would seldom have been possible for the extreme wing to break away from the Government. A stricter parliamentary discipline would have been enforced on the royalist deputies in order to keep safe their superiority as against the republican and leftist groups.

It strains the imagination, however, to picture royalists and Communists sitting in the same Chamber. Were the two extremes brought so close together, it would be almost certain that the intensity of their mutual hate would have made peaceful proceedings utterly impossible, and parliamentary procedure would have been reduced to brawls and fisticuffs. The institutions of Western democracy hardly fitted the social and political situation in which Greece found itself;

and, at any close look, it appeared that the parliamentary cloak was ill fitted to the Greek body politic, though it might camouflage its true bones and joints upon occasion.

Despite the weaknesses of the Popular Party and of the Chamber of Deputies, the new Government was far stronger than those which had preceded it. It had come to power through a relatively free and honest election and was firmly supported by both police and Army. The British accepted the new Government with some reservation. British officials were anxious to improve administration and moderate the Government's narrow partisanship, but nevertheless approved the general policy and political orientation of the new Cabinet.

The Chamber of Deputies met for the first time on 13 May. It was the first assemblage of a legislature since the brief and fruitless session of 1936. The occasion was not without dignity. The deputies filled the hall, seating themselves according to their party affiliation. More than half of the space was occupied by the deputies of the Popular Party. Not all of them were well dressed, and many bore on their persons marks of provincial origin. In front of them sat the Ministers in full and formal array. Toward the center of the hall, Zervas and his deputies took their place. The guerilla leader looked strangely different with shaved face and civilian clothes; his followers, nearly all from the wilds of Epirus, presented a rough-and-ready appearance. Other well known faces were present. Former Prime Ministers Papandreou, Venizelos and Kanellopoulos sat on the left, each with his group of deputies clustered around him. On the extreme left the aged but still vigorous Liberal leader, Sofoulis, appeared in the front row, and a few rows behind him sat two Cretan deputies, clad in the old peasant costume of their island: baggy trousers and little flat cap. The majestic figure of the Regent strode into the hall to open the session. He read a brief speech from the

Throne which had been prepared for him by the Cabinet, after which the meeting was adjourned.

The following day, Prime Minister Tsaldaris outlined the Government's program, and announced that the plebiscite would be held on 1 September. This date had been set as the earliest by which the election registers could be thoroughly revised. The British still wanted to postpone the plebiscite until 1947 or 1948, but the newly elected Government would not brook such a delay, and for the first time since 1941, a Greek Government was able to resist the wishes of the British successfully. Such independence reflected the firmer base elections had given the new Government. The British could not very well gainsay its right to decide on the date of the plebiscite, and in fact accepted Tsaldaris' decision with good grace.

The program Tsaldaris expounded to the deputies put major emphasis on the restoration of the King. Everything else was subordinated to this issue. In foreign affairs he promised strenuous efforts to secure the annexation of new territory to Greece from Albania and Bulgaria. Economic recovery he passed over lightly, falling back more on pious hopes than on specific proposals. A fourth topic which he greatly stressed was the restoration of law and order in the provinces, for which he promised quick and effective action against the armed bands which were principally responsible for disturbing the peace.

Of all the problems which faced the new Government, economic recovery was probably the most important. Yet the Government was on the whole little interested in economic matters. Their attitude was one of *laissez faire*, with politic attention to the wishes of their friends who could profit from a complacent government policy in matters of taxation and contracts. To make the system work, they counted on loans from Britain and America. Such an ap-

proach to economics did not correspond well with the ideas and wishes of the British Economic Mission. This Mission had scarcely begun to function under Sofoulis, and it soon found itself facing the passive resistance of the Greek Government and administration. The Greeks suspected the British advisers of trying to bring Greece under their economic control, and did not welcome the prospect. They resented British suggestions for economy and limitation of government expenditures, but found that they could not easily resist the advice showered upon them.

A state budget was drawn up and presented to the Chamber in June. The largest single item in this estimate was for the maintenance and equipment of the Army. With the cost of the police, Navy and Airforce, the total for military and security expenditures amounted to fifty per cent of the total budget. Estimates for other expenditures were reduced to a minimum; and in particular, the amount allotted to reconstruction was pitifully small. Taxation policy was not clarified, and the estimates of government receipts, by which the budget was almost brought to balance, seemed to be rather hopes than calculations.

Such a budget could not excite wholehearted approval. Yet the desperate economic plight of the country made it difficult to conceive of anything much better. The Government promised to introduce genuine budgetary control of expenditure, as its predecessors had never done. It seemed highly doubtful, however, whether in fact the estimates would prove enforceable, or inflation could permanently be stopped. In general, the Government counted on foreign loans for reconstruction. The budget was drawn up partly with the purpose of inducing British and American officials to approve loans, which, if the budget could be adhered to, would be devoted principally to economically productive expenditure. In July a vast plan for reconstruction was hastily drawn up for presentation to the United States and Britain

as a basis for loan making. Negotiations dragged, however, and were not concluded at the end of September.

To establish satisfactory public peace called for strong action. In the southern parts of Greece, rightist bands continued to harass leftists, frequently resorting to violence and murder. Their acts sometimes embarrassed the Government and regularly brought grist to the Communist propaganda mill. Nevertheless the leaders of the Government and members of the gendarmery generally sympathized with these bands, and secretly considered such to be the only effective way of dealing with the Left. Gestures toward the arrest and punishment of these rightist bands were made, but no more.

In northern Greece, however, the Government viewed the situation with some alarm. Leftist bands had been abroad in the fastnesses of Mount Olympus and near-by areas since the summer of 1945. After the royalist victory in the election, the Communists increased their effort to create additional bands, hoping to reestablish a guerilla force such as ELAS had been. What most alarmed the Government was that some of these bands received help and supplies from Yugoslavia. Their existence seemed a standing threat not only to local rightists but to the security of the Greek state itself. Strong measures were accordingly taken to disperse them. The Minister of Public Order organized special gendarme detachments to hunt down the bands. They were equipped with automatic weapons and instructed to take no prisoners. Operations began in July, and met with some success. The gendarmes were not able to eliminate the bands completely, but did succeed in restricting the scale and scope of their activities.

In September the scale of leftist band activity increased again. The Communist leaders in Athens openly acknowledged their connection with these bands, and claimed that ten thousand men had again taken to the hills of Greece, forming a new ELAS which would combat the monarcho-Fascist government of Greece. Units of the Greek Army were

called into action against the new ELAS, and a number of skirmishes ensued in which altogether several hundred men were killed. British troops, although they remained in Greece, took no part in these operations.

Despite some pressure from extremists, the Communist Party was not declared illegal. However, its activities were somewhat hampered by the enactment of laws designed to impede Communist organizers. Security Committees were established in a number of provincial towns with the legal power of banishing objectionable characters who were not native residents. Since it was standard Communist practice to assign their organizers to particular towns and districts, usually under false names, where they were not native born, this law made it possible for local leading citizens to compel Communist organizers to move on. The initial use of this power was very cautious, for the Government feared that British and American public opinion would consider such action a violation of civil liberties. New and stricter libel laws were also passed, which, if literally enforced, would severely restrict the traditional scope of almost every Greek newspaper. This law too was sparingly invoked, and the Communist press remained free to publish bitter denunciations of the government "Fascists."

To cope with economic problems and Communist intransigence was, in the Government's view, a necessary task; the restoration of George II, King of the Hellenes, a joyous duty. The clique of younger deputies advocated an immediate recall of the King, arguing that he was the rightful sovereign of Greece and required no plebiscite to justify his power. The official leaders of the Popular Party, however, had committed themselves to a plebiscite in December 1944, and saw no reason to risk public and world opprobrium at this juncture by declining to take a vote which they knew they could win. In order to give the plebiscite the sanction of the Western Powers, Tsaldaris decided to invite the Allies to

send a second mission to observe the preparations for the plebiscite. Invitations were issued in April, and accepted by Britain and the United States. France declined on the ground of expense, although the pressure of French Communists in the Chamber of Deputies probably had more to do with the decision.

The original Election Mission had recommended that a thorough revision of the Greek electoral registers precede any new vote. This the Government undertook to do prior to 1 September, when the plebiscite was scheduled to take place. Renewed instructions were sent out to the local government officials, ordering a careful check of all names on the elections registers. As a result of this order, a few new names were inscribed, but the major change was the elimination of several hundred thousand names of persons who had died since 1936, when the registers had last been brought fully up to date. Revision began in June, and was observed and verified by the British and American Mission that came to supervise the process. The second election mission was much smaller than had been its predecessor, and only twenty-five teams were sent into the country to check on the procedure in the provinces. These teams managed to visit six hundred registration polls, and concluded, when the revision had been completed (mid-August), that the Greek election lists had been brought to "a degree of fairness and accuracy which justifies their use in seeking the opinion of the Greek people in matters of national import." By sampling cross-sections of the population and checking the result against the registration lists, the Mission estimated that over eighty per cent of the persons of voting age had registered, and that errors and false registrations were reduced to minimum.

The Greek Government requested the Allied Mission to remain and observe the actual voting in the plebiscite, but the British and American Governments declined to undertake the task, arguing that the Mission was too small to be able

adequately to cover the whole of Greece, and consequently would not be able to make any authoritative report. Individual members of the mission nevertheless remained in Greece until after 1 September, and were able to watch the actual voting process.

The Greek Government was most anxious to carry out the plebiscite in a fashion that would win the approval of the Western Powers, and give the leftists no plausible basis of criticism. The royalists were sure that they could win a majority for the King, and consequently were not much tempted to falsify the result, or to resort to illegal means of persuasion. In point of fact, the Greek Communists played into the royalists' hands, for the increased scale of leftist banditry lent power to the Government's argument that only the King could establish a stable Government, capable of opposing the violent attack of the Communists. Systematic publicity was given to the armed clashes between gendarmes and Communist bands; and for the first time it was publicly announced that the leftists were receiving weapons and other supplies from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This roused the old and deep-seated Greek fear of Slavic invasion of their northern provinces, and seemed to prove that the Communists were indeed enemies of the Greek nation, in league with the hated Bulgars. More and more, the threatening foreign situation weighed on the public mind, and the Government was able to distract attention from the internal problems of the country.

There is no doubt that the aggressive Communist policy alienated many former followers. In August KKE proclaimed a general strike to last only two hours as a demonstration against the Government. It was not successful; and the royalists construed the failure as proof that the workingmen no longer adhered wholeheartedly to the leadership of the Communist Party. But at the same time, the more aggressive policy had the effect of binding those who remained with the

Communists more firmly to their cause. Thus the net effectiveness of the Communist Party as an instrument of power scarcely suffered decline.

The republican arguments against the King were often scurrilous and bitterly personal. The principal charge was that King George had wantonly established dictatorship in Greece in 1936, and would do so again if he should return. The words and behavior of some of the extreme royalists lent a certain amount of plausibility to this charge, despite the Government's official rebuttal that the King was now firmly committed to democratic principles.

Some weeks before the plebiscite, the three former Prime Ministers, George Papandreou, Sophocles Venizelos and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, whose parties had tended to cluster together in the Chamber of Deputies in a sort of informal Opposition bloc, came out definitely for a republic. They all professed willingness to abide loyally by the result of the plebiscite; but, perhaps anticipating a future popular revulsion against royalism and the Popular Party, took the occasion to declare against the King's return.

Just prior to the plebiscite, apprehension lest the Communists should mobilize to create riots and break up election booths was general in Athens. To discourage such an attempt, the Greek Army was alerted. Guard detachments of soldiers were scattered through Athens and other large towns. The reduced British garrison, however, was confined to barracks during the time of voting, and took no part in the proceedings.

Despite the fears, there was little disorder on 1 September. In the provinces a number of brawls took place and several people were killed; in Athens the plebiscite was carried out with decorum. Almost all the registered voters cast ballots, for no party urged its followers to abstain, and the republican groups were anxious to make as impressive a show of their strength as possible. According to the figures of the Ministry

of the Interior, from a registered total of about 1,700,000, more than 1,673,000 votes were cast: sixty-nine per cent in favor of the King and thirty-one per cent against his return. This amounted to a slightly larger royalist vote than had been polled in the election of March, when the various royalist parties combined to gain sixty-five per cent of the total.

When the result of the plebiscite was known, Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris (who was in Paris at the Peace Conference) went to London and formally invited his sovereign, George II, King of the Hellenes, to return to Greece and resume his throne. Tsaldaris returned to Paris briefly, but went on to Athens, where he busied himself with preparations for the royal arrival. On 27 September, King George alighted from an airplane and set foot on Greek soil for the first time since 1941. He immediately embarked in a Greek destroyer, and made his formal entry into Athens the next day, coming ashore at Phaleron Bay, and progressing up Syngrou Boulevard to the Cathedral. There the former Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, officiated at a *Te Deum*, after which the King made a public appearance in Constitution Square, where he laid a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Later in the day, he held a reception for leading politicians, government officials and foreign diplomats. The Russian and Yugoslav diplomatic representatives were both ominously absent.

The city was decorated for the occasion with thousands of Greek and Allied flags. Large crowds watched the King's progress into the city, and were restrained with difficulty from blocking the streets, by long lines of police. Loud cheers greeted the King as he made his way slowly toward the center of Athens, and some of the people in the crowd made highly emotional displays of their affection for the returned monarch. Yet there was an overtone of sombreness. The crowd, though large and enthusiastic, was not so large nor so stirred-up as some EAM crowds had been. Officials feared that some

attempt at assassination might be made, and a special police edict forbade the throwing of flowers, lest a bomb be mixed with the bouquets. The celebration was ostentatiously boycotted by all leftists. The Communist newspaper of Athens in reporting it remarked that George Glücksburg, a foreigner, had returned and would begin to rule over the Greeks. The King could not cease from being a symbol of party strife even for one day, and the ceremonies were in fact a party and not a national demonstration.

Despite the welcome of the royalist crowds and the protestations of loyalty which the politicians of the Popular and associated parties showered upon King George, it must have been with some sadness that he saw the evidences of poverty and sensed the antagonism that divided his subjects against one another and turned a part of them so bitterly against his own person. By himself, the King could hope to do little to relieve the troubles and anxieties of his kingdom. The familiar problems—economic dislocation, internal strife, and international ill will—still were as pressing as ever. The solution of each seemed to require the solution of the others first, making an endless circle from which only great wisdom, hard work and good fortune could rescue the country. The greatest test of the royal Government clearly still lay ahead.

X

Foreign Relations

UNDER the occupation, Greece had become an unwilling part of the New Order, and had lost all the reality and most of the pretenses of national sovereignty. The quisling Government did what it was told, though sometimes with reluctance. Greek provinces had been ceded to the Bulgars. A fierce hatred for the old enemy flared in nearly every Greek heart, but resentment could find no open or official expression for the time.

EAM, at its inception, paid little attention to international problems. As time passed, the power of EAM extended into the border regions of Greece. This inevitably raised problems of relations with guerilla forces of neighboring countries. In general, EAM followers believed that the hostilities which had divided the Balkan countries against one another in the past would be overcome by their revolutionary movement, working in conjunction with the parallel movements of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. No very clear blueprints for the future were ever drawn up. Some members of the movement talked of a Balkan confederation; but a strong streak of unregenerate nationalism ran through much of the EAM rank and file, and projects for such a submergence of Greek sovereignty were never officially promulgated.

In practical matters, relations between the Communist guerillas of the Balkan countries were generally amicable. A sort of passport system existed whereby a man could get a slip of paper from designated authorities near the frontier,

which, upon presentation to the guerilla officials across the border, assured recognition as a friend. With such a passport, travel was possible between all the Balkan countries. Difficulties of transport were of course severe, yet Tito and ELAS did exchange liaison officers in 1943 and communication was irregularly maintained between Partisan and ELAS Headquarters thereafter. The Albanian guerilla movement, when it began to form under Enver Hodja, was in practice little more than an extension of Tito's power into a new area. EAM was friendly, and, as we have seen, an ELAS division could march through Albania in December 1944 (in order to attack Zervas) and meet with no opposition or even protest.

The relation of the EAM movement with Bulgaria is less clear. It seems probable that some communication with Bulgarian Communists occurred during the occupation; and, as we have seen, there were rumors that the Greek Communists made an agreement assigning East Macedonia and Thrace to the Bulgar sphere of revolutionary operations.

During the six months of EAM rule in northern Greece, relations with the northern neighbors remained on the whole friendly. There were certain quarrels with the Yugoslavs, and one small battle took place between ELAS and a detachment of Yugoslav Partisans when the latter tried to remove some railroad freight cars from Greek territory. However, these incidents were smoothed over by an evangelistic spirit, preaching the brotherhood of all Balkan nations. In 1944, a more serious issue between Greeks and Yugoslavs began to develop in Western Macedonia, but that is best described separately as a part of the evolution of the Macedonian question.

The international frontiers were lightly guarded, and passage to and fro was relatively free. Certain grain shipments from Greece into Albania took place in the spring of 1945, when ELAS power was about to come to an end, and the leftists saw no reason to give up their food stores to an un-

sympathetic central Government. Shortage of surplus products and lack of transport reduced other economic interchange to a minimum.

The victory of the Greek Right in the fighting in Athens brought an end to these relatively harmonious international relations. Toward the end of the occupation, at a time when the Right was generally disorganized and divided between collaboration and refusal of collaboration, the one clear issue on which conservative Greeks had been able to unite was advocacy of the ideal of Greater Greece. After liberation, propaganda for annexation of neighboring territories grew stronger. Nearly all Greeks came to believe that the sacrifices and sufferings they had undergone could only be compensated by the addition of new territories to their country at the expense of the neighboring nations to the north. The old hope of restoring the Byzantine Empire was revived in this shrunken form. It was easy for the Greeks to convince themselves of their right to the territories they coveted, remembering the extent of Byzantine boundaries. It is probably also true that calculating politicians chose to fan the flame as a means of distracting attention from hardships at home. The conviction took deep emotional hold. The national claims were warmly applauded by all parties of the Right and Center. The Left, in deference to the strength of popular feeling, advanced claims of its own, against Turkey and Great Britain (Cyprus), and even accorded vaguely phrased support to territorial claims to the north.

Basically, the Greek feeling was one of moral indignation. They believed that the Bulgars should be made to pay for their annexation of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace during the war. But retribution did not seem an adequate argument to justify annexation of Bulgar soil. Consequently an auxiliary argument, the need for military security, was developed and expanded until the vast majority of the people of Greece came to believe that only by the addition of a strip of land

some thirty to fifty miles in width across the whole length of their northern frontier could Greece become militarily safe from her neighbors. The fact that Yugoslavia had been an Allied state and could hardly be asked to yield up part of her territory to the Greeks, was simply glossed over in most public utterances. Emotional emphasis was directed against the Bulgars and the Albanians; mention was scarcely made of the Yugoslavs, but maps of the new "Greater Greece" showed a generous slice of Yugoslav territory included in the new Greek boundaries.

Ethnological arguments were advanced to justify the desired annexations, but except for the case of southern Albania (or, as the Greeks insist on calling it, Northern Epirus) the grounds for the Greek claims were ridiculously slight. Albania presents a more difficult case. The Albanian state came into existence only as a result of the intrigues of the Austrian and Italian Governments in 1912. At that time, Albanian nationalism was in a formative stage. In the province of Northern Epirus the educated and articulate Christians spoke and considered themselves Greek. There was also a peasant Christian population which spoke Albanian, and had practically no sense of nationality. After World War I, Greece laid claim to this province, but Italian influence again prevented any cession of the southern part of Albania to Greece. During the following years of Albanian national independence, the feeling of nationalism was successfully implanted in most of the Albanian-speaking peasants, whether Moslem or Christian. Persons who actively expressed loyalty to Greece not unnaturally were persecuted in greater or less degree, and many individuals found it politic to lose their Greekness and assume an Albanian nationality, in outward things at least. The result was a steady weakening of the Greek element in the border regions, until today it is certain that the number of active Greek nationalists in Northern Epirus is a small minority.

After the overthrow of ELAS in Greece, the national antagonism became entangled with ideological struggles. Albania came under a Communist Government in 1944. When a conservative Government took power in Greece, Albanian conservatives, in the southern part of the country at least, began to look to Greece for liberation from their rulers. At the same time, Albanian authorities began to take precautionary measures against the opposition, jailing many, executing some, and putting others into forced-labor battalions. This the Greek Government has interpreted as persecution of the pro-Greek minority, as indeed it has become.

Greek territorial claims against her three northern neighbors naturally did nothing to improve Balkan international relations. An initial strain existed in the ideological opposition, for Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania all lay within the Russian sphere of influence and came under Communist Governments. The Greek border was closed to all normal traffic from 1945 onward. In March 1946, when UNRRA tried to organize the delivery of relief supplies to southern Yugoslavia through Salonika, quarrels between the Yugoslav and Greek local officials prevented all but a single shipment from crossing the border.

Mutual distrust led inevitably to a series of border incidents. Most of these were entirely insignificant, consisting of sheepstealing raids or smuggling by civilians across the frontier. Others, however, developed into small-scale battles between the rival frontier posts, in which prisoners were sometimes taken and casualties suffered. It is unprofitable to try to assess the fault for these affrays. They arose over minor misunderstandings, fed by the general atmosphere of hostility.

The Greeks had laid claims of \$700,000,000 in reparations from Bulgaria for damages wrought in the zone of their occupation. The Bulgars countered with lists of the capital improvements they had made in the area, and refused to

accept Greek accounting of damages. A single small reparations payment was made. Eighty railway freight cars and two locomotives were surrendered to the Greeks in March 1946 but most of them were so worn as to be almost useless. At the Paris Peace Conference (October 1946) Greece was tentatively awarded reparations payments from Bulgaria amounting to \$62,500,000, but time and means of payment remained uncertain.

During the early months of 1946 it became clear that Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had small chance of satisfaction. The Bulgars not only announced that no cession of any territory to Greece would be considered, but went further and countered Greek claims by demanding an outlet to the Aegean for themselves. Such "impudence" startled the Greeks; but helped to make clear that few concessions could be expected from Bulgaria, especially since Bulgar claims seemed to have the tacit support of the Russians.

Disappointment in Bulgaria made Greek territorial aspirations turn the more strongly toward Albania, where their case was a better one. Memoranda were prepared for the principal Allied Powers; and Greek historical, military and ethnological rights to possession of Northern Epirus were presented before the Peace Conference in Paris (July 1946) by the Prime Minister himself. The Greek claims did not come up for hearing until the last days of August. Russia proved unalterably opposed to any territorial changes at the expense of her protectorate, Albania; and maneuvered matters so that when Greek accusations against Albania came up in Paris, Ukrainian accusations against Greece were simultaneously being aired at Lake Success before the Security Council of the United Nations. The Western Allies were unprepared to back the Greek claims strenuously in the face of Russian opposition; but Greek hopes rose when the question of Bulgarian boundary adjustment was referred, by a

quirk of Conference procedure, back to the Council of Foreign Ministers without any specific recommendation from the Peace Conference.

Greek relations with her Mediterranean neighbors were not much happier. From Italy, Greece claimed the Dodecanese Islands in the southeast Aegean. These islands were inhabited by a Greek population, but had been under Italian rule since 1911. They had considerable importance as military bases for control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The island of Leros boasted a fine harbor, and the Italians had there constructed a naval base and several military airfields. Perhaps for this reason, the Russians at first raised objection to the transfer of these islands to Greek sovereignty, but at a Conference of the "Big Four" in Paris, May 1946, it was finally agreed that Greece should have the Dodecanese. Actual assertion of Greek sovereignty, however, was delayed until after the conclusion of the final peace treaty with Italy.

A second point at issue between Greece and Italy was reparations. The Greeks calculated the costs of the Albanian War and the Italian occupation in rough and ready fashion, and arrived at the astronomical figure of \$2,677,000,000. This claim was referred to the Peace Conference (July-October 1946) for settlement, and the amount was at length scaled down to \$100,000,000, less than four per cent of the original claim. In the course of the Peace Conference, Greece and Italy showed signs of coming into more harmonious relations with one another. Despite the prominent part Italy had played in the war against Greece, public resentment against the Italians did not rise to a high level in post-liberation Greece. Relatively little attention was paid to the past crimes of the Italians, perhaps because the full force of public resentment was so effectively channeled against the Bulgars. This fact, plus the possession of common friends (Great Britain and the United States) and common opponents (Yugoslavia

and Russia) made rapprochement between the former enemies a relatively easy matter.

Relations with Greece's other neighbor and old-time enemy, Turkey, were generally amicable but scarcely intimate. During World War II, the Turks had assessed heavy and unjust taxes against the Greek community in Constantinople, and many prominent Greek families had been ruined. This raised an echo of the old antagonism, which only slowly died down in Greece, and rather reduced the warmth of official relations. Early in 1945 the Greek leftists advanced a claim on Eastern Thrace, arguing that the province by old historic right belonged to Greece. They furthermore hinted that if Greece would see the light and join the Communist bloc, a grateful Russia would gladly give Greece all or most of that province, after having wrested Constantinople and the Straits from Turkish control. As can be imagined, such a propaganda did not help to cement relations between Greece and Turkey. In general, the Turks considered the Greeks so weak and divided that they would not make worthwhile allies against the Russian and Communist danger, which threatened both governments alike. Consequently even the possession of a common enemy did not bring about any important rapprochement between the two countries. Trade and communication with Turkey were relatively free. A railroad connection between Salonika and Constantinople existed after June 1945, and boat service ran between Pireus and the chief Turkish ports. With the exception of Egypt, Turkey was the only country to which an ordinary civilian could travel from Greece. Other frontiers and countries were closed, either by government policy or by insuperable transport and exchange difficulties.

Greece thus found herself in an unenviable position. She was surrounded by enemies or lukewarm friends and supported only by the distant power of Great Britain, and, less

directly, the United States. Even relations with Britain were not perfectly smooth. Greek claims to Cyprus constituted a long-standing irritant. That island is inhabited by a mixed Greek and Turkish population, and during recent years the Cypriote Greeks have become ardent nationalists. The Greek Right, feeling the need of British support, never raised the question of Cyprus directly. Rightist politicians repeatedly stated that Great Britain and Greece would be able to settle the question amicably, implying that the British would, from the generosity of their hearts, surrender the island to Greek sovereignty. These hints the British studiously disregarded. The Left, however, fixed upon Cyprus as a legitimate national claim, and demanded it loudly and emphatically. Most Greeks wanted Cyprus, but were not prepared to risk British displeasure by pressing for its immediate annexation. The question, consequently, remained more or less in the background.

Another factor which made relations between Greece and Great Britain something less than idyllic was the feeling current among many Greeks that the British were trying to exploit their country economically. Most of the prewar concessions to British capital were reestablished with the return of the Exile Government. Such enterprises as the Athens streetcars and the electric power company were British owned and directed. It was generally feared that the Economic Mission, which had been set up in conformance with the agreement of 25 January 1946, would operate to the advantage of Great Britain and tie Greece to the sterling area in all financial and commercial dealings. The Greek Left made much of these misgivings, but, in fact, they were shared by many other Greeks who accepted economic bondage as the necessary though unwelcome price of political and military support against the Communists within, and still more outside, the country.

A further irritant to Greek-British relations was the casual

way in which British officials and troops constantly assumed an air of superiority. Many Greek Army officers came bitterly to resent the patronizing attitude Britishers adopted in discussing military matters with them; and in other walks of life, where Greeks and British came closely into contact, similar disharmony tended to arise. Nevertheless, on a purely personal and social plane, relations were often very friendly. Most Greeks appreciated the difference between British and German or Italian methods, and infinitely preferred British superciliousness to the harsh subjection they anticipated if ever they should come under Russian domination.

Relations between the United States and Greece were much happier. In general, the American Embassy, headed by Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, took no active part or independent lead in Greek affairs. During the civil war in Athens, the handful of American troops on the scene maintained an official neutrality between the British and ELAS. This enabled the United States to escape the full bitterness of partisan attack; and during subsequent months, despite the fact that in most things American policy tacitly supported the British, the United States never became a prime target of leftist criticism. Americans took a leading part in the first Election Mission, for the American contingent of observers was the largest and best equipped of the three national delegations.

From the time of liberation (and even before) the United States government, and private societies in America such as the Greek War Relief and the Near East Foundation, played a major part in organizing relief and rehabilitation for Greece. The American contingent in the UNRRA Greece Mission was larger than any other, and the head of the Mission was an American, Buell Maben. In the summer of 1945 a \$25,000,000 loan was granted to Greece by the United States Government for reconstruction purchases, and the Greeks entertained lively hopes of securing additional and larger loans

in the future. The prominence which the United States achieved in relief activities strengthened the gratitude and affection which nearly all Greeks felt toward America. For many thousands, emigration to the United States seemed the brightest hope for the future, and the American consulates were constantly besieged by eager applicants for immigration permits. A small and inelastic quota prevented all but a very few from achieving what they so much desired.

As tension developed on the larger international scene between Russia and the West, the United States began to take a rather more positive part in Greek affairs. Ceremonial visits by American warships were generally accepted by the Greeks as proof that the United States was interested in and solicitous for the welfare of Greece and her protection against Communist invasion from the north. In December 1945 the USS *Providence* visited Pireus briefly. In April of the next year the USS *Missouri* put in at Phaleron after its visit to Constantinople; and six months later, the aircraft carrier, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, repeated the call. The visit was climaxed by a demonstration flight over the capital city of Athens.

The large Greek-American community in the United States created a special sentimental tie between the two countries. Many Greeks felt a sort of vicarious partnership in the United States: if their relatives could so easily become Americans, they too could feel a vague kinship to the great, rich and powerful nation across the ocean. The United States was thus in a unique position, and enjoyed high esteem in the eyes of nearly every Greek.

The third Great Ally, Russia, occupied first place in the affections of the Left, but was profoundly feared by the Right. Official relations after the rightist victory of January 1945 were consequently cool. For many months the Russians sent no ambassador to Athens, and were represented only by a military mission. (The same that had been dropped into ELAS Headquarters by parachute.) This embarrassing gap in

the diplomatic corps was filled only after Sofoulis became Prime Minister; and when Admiral Constantine Rodianov presented his credentials they proved to be addressed not to King George but to the Regent.

The Russian press and radio regularly reproduced the propaganda of EAM, and did not hesitate to call the Greek government Fascist. In March 1946 the Russian Ambassador suggested that Greece should cede one of the Dodecanese islands to Russia as a base for shipping, so that supplies of grain could be sent from Russia to the Greeks. This idea was firmly refused by the Greek Government, and the Russians dropped the matter without further discussion. Implied Russian support for Bulgarian claims to an outlet on the Aegean shocked and terrified the Greeks. Official relations became the more frigid and correct.

In July 1946 the Peace Conference assembled at Paris, and Prime Minister Tsaldaris attended in person, hoping to emulate the successes of his predecessor, Eleftherios Venizelos, and win for Greece new territories. It soon became evident, however, that the Russians were strongly opposed to the Greek claims, and that the United States and Great Britain were at best lukewarm to the Greek hopes of territorial changes. It was a shattering discovery for most of the Greeks. They had so completely convinced themselves of their rights to enlarged boundaries, that they generally felt that they had been ungratefully betrayed and their heroic part in the war shamelessly forgotten. The award of much-whittled-down reparations seemed a caricature of justice; and the Left took the occasion to proclaim the folly of a Government which depended on such ungrateful nations as the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

Tsaldaris' unsuccessful demands against Albania and Bulgaria at the Peace Conference did not help to improve relations with Russia. Toward the end of August, the Russian and Yugoslav Ambassadors both went home on "leave." and

their prolonged absence was generally interpreted as a sign of displeasure at the policies of the Greek Government. A few days later, August 23, Dimitri Manuilsky, Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, asked the United Nations to consider the threat to world peace which the policies of the Greek Government offered. He specifically accused Greece of fomenting border incidents, of seeking to take over by force the southern part of Albania, and of persecuting minorities; and requested the Security Council of the United Nations to consider and concert steps to deal with the threat to peace which these acts had created in the Balkans.

The Ukrainian charge was accordingly put on the agenda of the Security Council meeting but only after bitter words had been exchanged between the British and Ukrainian representatives. The debate turned into fruitless discussion of border quarrels between Greek and Albanian frontier guards over stolen cattle, the painting of frontier markers, etc. Representatives of various Russian satellite nations accused the Greeks of aggressive intentions, and dwelt on the malicious influence exerted by the presence of British troops, which, they charged, encouraged Greek collaborators and reactionaries to stir up trouble in the Balkans. The Greek representative, Ambassador Vassili Dendramis, heatedly denied the charges, and was supported by the British delegate to the UN. Despite its heat, the debate generated little light, and concluded with a vote whereby a majority of the nations declared that Greece had not been proven an aggressive nation, nor a danger to the precarious Balkan peace.

The Security Council debate of August-September 1946 dramatized the ill-feeling that permeated the Balkans, and the tensions which had arisen during the preceding two years between Greece and her neighbors. In actual fact, Greece found herself in the front line, at the juncture of British and Russian spheres of influence. Such an advanced position in-

evitably exposed Greece to severe buffets and a constant inquietude.

Potential enemies were near and powerful in comparison with the limited resources of the Greek nation. Potential allies were far away, separated from Greece by long stretches of sea. The delicate Greek international position was made still more acute by a revival, in altered form, of the Macedonian question which had for so long plagued the Balkans. Since the future history of the Greek state and people may depend in large part on the development of the Macedonian issue, it deserves a careful examination.

Before the Balkan Wars (1912-13) the Turkish province of Macedonia was inhabited by a peasantry predominantly Slavic, mixed with a population, mostly urban, of Turks, Greeks and Jews. The Slavic peasants spoke a language distinct from other Balkan tongues, but more nearly related to Bulgarian than to any other. Helped by this affinity, the Bulgars on the whole had more success in winning the allegiance of the peasants in the struggle for Macedonia (1876-1912) than had any other nation.

After World War I, when the Bulgars were excluded from nearly all of Macedonia, Greek influence became overwhelmingly predominant in the part of that province which had come within the boundaries of Greece. Exchange of populations with Bulgaria resulted in the uprooting of nearly all of the Slav-speaking peasants, and Greek refugees were settled in their place. Much new land was brought under cultivation, and the total population increased rapidly. No exchange of populations with Yugoslavia took place, however, and in the remote northwest corner of Greece a substantial colony of Slavic peasants remained on their ancestral lands. Their actual number is much disputed, but probably lies between sixty and a hundred thousand today.

The Slavic peasants of Western Macedonia had been less

affected by nationalism than their fellows of less remote districts, and were generally content to accept the new Greek sovereignty calmly enough. The Greek Government for its part was distracted by other problems, and paid very little attention to the Slavic community that had been incorporated inside the national boundaries. Greek schools were set up throughout the district and substantial numbers of Greek settlers came to occupy land that had fallen vacant as a result of the prolonged disorders which had affected all Macedonia. Under these circumstances, Greek influence became firmly established in the region, and, through the schools, the younger generation among the Slavs generally began to learn a little Greek.

This process of peaceful assimilation was checked by a series of laws passed in the time of the Metaxas dictatorship. In an effort to hasten assimilation, it was made a legal offense to speak Slavic in public, and other legal handicaps were put upon the Slavs. Under such repression, the Macedonian peasants became acutely conscious of their difference from the Greeks. The old half-dormant conviction that the land belonged by right to them and their kind gained a new hold over their minds. Population had grown rapidly, and the land which had been half empty in 1912, was, by 1936, insufficient to provide a living for all the peasants' sons. Greek and Slavic peasants were driven to compete against each other for the very means of their livelihood, and the latent national antipathies thrived as a result.

Throughout the early years of occupation, the Italians were responsible for policing Western Macedonia. The occupying army quickly hit upon the idea of using the antagonism which had developed between Slavs and Greeks for their own advantage. Bulgarian agents were allowed free scope to spread propaganda among the Slavic villagers, and persuaded many to opt for Bulgarian nationality. Thereby the Slavs gained special legal and ration privileges, and were able to lord it over

their Greek neighbors as the Greeks had previously lorded it over them. The Italians organized a special Slavic gendarmery force from among the peasants of Western Macedonia and used it for ordinary police work of the area. As was usual with Axis police forces, it indulged in punitive raids against Greek villages in retaliation for acts of sabotage carried out by the guerillas. Naturally enough, the Greeks of Western Macedonia came to hate their Slavic neighbors for such traitorous behavior, but were relatively helpless for the time.

The Italian surrender in 1943 brought a temporary increase in Bulgarian influence, for Western Macedonia was nominally added to the Bulgar zone of occupation. Actually, Bulgar troops never came to the area in force, and practical control of all but the main roads passed into the hands of ELAS. The indigestible Slavic population of Western Macedonia presented the leaders of ELAS with a difficult problem. International Communist policy for Macedonia in the years before the war had been far from clear. There had, however, been considerable talk in Communist circles of a Macedonian republic to be organized within a Balkan federation of revolutionary states. Within each of the three countries concerned—Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia—the national Communist parties had had an “autonomist” wing which advocated creation of the new state. But there was no Macedonian Communist Party as such, and individual Macedonians who fell under the influence of Communist doctrine joined one or another of the three established national parties. Among Greek Communists, Andreas Dzimas had become the recognized leader of the Macedonian autonomy movement. He was a native of Kastoria in northern Greece, a Slav by ancestry, but educated as a Greek.

In the summer of 1943 a conference was held between representatives of the Albanian, Yugoslav and Greek guerilla armies in a village of Western Macedonia. The question how to counteract reactionary Bulgar influence among the Slavic

peasants of Greek Macedonia came up at this meeting. The Yugoslav representative suggested that Tito's Macedonian Partisans could best succeed in establishing Communist village organization and in raising guerilla bands among the Slavs of Greece. But the Greek representative refused to fall in with this suggestion. It was finally agreed that the guerilla groups would restrict their organizations to the old national boundaries, and ELAS undertook to organize the Slavs as an integral part of EAM and ELAS. To establish liaison and assure smooth coöperation, Dzimas was sent to Tito's headquarters shortly after this conference (fall of 1943) as chief representative of ELAS. In that position he undoubtedly did what he could to forward the cause of Macedonian autonomy.

As a result of the conference, in the fall of 1943 ELAS formed a Slavic Communist band under the command of a man named Gotsi (or Gotseff). Gotsi was a native of Florina, a town just south of the Yugoslav border; himself a Slav and a baker by trade. The band was considered to be a part of ELAS and came under the command of ELAS Macedonian Headquarters. From its inception, however, the band had a strong autonomist coloring, and Gotsi followed a relatively independent propaganda policy, openly advocating the establishment of an independent Macedonian state under Communist auspices. His band found recruits easily enough, and he was able to draw at least some of the necessary weapons from ELAS stocks.

It seems probable that from the beginning Gotsi had accepted ELAS control only with reservations. Matters came to a crisis about May 1944 when the remnant of the Slavic gendarmery joined forces with Gotsi. From the point of view of ELAS Headquarters, this was an enemy formation which had surrendered to Gotsi. It followed that the gendarmes' guns were captured enemy property, and, as such, subject to the disposition of ELAS Headquarters. Gotsi, however, looked on the matter quite differently. He considered that,

to advance their common aim the better, the two forces had united to work for the establishment of an independent Macedonia.

When ELAS Headquarters ordered Gotsi to turn over most of his newly acquired weapons, he refused to do so. Prolonged negotiations followed in the course of which Gotsi did yield some few guns, which were however mostly useless castoffs and failed to satisfy ELAS. Such intransigence seemed intolerable to the Greek leaders of ELAS, and at length they decided to break with the Slavic band. In October 1944 superior ELAS forces were brought up, and Gotsi was compelled to cross the border into Yugoslavia.

In Yugoslavia Gotsi found refuge but no warm welcome. The Partisan movement in Macedonia had a strong tinge of autonomism, and was Communist chiefly for convenience. When the power of Tito's central Government began to make itself felt in Yugoslav Macedonia (spring 1945), considerable friction developed as a result of the Macedonian expectation of a real autonomy in the new federated Yugoslav state. The whole Macedonian autonomist movement consequently fell under Tito's displeasure. Serbian and Montenegrin troops were sent into Yugoslav Macedonia and purely Macedonian units were transferred elsewhere. Simultaneously, the government at Skoplje was overhauled and brought fully into line with Tito's central Government. Gotsi's band fell under suspicion with the rest of the autonomists, and it was put into semi-internment for several months. Groups of ELAS refugees, which came from Greece in March, were similarly treated.

After Gotsi's expulsion from Greece, ELAS and EAM ruled the Slavic villages of Western Macedonia for the next six months. By and large EAM distrusted the Slavs. No systematic persecutions were carried through, however, and efforts to spread Communist organization to them continued and met with fair success. When the National Guard and

Greek gendarmery came to Western Macedonia in April and May 1945 the ill-feeling, which had accumulated during the occupation and had been more or less repressed by EAM, boiled to the surface. Greeks came to the authorities bearing all manner of accusations against the Slavs. It became customary in local rightist circles to call all the Slavs Communist. The National Guard, for its part, was ardently nationalistic, and prone to accept any accusations against a Slav at face value. Repeated acts of violence and official discrimination against the Slavic peasants resulted. Many were beaten and robbed of some or all of their goods, but relatively few were killed. Such deeds were usually justified as repayment for acts committed by the victims against Greeks during the occupation; and in some instances undoubtedly such was the case. On other occasions, innocent individuals suffered; but the Greeks tended to regard the Slavs as collectively guilty for the acts of a few, and threatened to evict the entire population from Greek soil in punishment for their treason during the war.

Thus it came about that in the spring of 1945 the Slavs of Western Macedonia were like sheep without a shepherd. Greek Communists distrusted them; Greek nationalists hated them; and the autonomist movement seemed to have undergone an eclipse in Tito's Yugoslavia. In many Slavic villages of Greece fear and apprehension was intense, and villagers slept away from their houses to avoid sudden surprise by night. Reports of this situation easily reached Yugoslavia. Communist authorities across the border saw a great opportunity and did not hesitate to take it. Selected men from Gotsi's followers and from among the ELAS refugees were allowed to form small armed bands and cross over into Greece. These bands appeared first in June 1945. They devoted most of their attention to spreading propaganda among the Slavic villages, promising an early liberation from the Greek rule. A "third round" was darkly hinted at when the

Communists would return triumphantly to power, and incorporate Greek Macedonia into Tito's Macedonian republic.

The bands were never numerous—perhaps five hundred men in all, divided into fifteen or twenty groups. They emphasized their propaganda by waylaying a few National Guardsmen and gendarmes, and by assassinating a few leading Greek nationalists in the villages. On one occasion, a band attacked a British truck and killed one of its passengers. Strenuous British and Greek countermeasures, the approach of cold weather, and perhaps difficulty in getting ammunition and other supplies from Yugoslavia, persuaded the bands to withdraw in the fall of 1945.

They had however brought a new hope to the Slavs of Greece. It seems clear that these bands persuaded the great majority of the Slavic villagers to pin their hopes on the Macedonian People's Republic to the north, and attach their political loyalties to Tito and his brand of communism.

This new development proved an acute embarrassment to the Greek Communist Party. Most Greek Communists strongly objected to any cession of Greek territory; and should it become recognized that the party officially backed cession of all or part of Macedonia to a Slav state, the Greek Communist movement would lose much of its influence overnight. To avoid such a debacle, Greek Communist leaders became extremely anxious to reach an understanding with Tito on the question of Macedonia. In January 1946 Zachariades made a secret trip to the north of Greece, accompanied, significantly, by Dzimas. In the course of his travels, Zachariades had a conference with high-ranking members of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist parties, and probably discussed the Macedonian question with them.

What was decided at this meeting can only be surmised from subsequent events. During the following months, parallel Communist organizations were set up through most of

Western Macedonia: a Greek organization designed to attract and appeal to Greeks; and a Macedonian organization, directed from Skoplje, which was designed to win the support of the Slavic population. Local Greek and Macedonian organizers were instructed to coöperate with each other closely. It is impossible to say whether Zachariades and his fellow conferees made any decision as to the ultimate disposition of Macedonia. The Greek Communist Party did all in its power to gloss over the issue and distract public attention from it; and in Yugoslavia spokesmen refrained from making any public statements which might seem to threaten the integrity of Greek Macedonia.

Since the summer of 1945 the activities of the Macedonian Communist Party inside Greece have been constant and effective. They won the support of most of the Slavs; and continued to instigate murders and assassinations of Greek nationalists and officials of the Government. In the summer of 1946 armed bands reappeared in the hills, supplied and supported as before partly from Yugoslavia. The Greek Government was seriously alarmed by the presence of these bands, and as we have seen made strenuous efforts to suppress them.

Chiefly as a result of the success of the Macedonian Communist organization in Western Macedonia, the Greek Communist organization lost much of its former influence in that area. Communism for the local Greeks came to mean an anti-national movement. In reaction, the Right grew stronger than anywhere else in Macedonia. In other words, ideological and national antagonisms aligned themselves; Greek reactionary against Slav revolutionary.

It is an explosive mixture, and may provide Tito at any moment he desires with a convenient and plausible excuse for diplomatic or even military intervention in Greece. The Slavic peasants have a long tradition of guerilla action, live in a remote and mountainous land, and have bred hundreds of young men who have no land of their own, and find them-

selves strongly attracted toward the heroic life of banditry, colored and condoned by political principles and national antagonism. At almost any time it may desire, the Macedonian Government in Skoplje will be able to create serious disorders in northwestern Greece; disorders adequate, should the Yugoslavs ever wish it, to justify intervention to protect "oppressed Slav brothers of Aegean Macedonia."

The Macedonian question is like a lighted match. It may go out with the passage of time; but it may also provide the occasion for widespread conflagration. As we have seen, Greek international relations are difficult. The country faces hostile neighbors, and finds itself on the razor's edge dividing East from West, Russia from Great Britain and the United States. The internal struggle of Left and Right is inextricably mixed with the international struggle between Russian communism and Anglo-American capitalism. In such a chiaroscuro, an open flame like the Macedonia issue may prove fateful indeed.

XI

Conclusion and Prospect

CIVIL war did not come to an end in Greece when the Varkiza Agreement was signed. A bitter war of words has continued without cessation, and sporadic sparks of violence illumine, as it were, two armies encamped over against each other, dividing and disputing Greece between them. Neither side thinks the time quite propitious for all-out battle. Skirmishes take place from time to time, and only tactical calculation, not any spirit of compromise and commonweal, prevents hostilities from breaking out between Left and Right on a much larger scale.

Real democratic government is impossible under such circumstances. No one supposes that battles can be settled by asking rival armies to vote for the candidates of their choice. Democratic government of the sort familiar to American or British tradition can only exist when an overwhelming proportion of the people agree in all important matters as to how things should be done. When such a happy unanimity exists, parties may divide over minor issues, take their differences to the polls, and accept the result with good grace. In case of defeat, the minority can contentedly wait and hope for a future redress of the balance which will bring them to power. These conditions obviously do not exist in Greece. The issues and memories which divide Left from Right are too deeply fraught with emotion to permit either side ever to admit defeat until physically crushed by superior force.

It is conceivable that democratic organization and control

should prevail within the ranks of one or the other or both sides. But no stretch of the word will bridge the gap between them. Furthermore, the strain of battle operates to reduce or eliminate the democratic elements within the contending parties. To fight well, whether with guns or with words, requires unquestioning subordination to a unified command. Much of the peculiar strength of the Communist Party comes from its firm recognition of this principle. The Greek Communist Party, to be sure, holds elections within its ranks; but the elections are all rigged in advance so that only the men already chosen by the leaders of the party come to office. In case of serious quarrel between the leaders, higher Communist authority intervened in the past, and there is no reason to suppose it would not do so again. For, though the Comintern has been officially declared dead, there are in Greece unmistakable signs of its lively life after death.

The strain toward military subordination and unified control has asserted itself among the rightists also. Their organization and discipline are far less developed, and the rival ambitions of individual politicians have prevented any single party organization from achieving unquestioned leadership of the Right. The lack of strong party machines has been partly compensated for by the use of the governmental administrative bureaucracy as a substitute. But up to date, the British and American Ambassadors have exercised an effective restraining hand on the extremists of the Right, who would like to deny all civil liberties to their Communist enemies, and use the police and Army to destroy the power of the Left.

If the strength of the Communists should increase until they seemed seriously to challenge the present power of the Right, a notable consolidation of rightist ranks would probably take place. In real or imagined emergency, rather than go under to the Communists, the men of the Right would try to establish a dictatorship such as the one Metaxas wielded

before the war; and would employ the full power of the police and Army to repress the threat from the Left. Such an event would prove highly embarrassing to the British and American Governments. Both have preferred a Center which does not exist; but between extremes have chosen to support the Right within certain limits. Should the Right, facing emergency, set up authoritarian government, the Western Powers would find themselves faced with the problem whether to support what would practically be a Fascist state. Only if communism fades away and becomes what it was before the war, an irritant but not a threat, will the probability of a dictatorship from the Right disappear.

What then will bring a weakening of the extremes and the strengthening of moderate opinion? Moral education can perhaps do something, but apostles of the golden mean are hard to find in Greece today, and their influence does not promise to be great until their numbers and conviction increase. If economic conditions could be so improved that every Greek was able to live as well as he had been brought up to expect, it seems probable that the excessive concern and fanaticism which the people now manifest for political parties and programs would diminish. Circumstances might then become propitious for the gradual emergence of a community of ideas that would embrace almost the whole population, and permit genuine democratic government to be established. Economic prosperity could not guarantee stable and popular government, but it would certainly make its achievement more probable.

Unfortunately for Greece, the country's economic life is deeply distressed, and will almost surely remain so for years to come. The fundamental problem is overpopulation. For generations, the Greek peasant family has produced a large surplus of children. In the past, periodic outbreaks of disease, war and famine kept the population down. Greece after the War of Independence, and Macedonia after the Balkan Wars,

had both been half depopulated by these means, and a generation or more was required to restore full occupancy of the land.

Today the land of Greece is fully occupied. Greece is one of the most densely inhabited countries of Europe in proportion to the extent of arable soil. Only Belgium and Great Britain have a greater concentration of population per cultivated acre, and they depend on a highly developed industry to support their people. In Greece, the land is generally poor. Most hill slopes are denuded of soil so that they can be used only as pasture for sheep and goats. Every patch of tillable earth is exploited. Many peasant families wring a hard living from holdings of only three or four acres, and depend on the high value of specialized crops such as tobacco or currants to buy the food they require. Any interruption of export trade brings immediate disaster to them, unless charity such as has been provided by the Red Cross or UNRRA becomes available.

Substantial improvements in agricultural techniques are possible, especially through the more abundant use of fertilizers. But improvements generally require capital which most peasants do not have. A stubborn conservatism among them hinders innovation of any kind, especially when recommended to them by city-trained (and therefore suspect) agricultural agents. For these reasons, only small increases in agricultural production can be expected in Greece during coming years.

After 1900, when Greece faced a similar population crisis, the pressure was relieved by emigration, expansion into Macedonia and industrial development at home. Today emigration is almost closed except to men of considerable wealth who can satisfy the requirements for admission to South American countries, South Africa, etc. The United States, which absorbed most of the earlier emigration, has almost closed its doors. The quota for Greece is only a little

over three hundred per year. Applications for more than ten years to come are on file at the American Embassy.

If Americans seriously want to help Greece, the simplest and most effective way to do so would be to enlarge this small quota. Greeks have proved themselves good Americans, and the United States could easily absorb several thousand immigrants from Greece each year. Thereby, the population pressure in Greece would be partially relieved, and the United States would acquire useful, energetic citizens. Such a policy would be better and cheaper than millions of dollars in loans. It would bring gain to both nations, loss to neither.

Other means for bringing a satisfactory living to the surplus population are not very hopeful. Any important territorial expansion of the Greek state seems hardly probable. Greek territorial demands are extensive and unabashed, but met with almost no success at the Peace Conference. Furthermore, with the exception of parts of European Turkey, the land which adjoins Greece is already thickly populated with Bulgars, Macedonians, and Albanians. There is no longer any half-empty land into which Greece might expand as was the case after World War I.

The only peaceful alternative is absorption of the surplus population by a vast development of industry. Greek industry, however, labors under heavy handicaps. The country has no abundant source of power, and many factories now depend on imported coal. This means higher costs. In the past the disadvantage was counterbalanced by tariff protection and near-starvation wages. Greece has never had any important industrial exports. There seems small likelihood of any being soon created. Raw materials are not abundant, and, save for some bauxite deposits, no important mineral resources exist in the country. Other countries have equally good bauxite, and Greece lacks the power with which to refine aluminum from the ore economically. Some cotton is raised which provides a part of the raw materials for the textile factories of

Greece. Save for that, almost everything has to be bought abroad and brought into the country for manufacture. This inevitably means production costs above those of more favored parts of the world, and implies small chance for Greek industry ever to compete on the world market.

It is conceivable that enormous expenditures of capital could nevertheless create a substantial industrial plant in Greece able to supply almost all the industrial products required by the country itself. This would absorb some, but by no means all of the surplus population. A network of dams could be constructed, which would permit flood control, help irrigation, and produce electric power. But the flow of all streams is markedly seasonal, and all but a few dry up completely in the summer. Power production would consequently have to follow the seasonal fluctuation, or else run at a very low level the year round using water impounded by the dams to tide over the dry months. The great initial cost of the dams would make electricity expensive, and it would almost certainly be uneconomic in competition with other countries. Although such a program would undoubtedly bring great improvement to Greece, it would fall short of solving the basic population question. There are, nevertheless, a few sites, especially in western Greece, where valuable and economically practicable dams could be constructed to the great advantage of the country.

Physical difficulties are only a part of the industrial impasse which confronts Greece. The whole social pattern in the cities is disjointed, and there is no efficiency in it. The war, and the impact of EAM, largely succeeded in breaking down the peasant attitudes of mind which had persisted among most of the industrial workers of Greece prior to the war. Up to the present, the effect has been wholly negative. Old habits of work have been lost, but new ones have not been developed to take their place. Under the occupation, the Left succeeded in building up a magnificent machine for

industrial sabotage; it continues to operate under the royalist Government with almost equal success. In consequence, efficient and honest work in the factories is almost unheard of, and labor costs are doubled or sometimes trebled as compared with prewar times.

Equally, capitalists are afraid to risk anything in the unsettled times, and many individuals have sabotaged governmental efforts to improve industrial production by hoarding raw materials and refusing to make expenditures that are required to reopen factories.

There is little if any sense of commonweal. Workmen regard their employers as natural enemies; employers look upon their workmen as unruly, dishonest, greedy. The political paralysis of the country extends to its industrial relations. Labor unions are mostly controlled by Communists, and many workmen sympathize with the Left. Employers are stout conservatives almost to a man, and regard any concession to their workmen as a concession to communism. Peace and goodwill are obviously not to be found under such circumstances; even intelligent coöperation for the improvement of production hardly exists.

Before the war, Greek industrial efficiency was relatively good. Capitalists were daring and adventurous; workmen labored hard and long. Their miserable wages scarcely sufficed to buy more than the food they needed; but the smallness of their wages contributed to the cheapness of the product. Today, this efficiency seems irretrievably gone. By May 1946 industrial production in Athens and Pireus amounted to less than half the 1939 total, even with the advantage of free import of raw materials by UNRRA, which were issued to the factories at less than market cost.

The Greek foreign exchange balance was always precarious in prewar years. Remittances from emigrants to their families back home, and income from the merchant marine, almost, but not quite, covered the trade deficit. Remittances will in-

evitably decrease as the generation of emigrants passes from the scene, and this source of foreign exchange will gradually dry up unless large-scale fresh emigration becomes possible. About eighty per cent of the Greek merchant marine was sunk in the war, and reparations will only replace a small proportion of the lost tonnage. Furthermore, it seems probable that the low wages which made possible Greek success in international competition before the war, will lead to paralyzing labor troubles on Greek ships. If such in fact proves to be the case, it will be difficult indeed for Greece to build up again the merchant marine she had before the war.

To this accumulation of problems must be added the disaster of physical destruction during the war, which greatly reduced the capacity of the internal transport system, and cut into the industrial plant.

Most Greeks consider their only escape from the economic dilemma to be foreign loans. The United States and Britain have already made loans to Greece, although relatively small. Enormous sums would be necessary to build a self-sufficient economy in the country, and there seems almost no possibility that such sums could ever be repaid. Both America and Britain are prepared to subsidize the Greek economy to some extent in order to keep peace in the country, but it is doubtful whether their willingness will extend to large sums delivered over long years. Especially will this be true if strong-arm dictatorial government comes to be established in Greece.

It seems clear, then, that all Greeks must expect a lowered standard of living during the next few years. But many Greeks existed on the thin edge of starvation even before the war, and it is difficult to see how any great lowering of their income can take place without widespread social disturbance. There is no spirit of willingness to share the inevitable suffering. Each man is out for himself, and many Greeks are quite prepared to disregard laws designed to equalize the economic burden among all classes. Evasion of taxation is

common practice among the well-to-do; bribery of underpaid government officials is a normal way to secure special favors.

With such an economic base, Greek politics seems certain to continue embittered, and democratic government will scarcely prove viable. The strategic place Greece holds on the international scene adds still more to the difficulties that lie before the country. Tension between Russia and the Anglo-American Powers almost guarantees continuance of the Communist-Rightist struggle within Greece. Each of the domestic factions looks abroad for moral and physical support. Each promises eventual victory to its adherents on the strength of foreign help.

Greece has involuntarily come to the forefront in the postwar jockeying of the Great Powers for position in Europe. The northern frontier of Greece has come to be a part of the line separating Russia from the West; and it is crystal clear that the Russians would be glad to increase their zone of influence and bring Greece among the number of their client states. In the struggle for Greece, geography gives Russia an advantage, while history helps the Western Powers. The geographic advantage of proximity and a long land frontier needs no elaboration. Against it must be set the traditional affiliation of Greece with France and England, and the general Greek fear of Slavic inundation. The existence of the Communist threat, we have seen, forces Greece into dependence on Great Britain. Equally, the Russian danger drives the British to seek to maintain their power and influence in Greece.

In the world-wide strategic picture, this barren little country cannot of itself be considered highly important. Its value lies in its position. Communist success in Greece would bring Russian power and influence into the Eastern Mediterranean, and go a long way toward assuring the Russians of predominance in all of that troubled area. Neither the United States nor Great Britain is willing to accede passively to such

an increase in Russian power. It is for this reason that the British so high-handedly supported Papandreou in December 1944 and used their troops to combat EAM. It is largely for the same reason that Britain and the United States have hoped for economic and political stabilization in Greece, and have sent such large amounts of relief supplies to that country.

The task of stabilization is not yet accomplished, nor is the Communist threat dissolved. I have already said that support of the enemies of the Communists in Greece may possibly turn into support of dictatorial and violent government. If this should come to pass, the British and American Governments will find themselves in a difficult dilemma, unwilling to withdraw, and hand Greece over to the Communists and the Russians, yet unable with good conscience to support what will to all intents and purposes be a Fascist state. The Western Powers will undoubtedly bend every effort to prevent such a situation from arising. The British and American Ambassadors will do all they can to assure the maintenance of democratic and parliamentary forms even though the substance of government by consent will almost surely be unattainable. Diplomatic pressure supported by economic subvention on a sufficient scale would probably suffice to stave off dictatorship. The question is whether we will prove willing to pay the cost of our scruples; or, refusing to make uneconomic loans, and insisting on the sacred liberties of Western democracy, find that economic distress and organized Communist effort have made Greece ripe for Russia to pluck.

In Communist hands, Greece would suffer from most of the economic ills that beset the country today. Perhaps the energy and efficiency of the Communist organization would succeed in checking some of the sabotage that today comes from workmen and capitalists, and be able to put Greek factories more efficiently to work. But Russia is in no position to send much help to Greece, at least for the present; and

without foreign food, coal and manufactures, Greece would starve. The Greek economy is not like that of Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, self-sufficient within itself for the necessities of life. Greece depends on imports to live. For political reasons Russia might be willing to send wheat to Greece. Needing it for her own people, she might also let the Greeks starve, or solve the problem of surplus population by forming forced labor gangs for work in Russia.

In the world contest for power, the good or ill of a small state like Greece counts for little. Neither Great Britain nor Russia directs its policy toward the benefit of the Greeks. If Greece benefits, it is only incidentally; if Greece suffers, equally it is incidental. Yet the fate of Greece in very large part has come inescapably to depend on the remorseless action of the Russian millstone grinding heavily against the Anglo-American. It is a sad and anguishing position for a proud people.

The difficulties that face Greece may seem almost overwhelming. One does well to remember that Greeks have suffered many tribulations in the past and have survived them all. Poverty is no new thing among them, nor is internal dissension. The people are energetic, ingenious and clever, accustomed to living by their wits in a difficult world. After World War I, a million and a half refugees flooded the country, most of them bereft of all material possessions; yet, by a combination of foreign philanthropy and their own address, most of these refugees succeeded in making a living, and some even rose to easy circumstances. The surplus population that now throngs the towns and villages of Greece is much as was that refugee mass twenty-five years ago. There is no land in Macedonia today for them to settle, but perhaps they will nevertheless be able to contrive the means to live, and find a way to contribute their part to the productivity of the nation.

Even should the townsmen fail, and war and rapine be

called in to solve the population problem, the Greek peasantry remains. The peasants are hardy and industrious, able to survive the cataclysms of famine, war and pestilence. In the past, town life in Greece has often been nearly wiped out. One hundred and thirty years ago, Pireus was an empty harbor without even a single house by its shores, and Athens was only a small village of perhaps a thousand souls. Today the two cities number over a million inhabitants between them. Though they may again be brought low, the survival of the Greek people on the land will not thereby be prevented. The land and its tillers survive while cities rise and fall. If overpopulation is not relieved by emigration and peaceful economic development, it will bring its own solution by precipitating death-dealing violence, as has happened in the past. Yet the peasant community will still survive, and with it, something of the turbulent, proud, and civilizing Greek spirit.

Appendix:

Chronological Table

1453	Turks capture Constantinople. End of the Byzantine Empire.
1821-29	Greek War of Independence.
1833	Otto of Bavaria appointed King of the Hellenes.
1863	George I became King of the Hellenes.
1870	Bulgarian Church separated from the Greek Church. Great impetus to the rising spirit of Bulgar nationalism.
1878	Treaty of San Stefano created a Big Bulgaria, putting nearly the whole of Macedonia within the boundaries of the new state. It was modified in the same year at the Congress of Berlin, and Macedonia returned to Turkish sovereignty.
1881	District of Arta and part of Thessaly added to Greece.
1897	Greco-Turkish war. Inconclusive.
1899-1910	Chronic disturbances in Macedonia, with rival guerrilla bands and organized propaganda striving to advance the cause of Greek, Bulgar and Serbian nationalism among the local inhabitants.
1908	Young Turk Revolution promised longer life to Turkey than the Christian states of the Balkans had hoped. Venizelos distinguished himself in Cretan insurrection.
1909	Military league made coup d'état in Athens, invited Venizelos to come to Greece.
1910	Venizelos became Prime Minister for first time.
1912	First Balkan War. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria attacked Turkey and drove Turks almost entirely out of Europe.
1913	King George I assassinated. His son Constantine succeeded to Greek throne. Outbreak of Second Balkan

- War, Bulgaria fighting against Greece and Serbia over the division of the spoils in Macedonia.
- 1914 Outbreak of World War I. Great Britain annexed Cyprus. Bitter quarrel between King Constantine and Venizelos over Greek foreign policy.
- 1916 New elections returned slight Venizelos majority, but King Constantine refused to accept Venizelos as Prime Minister. Venizelos set up insurrectionary Government in Salonika.
- 1917 Venizelos returned to Athens. King Constantine forced into exile, succeeded by his second son Alexander.
- 1918 Armistice. Greek troops bivouacked within sight of Constantinople.
- 1919 Peace Conference at Paris. Venizelos won great concessions for Greece, including strip of Asia Minor along the Aegean, and Western Thrace. Treaty of Neuilly fixed Bulgarian peace terms, provided for a population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria and guaranteed Bulgaria an economic outlet on the Aegean.
- 1920 Mustapha Kemal refused to accept peace terms dictated by Allies for Turkey. King Alexander died and King Constantine recalled by popular acclaim.
- 1921 Greek offensive in Asia Minor.
- 1922 Turks threw back Greek armies in Asia Minor. Massacre in Smyrna. King Constantine abdicated and his elder son George II became King. Plastiras, Gonatas and Hadjikyriakos led revolt against royalist Government.
- 1923 Treaty of Lausanne made peace between Greece and Turkey. Greece gave up all claims to territory in Asia Minor, and exchange of populations prescribed. Corfu incident.
- 1924 Greece became a republic.
- 1925 General Pangalos established a dictatorship.
- 1926 Pangalos overthrown, republic restored.
- 1928-33 Venizelos Prime Minister again.
- 1933 Election gave majority to Popular Party (royalist). Plastiras attempted coup d'état without success. Went into exile in France.

- 1935 Second republican coup d'état put down after some days of fighting in Athens and Macedonia. Extensive purge of Greek Army, favoring royalists. King George called back by extensively falsified plebiscite.
- 1936 New elections resulted in almost even balance between royalists and republicans in Chamber of Deputies. General John Metaxas acting Prime Minister, while Chamber of Deputies was prorogued. Metaxas persuaded King George to entrust him with dictatorial powers.
- 1939 Outbreak of World War II.
- 1940 Italy declared war on Greece, but after initial successes Italian troops were driven back inside Albanian border.
- 1941 British troops land in Greece but were too weak to oppose German invasion. Greek Army of Epirus surrendered, General Tsolakoglu became quisling Prime Minister while King George and Cabinet, headed by Tsouderos, fled to Cairo. Famine in Greece, winter 1941-1942.
- 1942 Resistance organizations began to form in Greece, the chief being EAM and its army, ELAS; EDES less powerful, centered in western Greece under Napoleon Zervas' leadership. Destruction of Gorgopotamos Bridge marked arrival of British sabotage teams in Greece, first important act of resistance.
- 1943 Rapid growth of guerilla armies. British worked to unite all guerilla forces. General guerilla charter, July, established subordination of Greek guerillas to Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean. Italian surrender strengthened ELAS. Outbreak of large-scale civil war between ELAS and EDES. Estrangement of British from ELAS.
- 1944 Plaka Bridge agreement ended civil war between guerillas (February). Establishment of ELAS Reserve in towns. Provisional Government of the Mountains challenged the Exile Government's legality. Mutiny in Middle East (April). Efforts at unity. Lebanon Conference (May). Papandreou, Prime Minister; EAM agreed to join the Exile Government (August). Government transferred to Italy (Septem-

- ber). Caserta Agreement. Government returned to Athens (October). Quarrels between Left and Right. EAM ministers resigned (2 December). Demonstration led to bloodshed (3 December). Outbreak of civil war, with British supporting the Right. Churchill flew to Athens in effort to end fighting.
- 1945 Archbishop Damaskinos appointed Regent (1 January). Plastiras became Prime Minister. ELAS signed truce. Varkiza Agreement ended civil war (February). Dissolution of ELAS. National Guard took over control of provinces. Plastiras resigned (April), succeeded by Voulgaris, who resigned in October. Impasse. Regent Prime Minister for few days, succeeded by Kanellopoulos (October), and Sofoulis (November). Preparations for elections.
- 1946 Elections March 31 returned royalist majority. Tsaldaris became Prime Minister. Revision of election registers. Plebiscite (1 September) resulted in recall of King George. King returned to Athens (28 September).

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